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Abstract
A field survey of micro-enterprises was designed and analyzed to assess the impact and
social costs and benefits of micro-credit programmes. The survey was administered to a
group of the smallest and youngest Honduran micro-enterprises provided loans by a
Christian micro-finance. organisation, the Institute for Honduran Development (IDH). The
survey was also administered to a control group of micro-enterprises which did not
receive loans but with similar characteristics to those that did. The use of a control group
circumvents several difficult impediments encountered in rigorous impact assessment
research and in social cost benefit analysis. The approach employed in this research
thereby constitutes a methodological advance in this field. The research does not
distinguish between lending and non-lending support services provided by IDH. Statistical
techniques are used to analyze the data and the combined provision of lending and non-
lending assistance is found to significantly increase income. Social cost benefit analysis
demonstrates that the benefits far exceeded the costs of administering the programme.
The results suggest that micro-credit assistance to the smallest and youngest micro-
enterprises can be an effective way of increasing incomes and reducing poverty.
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CHAPTERONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Growth and Development of Micro-finance
Since the early 1970s, there has been increased interest amongst
development practitioners and academics in the role of micro and small
enterprises in developing countries. New financial institutions have been
created to provide financial services to these micro and small-scale
enterprises. These new specialised financial institutions have generated
interest due to the failure of commercial banks and public credit
institutions to effectively serve small-scale clients.
Surveys in several countries discovered an unexpectedly large informal
economy and a significant proportion of the workforce working in small and
micro-enterprises (Fisseha and McPherson 1991 , Grant 1991, Mead,
Fisseha and McPherson 1991). Although there does not seem to be a
commonly accepted definition of small enterprise, most of the literature
classifies an enterprise as small if it has less then either 25 or 50
employees (Nqwire 1995, Webster 1991 ).' Within the small enterprise
sector, there is a micro-enterprise sub-sector of firms with five or less
employees. In most developing countries, micro-enterprises are not legally
registered and they operate in the informal economy.
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, nation-wide surveys from a number of
developing countries indicate a high proportion of micro-enterprises. In
most countries, 90 percent of the enterprises have less than five
employees and 75 percent have no more than one employee in addition to
the proprietor. Information on productivity and returns by size from
several developing countries (Liedholm and Mead 1987) indicate that the
reason that one or two person firms stay small is not because they are
satisfied with profit levels. Research indicates that the average net return
per hour of the proprietor's labour in one and two person enterprises is
less than the unskilled shadow wage and between 10 percent and 50
percent of the average return on the proprietor's labour for firms with
three to five employees (Liedholm and Mead 1987). Since returns appear
to vary directly with number of employees, owners of one and two person
firms are the poorest group in the small enterprise sector.
There is research in' both industrialised and developing countries which
shows that business failure rates vary inversely with firm size (Biggs 1986,
1 '
The number of employees is the most common indicator of size used in enterprise classification schemes
(Nqwire 1995).
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Evans 1987a, Evans 1987b, Hymer and Pashigian 1962). There are other
research models which show that firm age is also a significant variable in
enterprise survival or failure (Bates 1990, Evans 1987a, Evans 1987b,
Mansfield 1962). If. firm size is held constant, these models predict that
younger firms have higher failure rates. These firm age models are
primarily based on research from industrialised countries and there is no
comparable body of empirical research from developing countries.
There is also evidence from both industrialised and developing countries
that formal financial institutions avoid dealing with the smallest firms
because of the higher risks, higher costs and lesser potential growth
(Anderson 1982, Little 1987, Schmitz 1982, Strassman 1987).
Prior to research on the urban informal sector which was published by the
International labour Organisation (llO) in the early and middle 1970s (llO
1972, Sethuraman 1976, Souza, Tokman 1976, Weeks 1975), most
development economists ignored the micro-enterprise sector because they
did not believe it had any potential to contribute to economic growth.
Micro-enterprises were viewed as income generating survival activities and
as transitional employment vehicles until "real jobs" could be found. The
very existenceof an informal sector was viewed as evidence of economic
inefficiency and underdevelopment (DeSoto 1989, Little 1982, Todaro
J 969). Some economists viewed the growth of the informal sector as part
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of the urbanisation trend from rural areas (Beinefeld and Godfrey 1975,
Bromley 1978, Todaro 1969). The new urban migrants often worked in
micro-enterprises in the informal sector until they could find wage jobs in
the formal economy. A United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) paper summarising research issues (Liedholm and
Mead 1991 :2) indicated that many economists
... have argued that micro-enterprises are a residual, made up of low
productivity activities that are destined to fade away as national
income increases. For those espousing this point of view, efforts to
promote micro-enterprises can be at best fruitless, and at worst a
serious waste of resources.
These negative views on the micro-enterprise sector are based on their
perceived lack of potential to contribute to economic growth or efficiency.
However, during the 1970s, many development organisations began to
experiment with programmes to assist micro-enterprises in developing
countries. These programmes were justified based on arguments in favour
of equity and employment creation. These direct assistance programmes
Usually combined loans and training: Assistance was often targeted at
specific groups of disadvantaged beneficiaries such as unemployed youth.
Services were normally subsidised on the presumption that clients could
not afford the costs. These assistance programmes often targeted micro-
enterprises in a limited geographic area having a high incidence of poverty.
An analysis of some of these early experimental programmes led observers
to conclude that micro-enterprises had a high demand for credit at market
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interest rates and that they had amazingly low loan default rates (Berger
1989, Meyer 1989, Remenyi 1991). Efforts to lower transaction costs and
collateral requirements led to widespread experimentation with group
credit schemes based on solidarity guarantee arrangements. The group
guarantee replaced traditional collateral as group peer pressure was alleged
to be very effective in ensuring high repayment rates. Under group loan
schemes, transaction costs of the lender are lower because of the
screening, monitoring and collection activities done by the groups
themselves. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which were
successful in providing credit to micro-enterprises began to undertake
large-scale national expansion. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and
Accion in Latin America began to attract significant donor interest and
media attention as they undertook rapid expansion using group solidarity
guarantee systems mainly targeted at poor women in villages and urban
areas.
By the middle 1980s, many NGOs, bilateral donors and multilateral
institutions were experimenting with programmes to assist micro-
enterprises in developing countries. Early proponents of interventions to
assist micro-enterprises argued that such assistance contributed to
development by increasing income levels, generating employment,
improving income distribution and psychologically empowering poor people.
Empowerment was viewed as increased self esteem resulting from the
5
discipline of loan repayment and confidence gained from successful self
employment. This process of empowerment was most evident in
programmes targeted at women and minority groups (Berger 1989, McKee
1989) who have historically faced discrimination and a lack of
opportunities.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, several micro-credit providers
grew into financially profitable financial institutions whose primary activity
was to provide credit and other financial services to poor micro-
entrepreneurs. The most visible of these organisations were Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh, Banco Sol in Bolivia, Ademi Bank in the Dominican Republic
and BRI in Indonesia. By 1990, Banco Sol and Ademi had more than 50,000
active clients and Grameen Bank and BRIwere both approaching one million
clients. By the early 1990s, micro-enterprise development institutions
began to be viewed as a specialized "industry" and donors and
practitioners started using the term "micro-finance" to describe the
increasing array of financial services being provided to poor micro-
entrepreneurs. Organisations which provide credit and other financial
services to micro-enterprises began to be called micro-finance institutions
(MFls) regardless of their legal registrations as banks, finance companies,
co-operatives, NGOs or other types of legal entities (Rhyne and Otero
1991 ).
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Throughout the 1990s, micro-finance 'best practices' have been focused
on issues of scale and sustainability. Scale involves outreach to large
numbers of clients. Sustainability is viewed as synonymous with
profitability. Financial sustainability is defined as charging clients interest
and fees which are high enough to cover all costs including loan losses,
cost of capital and inflation. The pressure to develop financially sustainable
micro-finance institutions has led to increased efficiencies and increased
use of group lending to lower unit costs. However, it has also led to the
reduction of non-financial services being provided to micro-entrepreneurs
as MFls have had to focus mostly on credit to be financially sustainable.
This credit only approach to micro-enterprise development has been called
"minimalist" (Malhotra 1992, Rhyne and Otero 1991). A minimalist
approach can be characterised as lending small amounts of working capital
to existing micro-enterprises (Martinez 1990). As discussed in Section
2.3.2, a minimalist approach usually involves excluding loans to new
enterprises deemed more risky and expensive to serve.
The number of MFls has grown rapidly throughout the 1990's as donors
and practitioners have extended the borders of micro-finance beyond
developing countries. The World Bank's CGAP (Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest) Micro-finance group (World Bank 1999) estimated that
there were between 3,000 and 5,000 MFls in operation at the end of
1999. However, these MFls only serve a total of about fifteen to twenty
7
million clients, which is about three or four percent of the 500 million
micro-enterprises in the world (Results International 1997). New MFls
have been started in Communist China and Vietnam, all post-communist
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and poor areas of
industrialised countries in Western Europe and North America. Micro-
finance initiatives have also been created to help countries recover from
destructive events such as natural disasters and civil wars.
In 1997, the NGOResults International initiated a global micro-credit
movement by organising the Micro-Credit Summit. The Micro-Credit
Summit brought together practitioners, donors, government officials,
business leaders and academics in an effort to unite people around the
goal of reaching 100 million of the world's poorest families with micro-
loans by 2005. This goal requires dramatic growth as the estimated
number of people with micro-loans in 1999 was only about fifteen to
twenty million (World Bank 1999). Since the global Micro-Credit Summit
kick-off event in 1997, Results International has organised annual regional
events which continue to generate publicity and awareness for the micro-
credit movement.
A number of thoughtful development practitioners, economists and
academics have raised concerns about micro-finance as a development
tool. Rogaly (1996) labeled the focus on scale and sustainability as
/
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'micro-finance evangelism' and he questioned the ability of these loans to
really help poor people. His views were based on a review of various
programme assessments which indicated that:
..... if agencies are serious about using the genuine advances in the
design of financial services in reducing poverty, they must be more
modest in their ambitions. While financial sustainability of service
providers is an important means, it should not be seen as an end in
itself. When this happens, there is an excessive focus on scale,
which increases the danger that institutions become increasingly
self-serving. Further, there is less incentive for donors to examine
specific design features or impact on beneficiaries (Rogaly
1996:110).
He concludes that "micro-finance cannot be assumed to reduce poverty
because it achieves a high level of outreach or almost perfect repayment
rates" (Rogaly 1996: 110). In addition to Rogaly, there are other critics
who question the blind devotion to scale and sustainability promoted by
micro-finance best practices (Copestake 1995, Montgomery 1995).
M-ontgomery (1995) is particularly concerned with the social cost of peer
group pressure which can erode mutual trust and increase the likelihood of
excluding the poorest people. Copestake (1995:264) doubts whether we
can "be sure that improved access to self sustainable financial services will
always and automatically result in poverty reduction".
Is micro-finance just another development fad that is destined to fade
away when it becomes clear that micro-loans do not really help poor
people? The answer may be approached by using traditional economic
. tools of assessment and social cost benefit analysis. These tools could
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help to determine whether borrowers are increasing their incomes and well
being as a result of micro-finance. However, in reviewing the literature over
the last 30 years, there is a surprising absence of impact assessment and
social cost benefit analysis being applied to micro-finance. USAID, the
largest bilateral donor to micro-finance programmes, published research
priorities in 1990 for its new Gemini micro-finance project and noted that:
... at this point in the micro-enterprise field there is no agreed upon
approach to impact evaluation or even monitoring. The premise
that assistance to micro-entrepreneurs is a good way to spend
development dollars needs to be tested (Liedholm and Mead
1991 :4).
James Boomgard, the Director of the Gemini Research project for USAID
from 1990 to 1994, viewed the micro-enterprise development field as
being in a "development impact crisis" (Boomgard 1991). This view was
based on the poor quality of impact assessment he had observed and
-
reviewed .: "When you combine bad answers and bad questions, the odds
of getting anything good are Lilliputian" (Boomgard 1991 :3). He also
discussed the obstacles to accurate data collection from micro-enterprises
and the lack of impact evaluation models and tools. In this regard he
stated "that it is difficult to perform microsurgery with a chain saw"
(Boomgard 1991 :3).
Many of the references to impact assessment within the micro-finance
literature focus on measurement problems and obstacles. These issues are
summarised in Section 3.2. As a. result of these problems, many
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practitioners and donors have argued that rigorous impact assessment is
irrelevant and the costs of impact assessment cannot be justified. This
view is often set forth by proponents of minimalist micro-finance. They use
a market demand oriented argument to claim that micro-finance must be
having a positive impact because poor clients will only take loans at
prevailing interest rates being offered if, on balance, they can earn a rate
of return in excess of the cost of capital (Rogaly 1996). Therefore, the
loans must be having a positive impact or there would not be demand for
them. Under this minimalist view, the key issues are outreach to the
largest number of clients to maximise total impact and the financial
sustainability of the micro-finance institution.
Arguments to support the impracticality of impact assessment are
summarised by Marsell-Carstens (1995). She argues that impact
assessment is generally not useful for the following reasons:
* Respondents may be interested in giving false information if loans
have been used for a purpose other than the stipulated one;
* establishing a causal relationship to the actual loans in question
involves knowledge of all the beneficiaries' sources and uses of funds; and
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* it is difficult to establish what would have happened if the loan
had not been made.
However, Rogaly (1996: 103) is critical that "traditional impact
assessment, which measures changes in incomes or well being has become
discredited within micro-finance". He questions continued investment in
micro-finance unless there is clear evidence of poverty reduction and
development.
This study assesses the practice of impact assessment within the micro-
finance field. It examines whether rigorous impact assessment using social
cost benefit analysis and other statistical tools can lead to the discovery
of important information about how micro-loans affect poor people and
Whether micro-finance can help to reduce poverty. As discussed in Section
1.2, this study also attempts to contribute new information about the
impact of micro-finance programmes and new methodological approaches
to the practice of impact assessment within micro-finance.
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1.2 Aims and Relevance of the Study
Credit programmes to assist micro-enterprises are often classified as being
involved in either enterprise formation, enterprise expansion, or enterprise
graduation (Lieberson 1989, Martinez 1990). Most successful MFls have
focused on credit for enterprise expansion. The market for enterprise
expansion loans permits outreach to a largeZ number of clients via short-
term loans primarily used for working capital. The focus on enterprise
expansion loans has become a micro-finance industry best practice
because it is perceived as the best way to build a financially sustainable
MFI. Enterprise expansion loans minimise risk and maximise profitability for
the lender. This has been termed the minimalist approach to micro-finance
(Rhyne and Otero 1991).
Most MFls perceive loans for enterprise formation as risky and costly. As a
result, many MFls simply do not make any loans for enterprise formation.
However, people who need loans to start a .business are usually poorer
than those who already have an existing micro-enterprise (Lassen 1991).
There is little specific research within the micro-enterprise literature on the
growth and dynamics of the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises. This
.study aims to develop an understanding of the direct impact of enterprise
2 The Micro Banking Bulletin (World Bank 2001) defines a Latin American MFI as large if it has a loan
portfolio of more than $10 million outstanding to more than 20,000 clients.
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formation loans provided to such enterprises. This is done by examining
the direct impact of individual enterprise formation loans made by IOH in
Honduras from 1989 to 1992. Published micro-enterprise research which
specifically examines micro-enterprise formation loans has not been
identified to date (2002).
Instituto de Desenvolvimento Humano (IOH) in Honduras was selected for
this field research because it made a variety of enterprise expansion,
enterprise formation, and enterprise graduation loans in the late 1980s.
IOHmade individual loans to people who were starting new micro-
enterprises which is the intended focus of this study. Micro-finance
organisations who were using a minimalist approach did not generally make
individual enterprise formation loans. IOH has been a pioneering micro-
finance institution since it started in 1979. It is part of the Opportunity
International Network of micro-finance institutions with which the
researcher has had a long-standing relationship. IOHwas willing to devote
the time and effort needed to gather information, for this study. It had
Worked with other researchers in the past (Kilby 1985, Reed and Befus
1992) and was willing to cooperate on this study. Honduras was also
selected because it has a large number of micro-enterprises operating in a
dYnamic informal economy as discussed in Section 4.2. Section 4.2
COntains comments regarding the applicability of the Honduran context to
other developing countries.
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There is little empirical evidence available regarding the impact of micro-
credit because of the difficulty in proving whether economic results such
as growth or employment creation are directly attributable to the
utilisation of loan capital. These attribution difficulties are evident in the
questions about causality in impact assessment raised by Marsell-Carstens
(1995). Since these concerns about causality exist in most ex-post facto
field research in the social sciences, control group methods have been built
into research designs (Kratwohl 1977). However, within micro-enterprise
research, much of the literature discusses the problems and obstacles
encountered in using control groups. These obstacles are discussed in
Section 3.2. Many impact assessment studies do not include control
groups because of the perceived high cost of gathering control group
information (Harper and Finnegan 1998).
In this study, a matching control group was developed using a relatively
simple and inexpensive door to door canvas? of the neighbourhood in
which each IOH client was located. The procedures used in identifying and
selecting this matching control group are described in Section 5.1.4. These
procedures aimed to ensure a control group comprised of the smallest and
youngest micro-enterprises which were similar to the IOH research
subjects. However, since control group members had never received credit
from a formal-institution, the provision of credit by IOH is the primary
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difference between the two groups. A constructed matching control group
selected via a door to door canvass is proposed as a methodological
contribution towards advancing the validity of micro-enterprise impact
research.
Various statistical tests were done with the survey data from the IOH
clients and the control group. Initially, these tests consisted primarily of t
tests of differences in group means and differences in group proportions.
These t tests aimed to test hypotheses about whether the enterprise
formation loans provided by IOH had a statistically significant impact in the
growth of the micro-enterprises analysed. The indicators tested in this
manner included mean value added, employment creation, and
productivity. Productivity was defined as the average return per hour of
family labour and was tested by replicating a model of productivity
measurement previously used by Liedholm and Mead Cl 987). Hulme and
Mosley Cl 996) discuss the impact of loans in reducing poverty by
developing an impact possibility frontier model and a poverty gap model.
These models are applied to the IOH data gathered in this study to analyze
whether the IOH enterprise formation loans contributed to a reduction in
poverty in Section 6.5.
Although the research design provided that the IOH subjects and control
group were similarly the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises, it did
16
not attempt to control for differences in personal or enterprise variables.
This study aimed to apply multiple regression analysis to fourteen pre-
defined variables to determine if any were more significant than an
enterprise formation loan in explaining differences in enterprise
performance or if any confounded the relationship between value-added
and the loan from IOH. It is possible that some of these independent
variables such as age, gender, religion, formal education, previous
experience, and type of business could have been more significant than
the enterprise formation loan by IOH in explaining differences in enterprise
results. Micro-enterprise research has seldom tested these kinds of
personal variables.
While the primary aim of this study was to research whether micro-
enterprise formation loans had a direct impact in enterprise growth or
poverty reduction, it is worthwhile to ask whether the costs incurred
justified the impacts oberved. The economic development literature
includes a well developed analytical framework called social cost benefit
analysis which provides tools to evaluate whether -and on what
assumptions- the benefits to a country from a specific project justify the
costs incurred. Empirical research on the impact of micro-finance has used
certain aspects of the theory of social cost benefit analysis. However,
many micro-enterprise researchers have commented that measurement
problems prevented them from applying various aspects of social cost
17
benefit analysis. Within micro-enterprise research, it seems that Peter Kilby
(1985) is one of the few who have attempted a comprehensive application
of social cost benefit analysis in assessing the impact of micro-credit. As
summarised in Section 3.3, Kilby applied social cost benefit analysis in
studying the impact of loans made by six micro-finance institutions
(including IOH) from data available in the early 1980's. Kilby carefully
explains various conventions and assumptions he had to make and he
suggests alternative approaches. Although Kilby comments on the general
desirability of using a control group, he was not able to obtain control
group data in his research.
This study aims to apply social cost benefit analysis in studying the impact
of the IOH enterprise formation loans by replicating the research done by
Kilby (1985). There does not appear to be any prior research applying
social cost benefit analysis specifically to the impact of micro-enterprise
formation loans. In replicating Kilby's approach, similar conventions and
assumptions were applied where possible. However, this research also aims
to expand upon Kilby's methodology (1985) by using the matching control
group data ..
Finally, since Kilby's study included IOH in the early 1980s, it is possible to
compare his results with the data generated from this research in the early
1990s. This comparison leads to various observations about how changes
18
in the strategy and goals of IDH affected its impact and social cost benefit
ratios over the intervening decade. This study provided an opportunity to
do a longitudinal comparison for IDH from data at two points in time which
were about ten years apart. This type of comparison has seldom been
possible in micro-finance research due to the relative youth of the micro-
finance 'industry' and the small volume of published empirical impact
research studies. -
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
Chapter One begins with an introduction to the growth and development
of the micro-finance industry during the 1980s and 1990s. The perceived
importance of micro-enterprises and the informal economy as a factor in
economic development grew throughout the 1980s as census data
revealed the large numbers of people working within the micro-enterprise
sector of developing countries. Programmes and organisations created to
provide loans to micro-enterprise have been growing as donor investment
has increased. Micro-finance institutions tend to focus on scale and
sustainability as a minimalist approach to micro-credit gained pre-eminence
in the 1990s. A minimalist approach to micro-finance has led to 'industry-
19
best practices' which emphasize expansion loans to existing micro-
enterprises because they are deemed to be the least risky and most
profitable. One consequence is that micro-finance institutions have tended
to exclude loans for micro-enterprise formation which are thought to be
more risky and expensive to service. As a result, some of the poorest
people who need credit to start self-employment are prevented from
accessing micro-loans. Also, the minimalist approach to micro-finance does
not encourage direct impact research at the micro-enterprise level. There
is a widespread view that loans are helping poor people or they would not
continue to demand them. Also, since it is hard to prove the direct impact
of micro-loans due to measurement problems, direct impact research
cannot be cost justified. As a result of these views, micro-finance research
in the 1990s has tended to focus on micro-finance institutions and
techniques employed to increase scale and sustainability, rather than on
the development impacts of credit provided to micro-enterprise clients.
The second part of Chapter One summarises the aims and relevance of this
study. The primary aim is to study the direct impact of enterprise
formation loans made to the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises. This
study aims also to contribute new tools and methodology to micro-
enterprise impact research by introducing a matching control group,
applying multiple regression analysis to the study of personal and
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enterprise variables and by expanding the application of social cost benefit
analysis within micro-enterprise impact research.
Chapter Two contains a review of relevant theoretical literature. This
begins with a review of the various efforts to define micro-enterprises and
the informal sector. There are disagreements between various writers and
there does not appear to be a set of commonly accepted definitions and
terminology. This section provides certain definitions and classifications
used in the remainder of the thesis. Based on these definitions, the
significance, changing perceptions, and justification for micro-enterprises in
various developing countries is then documented. Survey data from the
, 980s led economists to conclude that micro-enterprises were more
significant and involved more people than was previously believed.
However, many poor people seem trapped in the informal sector and they
cannot graduate to formal sector enterprises or formal sector wage paying
jobs. The informal sector is generally the poorest level of the economy in
terms of income and productivity. Can assistance to micro-enterprises lead
to economic growth and development?
Section 2.2 addresses this question by attempting to build a better
understanding of the micro-enterprise sector through the review of
theoretical literature which covers various models and theories of
economic development. This includes several general models of economic
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development, poverty assessment models, and models of
entrepreneurship. These theoretical models help to develop a better
understanding of both the potential benefits and limitations facing
attempts to provide assistance to the micro-enterprise sector. Since this
study is specifically concerned with people who are forming new micro-
enterprises, Section 2.2 closes by reviewing literature concerning the
smallest and youngest firms. Although much of this research is from
industrialised countries, it is also applicable in developing a better
understanding of the enterprise formation process within the micro-
enterprise sector of developing countries.
This leads to the third section of Chapter Two which reviews the literature
of the last 30 years on assistance provided to micro-enterprises. This
section reviews the historical development of such assistance and the
various classification schemes being used. This section reviews how a
minimalist approach to micro-finance has come to dominate the industry in
the 1990s. In contrast to the minimalist approach, also discussed are
holistic Christian approaches to micro-enterprise assistance. The fourth
section of Chapter 2 presents the Christian and Biblical motivation for such
a holistic approach.
Chapter Three reviews empirical research on the impact of assistance
provided to micro-enterprises. This starts with an overview of impact
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assessment issues within the micro-finance industry. The second section of
Chapter Three reviews the various issues and problems hindering the
progress of impact assessment within micro-finance. Much of the literature
on impact assessment appears to focus on these problems and explaining
why practitioners have chosen not to conduct rigorous impact
assessments or why impact assessments which have been conducted were
viewed as not very useful.
The third section of Chapter Three reviews the application of social cost
benefit analysis to micro-enterprise impact research. This reviews and
appraises the research methodology used by Peter Kilby Cl 985).
The fourth section of Chapter Three reviews literature on the impact of
assistance to micro-enterprise in reducing poverty. Section 3.4 analyses a
major cross-country research project conducted by Hulme and Mosley
Cl 996). This section also explains the impact possibility frontier and
poverty gap models developed by Hulme and Mosley; these models are
applied to the IDH data in this study as discussed in Chapters Six and Eight.
Since the field research was conducted in Honduras, Chapter Four
summarises the contextual situation. This includes the general macro-
economic situation in Honduras during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
conditions present in the micro-enterprise sector based on the work of
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other researchers, and the situation at IOH.The profile of IOHwas
developed by reviewing source documents, interviews and direct on-site
observation.
Chapter Five describes the research methodology used and the descriptive
information collected from the research subjects selected. The first
section of Chapter Five provides a detailed discussion of the research
design and procedures employed to obtain a matching control group. The
second and third sections of Chapter Five review personal and enterprise
descriptive information obtained from the field surveys of IOH clients and
the matching control group. Chapter Five concludes with comments and
observations about missing IOH clients and micro-enterprise graduation
into small scale firms in the formal sector.
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight explain the results of the various statistical
tests employed. Chapter Six summarises the results of statistical analyses
regarding the direct impact of micro-enterprise formation loans provided
by IOH. This is primarily based on t tests of differences in group means and
differences in group proportions between IOH clients and the matching
Control group. The first section explains the research design and the
statistical tests employed. The remaining sections of Chapter Six
. sUmmarise statistical results in the following areas:
-
6.2 Revenue, income and income growth
/
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6.3 Productivity
6.4 Employment and employment creation
6.5 Poverty reduction
It should be noted that productivity (Section 6.3) was measured using the
average return per hour of family labour. This was derived by replicating
previous research conducted by Liedholm and Mead (1987) in several
developing countries including Honduras. Poverty reduction measurements
(Section 6.5) were estimated using the poverty gap and impact possibility
frontier introduced by Hulme and Mosley (1996).
Although Chapter Six concludes that enterprise formation loans from IOH
were positively associated with increases in value added and productivity,
it is not clear whether other personal or enterprise variables might have
been as significant or more significant than the IOH loan in explaining these
differences in enterprise performance or whether these other variables
might have confounded the relationship between enterprise performance
and the IOH loan. Chapter Seven summarises attempts to test for these
other independent variables using multiple linear regression analysis. The
first section of Chapter Seven discusses the analytical techniques
employed. This included the examination of seven personal variables and
four enterprise variables. The remainder of Chapter Seven discusses results
obtained from the multiple linear regression analyses and the limitations of
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these results. In general, it appears that there were two variables
significant in explaining differences in economic performance. First, an IOH
loan was positively associated with economic performance confirming the
results of Chapter Six. The other significant variable was whether the
proprietor had previously owned a business. This variable was negatively
correlated with economic performance. Chapter Seven concludes with
comments on the problem of testing causality in micro-enterprise field
research.
Chapter Eight provides a detailed explanation of procedures used and
results obtained in applying social cost benefit analysis to the enterprise
formation loans made by IOH. This was done by replicating the procedures,
conventions and assumptions used by Peter Kilby (1985). The research
done byKilby is the only comprehensive application of social cost benefit
analysis in the measurement of micro-finance impact. Chapter Eight
explains how this study extends the work of Kilby. by applying control
group information which was not possible during Kilby's research. The use
of control group data provides significantly different and more accurate
results than would have been achieved if only the IOH research subjects
had been examined. This supports the conclusion that control group
information is essential to .the effective use of social cost benefit analysis
in micro-finance impact research. Chapter Eight concludes with a critique
of the methodology used.
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Chapter Nine provides the final summary and conclusions. The first two
sections of Chapter Nine summarise conclusions with respect to the direct
impact of IOH enterprise formation loans and to the role of personal and
enterprise variables. The third section of Chapter Nine provides concluding
remarks on the research methodology and the research tools used in this
study and the fourth section summarises future research issues and
priorities. Further research priorities include several policy initiatives,
including the need for the micro-finance 'industry' to allocate funds to
undertake more impact assessment as a critical tool in developing a better
understanding of client needs and how micro-finance can help to reduce
poverty. Also, further research and debate is needed to develop an agreed
set of micro-finance impact assessment best practices and to consider the
need for independent parties to review and audit impact assessments.
/
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CHAPTERTWO
REVIEWOF RELEVANT LITERATURE
2.1 Micro-enterprises and the Informal Sector
2.1.1 Definitions
Over the past thirty years, there has been significant research and
discussion on the role of micro-enterprises and the informal sector in
developing countries. According to Nubler (1996:4), there is no "agreed
definition of the so-called 'informal sector'." As discussed in Section 2.1.2,
Liedholm and Mead and their associates at Michigan State University
conducted extensive surveys of small and micro-enterprises in many
developing countries. In providing a summary of this research, they
indicate that "there is no commonly accepted definition of what
constitutes a micro or small enterprise" (Liedholm and Mead 1987: 2).
They indicate that a review of research conducted in 75 countries revealed
at least 50 different definitions (Liedholrn and Mead 1987).
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This section provides an overview of the issues in defining micro-
enterprises and the informal sector. Nqwire (1995) points out that the
concept of the 'informal sector' is essentially a designation of the legal
status of the enterprises making it up. It is commonly assumed that all
enterprises in the informal sector are not legally registered and do not pay
any income tax. However, Nqwire (1995) points out that the situation is
not so clear and simple as this common assumption. There are many forms
and variations of legal registration and tax payments and informal sector
enterprises may be affected by some of these. The degree to which
informal sector firms are effected by legal registration and tax issues
varies significantly between countries and between areas within a country,
especially between urban and rural areas. DeSoto (1989) also views the
informal sector as basically a legal concept and he documents the many
disadvantages and vulnerabilities facing those forced to work in the
informal sector.
Schmitz (1982) defined the informal sector according to the typical
characteristics of the enterprises operating within it. He views the informal
sector as being:
... characterized by ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family
ownership, small scale of operations.Tabour-intensive and adapted technology,
skills acquired outside the formal school system, and unregulated and
competitive markets (Schmitz 1982:430).
He describes the informal sector based on the internal and external
Constraints facing firms operating within it. Referring to the work of Kilby
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(1971), he views internal constraints as key elements lacking within the
enterprise owner, including (1) lack of motivation and drive, (2) lack of
organisational skills, and (3) lack of technical skills. With regard to
external constraints, Schmitz defines these as (1 ) exploitation and
interference by large enterprises and governments, and (2) lack of access
to resources, including credit, raw materials, information, technology, and
markets. As a result of these internal and external constraints, those
working in the informal sector are characterized by low productivity of
labour and they are forced to accept low wages arid often rely on unpaid
family labour (Schmitz 1982).
Some economists contrast the informal sector with the formal or modern
sector of an economy. In addition to a different legal status, the formal or
modern sector is distinguished by a far greater use of capital and
technology (Anderson 1982, Cortes, Berry and lshaq 1987, Lewis 1954,
and Schmitz 1982). The modern sector is more efficient and has higher
levels of productivity than the informal sector due to the availability of
capital and to the use of technology.
With regard to the definition of a micro-enterprise, there is also no single
commonly used definition (Liedholm and Mead 1987, Nqwire 1995). Most
writers seem to use the terms 'micro-enterprise' and 'informal sector'
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synonymously. Based on the discussions held at a major micro-enterprise
development conference as summarized by Levitsky (1988:5):
... the participants generally regarded the micro-enterprise sector as identical to
the informal sector. Most speakers did not see great purpose or benefit in a
prolonged discussion as to a suitable size definition to define a micro-enterprise.
They did agree that the term referred to very small income generating units,
owned and managed by entrepreneurs who worked in it themselves, from which
they derived most of their livelihood, which employ very few people, if any,
mainly relying on family members, and using very little capital.
Some researchers from the 1980s used the terms 'household' enterprise
(Anderson 1982) or 'cottage industry' (Cortes, Berry and Ishaq 1987)
rather than a micro-enterprise when describing those operating in the
informal sector.
For research classification purposes, a number of researchers have tried to
distinguish between small, medium, and large enterprises. Some
researchers have also noted a sub-group on the lower end of the small
enterprise scale called micro-enterprises. There is no commonly accepted
method of size classification and researchers have. generally adopted their
OWnclassification schemes. In classifying enterprises based on quantitative
criteria, most researchers have used either sales turnover, value of assets
Or number of employees.
Based on the literature review conducted for this research, it is apparent
that the number of employees is the most often used variable in enterprise
classification schemes. According to Cotes, Berry and Ishaq (1987:14):
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... in some contexts other variables may be a more appropriate measure of size
than employment, but the level of employment is the most easily and accurately
measurable variable; moreover, its frequent use in other countries permit a
greater number of useful comparisons.
For purposes of their research in Colombia, Cotes, Berry and Ishaq Cl 987)
used the following enterprise size classifications:
Cottage shop- 1 to 5 workers, including the owner
Small-6 to 49 workers
Medium-50 to 99 workers
Large- 100 or more workers
However, they clearly point out that their research excluded micro-level
firms with five or less workers.
According to Liedholm and Mead Cl 987:3), employment is almost always
used in enterprise size classification "because it is simple, relatively easy to
measure accurately, and a readily available indicator of size that can be
compared across countries." In their summary of work in fourteen
countries, Liedholm and Mead Cl 987) indicate that small firms were
defined as those with less than 50 employees and there was no lower limit.
They acknowledge that although the upper limit of 50 employees to be
classified as a small firm was arbitrarily chosen, this upper limit is
commonly used in other classification schemes and it is small enough to
exclude "most foreign-owned firms as well as most of those complex,
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specialized factories that have privileged access to capital and other
inputs" (Liedholm and Mead 1987:3). They also indicate that there is an
increasing interest in the potential of micro-enterprises generally defined
as having less than 10 workers: In many of their tables and analyses,
Liedholm and Mead (1987) treat micro-enterprises with less 10 workers as
a separate category from small enterprises with 10 to 49 workers. They
also point out that some researchers (Steel 1983) and Government
classification schemes (India) specifically exclude from the small enterprise
category those smallest enterprises at the lowest end of the size
spectrum. Steel (1983) argues that there must be some human or
physical capital entry barriers before a firm can be considered.
liedholm and Mead (1987) indicate that many governments had their own
classification schemes for the smallest enterprises based on employment
size as indicated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Government Classifications of the Smallest Enterprises
c.ountry Classification Name Number of Workers
COlombia
India
Indonesia
Philippines
,__
Household
Tiny
Handicraft
Cottage shop
Less than 5 workers
Less than 26 workers
Less than 5 workers
Less than 20 workers
Source: Liedholm and Mead 1987.
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Also, in reviewing the relevant literature, various researchers have
developed their own employment size definitions of the smallest
enterprises as indicated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Researchers Classifications of the Smallest Enterprises
Researcher Year Term Number of Workers
Hoselitz 1959 Dwarf Less than 5
Anderson 1982 Household Less than 5
Cortes, et al 1987 Cottage shop Less than 5
Liedholm and Mead 1987 Micro-enterprise Less than 10
Otero 1989 Micro-enterprise Less than 6
USAID 1991 Micro-enterprise Less than 10
Webster-World Bank 1991 Micro-enterprise Less than 10
Nubler 1996 Micropenterprise Less than 5
Although the number of workers is the most commonly used variable in
enterprise classification schemes, many researchers have pointed out
measurement issues and problems in using this variable. Liedholm and
Mead (1987:3) indicate that some of the limitations in using employment
as an enterprise classification variable include "the seasonality of labor,
unpaid family labor, and its relative inappropriateness as a measure when
employment promotion is a policy or program objective." Nqwire
(1995:52) indicates that "the employment size criterion is imprecise
because the employment variable itself is a troubled academic battlefield,
both as a concept as-well as a term of measurement." Henk (1990)
indicates that labour is not homogeneous and that most small enterprise-
research has ignored the special labour market situation experienced in
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small and micro-enterprises such as seasonality and unpaid family labour.
"It is usually assumed that a job created in a small enterprise is equivalent
to a job created in a large-scale, modern industrial enterprise, although
that is not generally the case" (Henk 1990:432).
Other researchers have used qualitative definitions of a micro-enterprise
based on how stakeholders benefit from it. Those who focus on a micro-
enterprise as being primarily a household level activity tend to stress its
potential to help with family survival (Berger 1989, Nubler 1996, Wiess
1988). Nubler (1996) views a household micro-enterprise as expanding
the 'survival territory'. "The household unit ensures the survival of all its
members by reallocating resources and labour between various activities"
(Nubler 1996:8). According to the survival territory concept, the aim of
micro-enterprise activity is not profit maximization, but to ensure the
survival of the individual and the family.
Peattie (1987:27) indicates that:
Micro-enterprise s constitute a way in which those at the bottom of the system
command and aggregate resources. They provide for those without educational
credentials, not the surety of upward mobility, but instead a setting in which
those with few status resources can have the prideful sense of being
'independent' .
For purposes of this research, the informal sector is defined as the sector
of the economy in which micro-enterprises and their stakeholders operate.
Micro-enterprises are defined as unregistered or minimally registered
/
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economic units with five or less full-time equivalent workers, including the
owner and all unpaid family labour. Micro-enterprise stakeholders are
defined as the owner(s), family members, employees, customers, and
suppliers of the micro-enterprise. In applying this definition, the focus of
this research is on urban and peri-urban household economic units. This
study did not include rural economic activities such as peasant farm
households or pastoral nomads. While an innovating peasant farmer could
certainly be considered to be an entrepreneur, the micro-finance literature
and research tends to exclude farming related activities in both theory and
practice. Therefore, the extensive literature on indigenous technical
knowledge or farmer-led research was considered to be outside the scope
this of study.
, 2.1.2 Development of Perceptions
Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on micro-enterprises in
relationship to economic development·theory. Section 2.3 classifies and
describes different approaches of providing assistance to micro-enterprises
operating in the informal sector of developing countries. Chapter Three
reviews the literature on efforts to measure the economic impact of
assistance provided to micro-enterprises. However, the question of
whether it is beneficial to provide assistance to micro-enterprises has been
an issue of debate amongst economists, policy makers, and donors for a
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number of years. This section provides an overview of how perceptions of
the informal sector and interventions to assist micro-enterprises have
changed and developed from the early 1950s to the early 1990s.
Prior to 1972, there were few references to the informal sector or micro-
enterprises in the literature of economic development. Lewis Cl 954)
presented a dualistic model of economic development inspiring economic
development theory and policy until the early 1970s. In his dualistic model,
there are two sectors of the economy called the 'traditional/agricultural'
sector and the 'modern/industrial' sector. The traditional/agricultural
sector provides an infinitely elastic supply of labour to the
modern/industrial sector at the prevailing wage rate. As investment
increases, labour will be transferred from traditional/agricultural activities
characterized by low productivity to the high productivity
modern/industrial sector. Lewis (1954) was mostly concerned about
increasing savings and investment to increase the speed at which labour
could be transferred to the modern/industrial sector. He viewed large
masses of impoverished people as a temporary problem.
Kuznets Cl 955, 1963) also viewed the problems of poverty and large
masses of impoverished groups as a necessary, but temporary
,phenomenon disappearing with the growth and development of the
.modern sector of the economy. Kuznets Cl 955, 1963) developed the
/
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'hypothesis of the inverted U' which argued that increasing income
inequality was necessary at the beginning of a country's industrialization,
but this trend would reverse at a later stage when the benefits of
economic growth were be more widely distributed via increasing demand
for labour in the industrialized sector.
According to Nubler's (1996:5) overview, these models:
... do not foresee people who were neither working in the agricultural sector nor
absorbed in the modern sector. The existence of a growing number of people
outside the traditional/agricultural sector and modern/industrial sector was
ignored both in theory and practice.
During the 1950's and 1960's, both international and national
development agencies allocated most of their assistance to trying to
expand the modern/industrial activities of the formal sector and largely
ignored any efforts to assist the informal sector.
Todaro (1969) tried to explain the growing number of informal sector
workers in the urban centres of developing countries with a model of 'rural-
urban' migration. Rural to urban migration is explained as a function of the
differentials between rural income and the income expected from
migration, which equals the modern sector urban wage multiplied by the
probability of obtaining a job in the city. Rural to urban migrants who are
unable to find employment in the modern sector will either seek casual and
part-time employment in the urban traditional sector or they will become
/ unemployed. The urban traditional sector was considered a residua! sector
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with low productivity and low income where those who could not obtain
paid jobs in the formal sector try to survive.
In addition to being largely ignored by economists, those in the informal
sector were often viewed negatively by the media and the general public.
In many countries, this led to harassment by the police and fostered a bias
of government policies against the informal sector. According to Sanyal
(1991 :8), urban "informal workers were depicted as potential
troublemakers, and they were blamed for creating slums, illegal shanty
towns and a culture of poverty which implied fatalistic attitudes and
discouragement." The ILO (1972:506) indicated that governments viewed
urban informal sector workers as "trying to survive through begging,
hawking and petty crime."
By the early 1970s, it was increasingly recognized that most developing
countries had been unable to productively employ its labour force in the
modern sector. A considerable part of the urban population made its living
in small-scale activities, most of which were unregistered and escaped
measurement in statistical surveys. This sector increasingly began to be
called the informal sector. In 1972, the ILO undertook a comprehensive
employment mission atthe request of the Government of Kenya. The
, report (ILO 1972) highlighted the urban informal sector and its role in the
, Kenyan economy, and it rejected the idea of the informal sector as a
/
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temporary phenomenon. The report identified the informal sector as having
the potential for growth and for employing an increasing number of
workers. It suggested a strategy to promote the informal sector that was
both growth oriented and poverty reduction oriented and included
measures to increase the income of the poor, to increase the demand for
informal sector products and to change Government policy towards the
informal sector.
ThislLO work in Kenya and other follow-up studies by the ILO (Sethuraman
1976) are often cited as being instrumental in changing perceptions about
the growth potential of the informal sector. Schmitz (1982) indicated that
the changing view of the informal sector and its potential for growth
largely grew out of the work of the ILO in Kenya in 1972. However, other
economists did not agree and expressed contrary views. According to
Bromley (1978: 1162):
The view of the urban informal sector which has been recently institutionalized
by the IlO emphasizes the growth potential of small, labour intensive businesses
and recommends major official assistance to the sector. The small businesses are
generally considered to be indep.endent, unorganized, almost unregulated, little
related to the authorities or big business, and essentially honest, legitimate and
entrepreneurial. This new style official view of the so called 'informal sector' may
be just as dangerous and impractical as the previous official ignorance and
neglect of the occupations which are now frequently classified together as the
informal sector.
Bromley (1978) and Sandbrook (1982) were concerned that micro-
enterprises in the informal sector would always be exploited by larger
businesses, governments and powerful groups in society and they would
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not be able to realize their growth potential without substantial policy and
systemic changes. Bromley (1978) and Sandbrook (1982) were also
concerned about a second level of exploitation, of informal sector workers
by owners of informal sector businesses.
During the early part of the 1980s, much of the debate was about
whether the informal sector had potential for expansion, growth and
development. Schmitz (1982) summarized this debate with a review of
whether small-scale producers in developing countries can expand or
whether they are up against constraints which stunt their growth. Schmitz
concluded that most views on constraints are either theoretically
inconsistent, or empirically unsubstantiated and that the issue is not
whether small enterprises have growth potential, but under what
conditions.
The development of small-scale production is not just an outcome of pressures
and constraints but also of opportunity and potential. The road to expansion
might be rough and hilly, but it is not black and impassable. The pressures
emphasized by those who warn about marginalization are real, but the conditions
which determine their pervasiveness vary and must be studied and specified.
Hence the issue is not whether small enterprises have growth and employment
potential but under what conditions. The task ahead is more difficult as the
relative importance of various factors need to be established (Schmitz
, 982:445).
Although the academic debate about the potential of the informal sector
continued, many experimental programmes to assist micro-enterprises
were conducted by international financial institutions, bilateral donors,
national governments, and private NGOs. According to Nubler (1996), the
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micro-enterprise sector attracted substantial attention during the 1980s
due to the poor performance of modern industry in creating jobs in the
1970s and the need to cope with economic structural adjustment
pressures in the 19"80s.
When structural adjustment and privatization became an important policy in the
1980s, the role of governments was to be reduced and the private sector to
play an increasing role in the economy. In this context, the enterprises operating
in the informal sector attracted particular attention from development agencies,
policy-makers, and researchers. At the same time, multilateral and bilateral
development agencies shifted substantial resources to micro-enterprise
development (Nubler 1996:11).
The debate over interventions to assist micro-enterprises may be
organized around the following four issues:
A. Inefficient markets and better allocation of resources
Market conditions in developing countries are very different from in a
developed competitive economy with well-integrated and efficient factor
and product markets. Anderson Cl 982) indicates that markets are
segmented and micro-enterprises lack access to know-how, skills, credit,
technology, inputs, and information. In comparing developing countries
with the markets of developed countries, Kilby Cl 988:224) justifies
intervention to assist micro-enterprises on the basis "it may well be that
ignorance-of present conditions and possibilities represents the dominant
constraint in indigenous entrepreneurial activity."
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The ILO (1991 :54) justifies interventions to assist micro-enterprises by
concluding "if the markets do not function and the institutions do not have
the capacity, one has no choice but to resort to project interventions."
B. Potential for Job Creation
The failure of the formal sector to create a sufficient number of jobs to
absorb the increasing labour force is a major justification to assist the
informal sector. According to the World Bank (1989), by 2020,
approximately 95 per cent of all African workers will be engaged in informal
activities, whose average contribution to GOPwill grow from under one half
to more than two thirds.
As documented in a summary of the country studies conducted by
Liedholm and Mead (1987:71), "virtually all studies indicate, for example,
that small manufacturing firms generate more employment per unit of
capital (i.e. are more labor intensive) than their larger-scale counterparts."
Liedholm and Mead and various colleagues at Michigan State University.
conducted extensive surveys of both small and micro-sized enterprises in a
number of developing countries between 1975 and 1990. In 1987,
information from surveys in 14 different countries was summarized and
provided valuable information on the significance of employment by small
and micro-sized manufacturing enterprises (Liedholm and Mead 1987).
44
These country surveys are often cited as a justification to assist micro-
enterprises to both create and sustain employment. Across the 14
countries summarized, approximately two thirds of all manufacturing
employment was in-enterprises with less than 10 workers. This ranged
from 35 percent in Jamaica to more than 80 percent in Ghana, Sierra
Leone, and Zambia. The authors found a negative correlation between per
capita income and the percentage of manufacturing workers employed by
enterprises with less than ten workers (Liedholm and Mead 1987). As per
capita income increases, a country has more savings and capital available
for investment and this leads to a reduction in the percentage of workers
in small scale manufacturing enterprises with less than 10 workers.
In reviewing the size distribution of manufacturing firms in these fourteen
developing countries, Liedholm and Mead (1987:21) indicate that "eighty-
five per cent or more of the firms in all of these countries employed fewer
than six persons."
Streeten (1991 :27) provides a number of arguments for assisting micro-
enterprises. With regard to job creation, he indicates that:
The labour force in low-income countries is likely to grow rapidly in the next
fifteen years, and neither agriculture nor the formal industrial sector is capable of
absorbing even a fraction of these additions, to say nothing of the large number
of already unemployed or underemployed people. The combination of population
growth, urbanisation, and recessions has swelled the informal sector, which
presents the only hope for jobs. .
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C. Poverty Reduction, Improved Income Distribution or Social Stability
Page and Steel (1984) indicate that assistance to micro-enterprises can
contribute to improving income distribution either through growth in the
number of workers and by raising productivity in the assisted enterprises.
Streeten (1 991 ) believes that assistance to micro-enterprises can improve
income distribution and improve social stability resulting in less possibility
for revolutions and violence. Streeten (1991 :27) adds that "by harnessing
the potential for micro-enterprises to generate income (and self-respect),
not only is efficient growth promoted but also poverty is reduced."
Pradhan (1989), Strassman (1987), and Tokman (1989) also believe that
properly planned direct assistance to micro-enterprises can reduce poverty
and improve income distribution.
D. Human Capital Formation
A number of authors (Farbman and Steel 1992, Harper and Shailendra
1988, Martinez 1990, Reed and Befus 1992) indicate that larger
enterprises in the formal sector often started as micro-enterprises and
another justification for assistance is to help in the process of human
capital formation by allowing entrepreneurs to gain experience.
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The growth of micro-enterprise development programmes during the
1980s led to increasing interest in the field and the first major conference
for practitioners was held in June 1988 in Washington DC, under the
sponsorship of the Pan-American Health Organization. Jacob Levitsky of
the World Bank was the moderator of the Conference and he summarised
the proceedings of the conference in a Summary Report (Levitsky 1988).
Most of the conference participants were very positive about the potential
impact of providing assistance to micro-enterprises. A number of the
conference presentations were later published as separate papers. These
papers show how the perceptions about micro-enterprises and the
potential for assistance to micro-enterprises were developing at the end of
the 1980s.
DeSoto's paper summarised his views on micro-enterprises and micro-
entrepreneurs from his research in Peru. This research was presented in his
book called "The Other Path" (DeSoto 1989). He praised the
entrepreneurial spirit of the micro-entrepreneur and identified them as the
'true indigenous entrepreneurs'. He saw substantial employment and
wealth generating possibilities for micro-enterprises if they could overcome
legal barriers, government interference, and bad laws. He proposed a
number of positive legal and policy interventions to promote economic
growth and efficiency in the informal sector.
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Tokman Cl 989) began to focus on the heterogeneity of micro-enterprises
and suggested that assistance should focus on those that have growth
potential. He distinguishes between 'viable' and 'vulnerable' sub-sectors of
micro-enterprises. Vulnerable micro-enterprises are defined as one person
businesses that work in highly competitive markets and have no expansion
potential. Viable micro-enterprises are usually businesses where economies
of scale are not significant and they are not attractive to larger
enterprises. Competition in these viable sub-sectors is weak and micro-
enterprises may be able to find niches that allow for expansion and
employment creation. According to Tokman Cl 989:1 7),
Contrary to the prevailing image of a decade ago to the effect that the informal
sector was of a homogeneous nature, it is clear that there are different
segments within the sector. If form of organization is taken as a main variable to
define an informal activity, a difference should be established between those
units using additional labor (whether paid or unpaid) and those representing
activities performed by only one person.
By the early 1990s, there was an increasing concern about the impact of
interventions to assist micro-enterprises. Two major summaries of
research issues about micro-enterprise raised significant questions whether
assistance to the informal sector would really lead to economic growth and
development. Henk indicates that:
... vulnerable groups emerge because an economic structure needs them to
emerge, and to believe that small-scale businesses can be turned into the engine
of growth, equality, and development is to ignore history. It has not happened. In
my opinion this is unlikely to happen given the fundamental disturbances in urban
labour markets related to long-run supply factors, especially demographic
pressures (Henk 1990:433).
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During the 1980s and early 1990s, USAID was among the largest donors
providing support for micro-enterprise development programmes. Michael
Farbman was the first Director of USAID's global micro-enterprise office
from 1986 to1993; In 1992, he published a paper on major research
issues and priorities. This paper concludes with a concern that assistance
to micro-enterprises would not lead to growth and development if markets
were not growing.
A contrary hypothesis is that assisting more people to enter business for
themselves only reduces incomes of those already in business and hence reduces
the chances for success and growth. Although it is difficult to gather the data
necessary to test this hypothesis, the question needs to be asked if the
economic benefit of micro-enterprise programs are to be assessed correctly
(Farbman and Steel 1992:32).
2.2 Micro-enterprises and Economic Development
2.2.1 General Development Models
In this section, the micro-enterprise is set in its general development
economics context. There is no consensus as to a precise definition of
development economics or the exact nature and priority of its aims.
Central themes recurring in most definitions include increases in a
country's real per capita income and some emphasis on equitable
distribution. Thus Meier writes:
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Economic development is defined as the process whereby the real per capita
income of a country increases over a long period of time - subject to the
stipulation that the number below an absolute poverty level does not increase,
and that the distribution of income does not become more unequal (Meier
1976:6).
Others (Little 1982) argue that no definition is possible, that it is best just
to describe the facts and address various issues individually as they arise.
Yet others (Todaro 2003) focus upon more qualitative aspects of human
existence such as life sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom from
servitude. Those who take an incomes based approach typically believe
that these more qualitative features of development involving also health,
life expectancy, literacy, and so on, follow in some natural way from
growth in per capita income. In this regard, micro-enterprise assistance
endeavours principally to enable increases in individuals' income; however,
the holistic approach to this assistance discussed in section 2.3.3
, endeavours also to directly contribute to certain of these more qualitative
ends .
. The period following the end of the second world-war saw tremendous
growth in the number and extent of development initiatives. The aim of
these was to enable poor nations to quickly reach the same levels of
economic growth and prosperity as the industrialised west. Some of the
fundamental theoretical models concerning economic growth are
presented below along with brief comments as to how the historical
. manifestations of such models fared over time.
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One early and important model concerned with economic growth is the
Harrod-Demar model, named after Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar, two
economists who separately, but concurrently, developed variants of it. In
the model, savings is equated with investment and so abstention from
current consumption allows for increases in capital. Capital in turn allows
for greater output. The model then relates two factors, the savings rate
and the capital-output ratio, to economic growth. The model can be
extended to allow for depreciation and population growth.
And capital was indeed the focus of the development initiatives of the
1950s and 1960s. It was believed that economic development in Third
World nations could be brought about by achieving in developing societies
the industrialisation that had taken place in the west. However, while
capital was an important factor in economic development, it was not
sufficient. Various necessary structural, institutional and attitudinal
conditions that had been in place Jn the west did not apply to many
developing countries. In these countries, there was often concentrated
political power and asset ownership; the work force was less educated;
developed transportation facilities often did not exist. In many countries,
these various structural barriers limited the amount of economic growth
that could be achieved.
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Lewis' theory of economic growth (Lewis 1955) was proposed to provide
a model as to how certain structural changes could come about. Lewis
proposed a dual economy which consists of a traditional rural subsistence
sector and a modern urban capitalist sector. Lewis argued that the
traditional sector is characterised by a labour surplus: labour can be
removed without loss of output (the physical marginal product of labour is
zero or near zero). In contrast with the traditional subsistence sector, the
modern sector can achieve economic growth by capital accumulation. As
rural-urban migration takes place, the labour surplus allows capitalist
entrepreneurs tremendous potential for profit, limited only by the supply
of capital. Lewis (1955:234) writes:
In the early stages of capitalist development an unlimited supply of labor is
available at a subsistence wage, if only because capitalist employment is small
relative to the total population, but even more so if the economy is
overpopulated, or if the population is growing rapidly. In such a situation,
practically the whole benefit of increases in productivity in the capitalist sector
goes into profits.
This permits industrial development with unlimited supply of labour, at
both sectors increase and the poor may benefit either by being drawn into
least until the surplus labour phase comes to an end. Eventually wages in
the modern sector or by a higher income in the traditional sector.
Indeed, perhaps attracted by the prospects of income growth offered by
urban industrialisation and/or propelled by rising rural poverty, massive .
rural-urban migration has taken place in this period following World War II.
.Arguably, the rural-urban migration was too extensive: there has been
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rapid growth in the urban supply of labour and the modest growth in the
modern sector has resulted in only relatively slow growth in the demand
for labour. The modern industrial sector is not large enough to absorb the
supply increase. Nevertheless, the migration continued despite rising
levels of urban unemployment. The Todaro migration model (Todaro
1969, Todaro 1970) attempts to explain this apparent paradox. In this
model, the decision to migrate depends upon the expected (weighted by
probabilities) urban-rural wage differential rather than the actual wage
differential. The decision to migrate thus depends upon the actual wage
differential and the probability of obtaining employment in the urban
sector. Migration rates in excess of urban job opportunity growth rates
are possible with sufficiently large urban-rural wage differentials.
Unemployment thus ensues and the urban unemployed spill over into what
is an informal sector; and it is within this informal sector that there is an
increase in the number of micro-enterprises.
Since Lewis' work, the concept of a labour surplus providing a potentially
unlimited supply of labour to the modern sector has been challenged.
Those who were taken to be the unemployed had to find some means of
economic activity in order to survive. Bienefeld and Godfrey (1975:6)
write:
To the surprise of some, the figures which emerged showed relatively modest
levels of unemployment in many Third World urban areas. In many parts of the
Third World, unemployment is a luxury few can afford. Nevertheless, it was
generally agreed that the finding of relatively low levels of unemployment did not
mean that a problem of unutilized labor did not exist.
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This of course also explains the rise of the informal sector. Various
concepts such as 'disguised unemployment' (Harberger 1971) have been
developed and extensions of Lewis' model have been made with these
revisions (e.g. Ray 1998).
Micro-finance also represents a new interest in the traditional sector of the
so-called dual economy: not as to how labour can better transfer from the
traditional sector to the modern sector, but concerning how to better
promote the production that continues to take place within the traditional
sector. Micro-finance thereby focuses on labour-intensive, rather than
capital-intensive, production. What, if any, help this can be in affecting a
country's long-run economic growth in unclear (Pack 1974).
During the 1960s and 1970s many countries pursued policies of import
substitution in order to protect domestic markets or in order to give them
time to develop. However, in most cases these policies sustained various
inefficiencies; imports were never adequately replaced by domestic
substitutes. During this time there was also extensive lending to many
LDCs. Interest rates gradually increased during the 1970s, especially after
the oil price shocks engineered by OPEC(Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries), and with inflation running relatively high in developed
countries, monetary policies were tightened and interest rates increased
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even further. Worldwide recession in the early 1980s caused a fall in
export prices and debt crisis in many LDCs (Least Developed Countries),
especially in Latin America, ensued. Debtor countries made substantial
cutbacks in investment and existing expenditures, including debt service,
were often made by a combination of debt finance (which raised internal
interest rates) and money creation which raised inflation. This led to
further problems including hyper-inflation, loss of efficiency, and increased
inequality.
Programmes of stabilization and structural adjustment were pursued in the
1980s in order to address the economic crises many of these countries
were facing. These programmes generally involved achieving a large
devaluation to bring domestic currency in line with international reality,
aiming to reduce budget deficits, and opening the economy to
international markets (Sachs 1989). The devaluation was undertaken in
order to expand exports but required also that inflation be brought under
control. By reducing budget deficits it was hoped that inflation would be
reduced or slowed down. Opening the economy to international markets
would perhaps eliminate inefficiencies and it was argued that an
international free-market economy leads to the best state of affairs for a
society. Nevertheless, many countries imposed further import restrictions,
.
and were supported in these, in order to achieve a trade surplus:
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The structural adjustment programmes were successful in achieving
certain of their objectives. However, the cost of these programmes was
quite high: the reduced public investment slowed down long-run capital
accumulation. Not only did real income decline, but unemployment
increased substantially and real wages fell in most countries (Edwards
1989). With lower public expenditures it became more and more difficult
for the state to meet the needs of health care, education and welfare of
its increasing poor. Voluntary agencies became increasingly aware of the
needs of the poor and micro-enterprise assistance programmes continued
to develop during this time.
The so called "new growth theories" attempt to explain persistent growth
and the dramatic disparities in economic performance across countries for
which previous models had been unable to account. These new theories
place emphasis on human capital (Barra 1991, Mankiw, Romer and Weil
1992) or technological progress (Romer 1990). These models make
economic growth a consequence of long-run equilibrium in which
technological progress or the development of human capital are seen as
endogenous. The models also allow for increasing returns to scale in
aggregate production and various externalities. Like previous models there
is emphasis on the importance of savings and capital investment; however
.
these new models explain how the potentially high rates of return on .
investment available in developing countries is offset by lower levels of
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investment in human capital, infrastructure, or research and development
(Barra 1990, Lucas 1988, Romer 1986). Because of various externalities,
free markets result in lower levels of investment in these latter areas than
is optimal. Governments can therefore improve the efficiency of resource
allocation by public spending in these areas. Although offering an
important extension to previous growth models, these new growth models
are often criticised as being of limited relevance to developing countries in
so far as they do not take into account the inadequate institutional
structures, and imperfect capital and goods markets often found in
developing countries. Furthermore, with their emphasis on long-run
equilibrium they neglect the short and medium state of affairs which
arguably are of great importance, especially as regards the poor, in
developing countries.
With the persistent failure of these development strategies, it is not hard
to see why, over time, micro-finance with its focus on quickly meeting the
immediate needs of the poor, has been believed to hold such promise.
Bigsten (1987:157) writes:
During the fifties and early sixties the general view among economists was that,
if growth was rapid, poverty and inequality could eventually be alleviated by the
natural course of change ... During the sixties, it became- increasingly clear that
the LDCs were characterized by a high degree of inequality and poverty, and the
seventies were therefore characterized by a search for development strategies,
of which income equalization and poverty alleviation were integral parts.
Micro-finance was one such effort in response to this search. By lending-
directly to poor individuals it seemed possible that poverty alleviation and
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some degree of income growth could be achieved before fundamental
economic shifts took place.
Perhaps of related significance concerning the importance of micro-finance
is Kuznets' hypothesis of the inverted U (Kuznets 1955, Kuznets 1963).
This hypothesis proposed that as per capita income increases, economic
progress is at first accompanied by increasing inequality,,and it is only
later, as the benefits of development permeate more widely, that the
inequalities begin to decline. It can thus take a long time before the
poorest individuals in society experience any increase in their relative
income share. Kuznets' hypothesis suggested that not only would the
poor have to wait until sustainable economic growth could be achieved
before experiencing any reduction in poverty but that they would have to
wait a sufficiently long period of time thereafter so that the benefits of
this growth could trickle down to them. Again, micro-finance seemingly
allowed for poverty alleviation long before what might otherwise be
possible.
Seen within an historical and theoretical context as outlined above, it is
easier to consider the role of the micro-enterprise and micro-enterprise
assistance within development economics. It is frequently noted
.
(Boomgard 1991, Farbman and Steel 1992, Liedholm and Mead 1989,·
Morduch 1999) that the evidence for the role of micro-finance assistance
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in poverty alleviation is mixed and very limited. This is discussed further in
Chapter 3. However, even the optimists do not conceive micro-finance as
being the final solution to economic growth. At best, it enables the
generation of additional income over certain periods of time and perhaps
has a minor trickle down effect. However, it rarely generates new jobs for
others (Liedholm 1991, Liedholm and Mead 1987, Malhotra 1992) and
there is little evidence of micro-enterprises 'graduating' to become modern
small scale firms (Meyer 1989, Stearns 1991). Micro-enterprises do not
provide the economics of scale and industrialisation which may be needed
for sustained long term growth.
The distinctive feature of economic growth is not that the little man is saving
and improving his productive capacity. This is a necessary and a desirable
feature; but the distinctive feature of growth is that a few persons, private
individuals, corporate bodies or government agencies are disposing of large sums
on costly project (Lewis 1955:265).
Nevertheless, evidence is provided in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 that forms of
micro-enterprise assistance do lead to substantial increases in
entrepreneurs' income and can thereby be useful in alleviating poverty. It
may be then that an intermediate view is justified which holds that:
although micro-finance perhaps has little potential impact on a country's
long-term economic growth, micro-finance services do have a role in
helping to alleviate poverty while economic growth is being achieved.
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2.2.2 Poverty Assessment Models
It is seldom disputed that poverty causes enormous pain and suffering.
Poverty prevents many from aCquiring the material necessities required for
survival. Poverty results in illiteracy, undernutrition, and ill health. These
limit the opportunities of the poor yet further. Poverty destroys
aspirations and hope. The removal of poverty is one of the fundamental
goals of economic development and it is often argued that the micro-
enterprise and micro-enterprise assistance can playa fundamental role in
this respect. In order to assess the role of the micro-enterprise and micro-
enterprise assistance in poverty reduction and how this assistance is best
structured in order to attain this end, it is important to understand how
poverty is measured. In this section we review various poverty
assessment models. Section 3.4 discusses empirical research relating to
the role of micro-enterprise assistance in poverty reduction. The issue is
taken up again in section 6.5 with regard to the micro-enterprise clients in
this study.
Poverty assessment models almost all employ the concept of a poverty
line. The poverty line is generally defined as the income needed to meet
basic material needs. Often this is taken to mean simply the income that
is sufficient to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet; when this level of
income is taken as the poverty line, it is frequently referred to as the
60
'absolute poverty line' so as to distinguish it from a 'relative poverty line';
the latter often being employed for poverty measurement in developed
countries in which poverty is measured relative to the prevailing socio-
economic conditions and set according to some level of acceptable
participation in society. More conservatively, the poverty line is
sometimes set to include also basic shelter and clothing. Greeley
Cl 994:54) notes:
The precise selection of a line that covers material needs is, within some small
range, a matter of convenience in a matter about which there is no basis for
great loyalty to any particular value. ~t involves an empirically-informed value
judgement designed to reflect the income need for meeting basic material needs.
There is necessarily some degree of error for any specific household but since
the main use of poverty lines is comparative analysis over time or between
groups of households, great precision in setting the line is less important than
consistent application.
In any case, the poverty line is ultimately set at a particular income level
and employed by the various measurements of poverty described below.
The simplest poverty measure is that of the head count or head count
ratio. The former is simply the number of people in any given country or
region who fall below the poverty line and the latter is the same number
but divided by the total population in that country or region. The
measures are widely used but not entirely adequate because they fail to
capture the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line. This
can be particularly problematic for policy measures undertaken to reduce
poverty in so far as they may target those who are very close to the
poverty line as this will be the easiest way to reduce the head count of
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those in poverty. Such an approach might well ignore those groups who
are furthest below from the poverty line and most in need.
Poverty gap models remedy this short-coming. The poverty gap measures
the total amount of income necessary to raise everyone who is below the
poverty line up to that line. Such a calculation is able to capture the
extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line. The figure is often
expressed as a percentage of the national income or of the total income
required for the number of individuals below the poverty line to be living
just at that line. The terms "poverty gap ratio" and "income gap ratio" are
sometimes used to distinguish between these two measures. However
there seems to be some discrepancy in nomenclature (compare Ray 1998
and Todaro 2003). The poverty gap models are often used in conjunction
with head counts and this can be reasonably informative.
However, even these poverty gap models are sometimes criticised for
being inadequate since they do not satisfy what may be called the "weak
transfers principle" (Foster 1984, Sen 1976). The weak transfers principle
states that a measure of poverty should be such that a transfer of income
from any person below the poverty line to anyone less poor, while keeping
the set of poor unchanged, will raise the measure of poverty. Foster,
Greer and Thorbecke (' 984) developed a class of models indexed by a
parameter a for which certain cases satisfy the weak transfers principle.
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The measure can be expressed as P, = Lyi<p [(p-yJ/p]U In where n is the
population of the region concerned, p is the poverty line, and Yi is the
income of individual i. For a=O, the measure is simply the head count
ratio; for a= 1 it is the poverty gap model; the case of a=2 satisfies the
weak transfer principle and has been found to be a useful measure for
poverty assessment. Work has also been done by Sen (1976) to develop
other sophisticated measures for the appropriate assessment of poverty.
Many have of course questioned the use of income levels as being
adequate for assessing poverty (Chambers 1995). Income may not
capture well the welfare of the poor. One measure of poverty which has
attempted to go beyond income is the Human Poverty Index developed by
the United Nations in its 1997 Human Development Report. The index
consists of a weighting of life expectancy, basic education, and the overall
economic provision the country provides. In the 2001 Human
Development Report rankings were calculated for 90 developing countries.
However, an incomes-based approach continues to have the advantage of
being easier to measure and more objective (Greeley 1994).
2.2.3 Entrepreneurial Models
At the centre of the micro-enterprise lies the entrepreneur. With regard to
the present study, understanding the role of the entrepreneur within the
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micro-enterprise may allow for better interpretation of the study results
and clearer understanding of the study limitations. In this section, general
trends in thought about entrepreneurship are discussed; this theory is then
related to the situation of the micro-entrepreneur; finally the role of the
entrepreneur in economic development is discussed.
One of the earliest writers on the theory of entrepreneurship was Knight
Cl 921). For Knight, the entrepreneur was the one who was responsible for
the direction of economic life through decision making, thereby assuming
both responsibility and control. The decision-making role of the
entrepreneur concerned, principally, decisions about uncertainties: through
insurance markets, risks could be diversified, but when information was
limited, entrepreneurs faced uncertainty and this could not be eliminated.
When successful, the entrepreneur was rewarded for this taking on of
uncertainty:
The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of
superior judgement. But it is judgement ·of judgement, especially one's own
judgement, and in an individual case there is no way of telling good judgement
from good luck, and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgement
or determine its probable value transforms the profit into a wage (Knight
1921:311).
This potential benefit would thereby attract those with judgement,
foresight, managerial ability, confidence, and a willingness to embrace risk,
to the task of-entrepreneurship. For Knight, the role of the entrepreneur
in the economy was a critical one:
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The supply of entrepreneur qualities in society is one of the chief factors in
determining the number and size of productive units. It is a common and
perhaps justifiable opinion that most of the other factors tend toward greater
economy with increasing size in the establishment, and that the chief limitation
on size is the capacity of the leadership (Knight 1921 :283).
The role of the entrepreneur in the economy in Schumpeter's theory
Cl 934) was also very important. In his theory, economic development
takes place by entrepreneurial innovation. He rejects a static model of
the economy and argues that change takes place when entrepreneurs
carry out new combinations in production. These may include new or
better quality goods, new methods of production, new markets, new
supply sources, or new types of industrial organisation. Schumpeter also
distinguishes between the capitalist who invests and thereby bears risk
and the entrepreneur who has a more managerial role. The bridge between
the two is the provision of credit which allows the entrepreneur access to
the capital needed to implement the desired changes.
Weber Cl 930) proposes that the entire capitalist system was shaped by
an entrepreneurial Protestant work ethic formed by a variant of Calvin's
idea of calling. This idea of calling suggests that some have been
predestined so that they may live life to glorify God. This may be
accomplished in part by achievement and achievement furthermore gives
evidence that one is among the elect. This goal of achievement led to
great discipline and work ethic and produced vast wealth. However this
wealth was not to be spent on sensual pleasure but for the building up of
65
the community, which meant reinvestment. With saving thus very high,
tremendous capital accumulation was possible. Weber (1930:180)
concludes, "One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern
capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture: rational conduct
on the basis of the idea of a calling was born ... from the spirit of Christian
asceticism."
Somewhat later in the history of economic theory, Baumol (1968)
complains about the lack of theory concerning the entrepreneur.
Concerning the entrepreneur, he writes, "In more recent years, while the
facts have apparently underscored the significance of the role, he has
virtually disappeared from economic theory" (Baumol 1968:64). He
suggests that neo-c1assical theory has left no role for the entrepreneur;
with its emphasis on perfect information, neo-c1assical theory trivialises
management and decision-making. He goes on to distinguish between the
entrepreneur and the manager. The manager is the individual who
oversees and ensures the efficiency of the production process; the
entrepreneur, in contrast,locates new ideas and puts them into effect. He
argues that it is entrepreneurship that allows one country to develop and
another not and that furthermore policy makers should consider carefully
What policies encourage entrepreneurship. Leibenstein (1968) places
some emphasis in gaps or deficiencies in information and markets.
Whether the managerial type or the innovator type, the task of the
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entrepreneur is to make up for these deficiencies. He thus coordinates
activities in different markets; he is an inter-market operator.
Casson Cl 982) attempts to identify a shared element in much of this
theory by introducing the concept of entrepreneurial judgement. The
entrepreneur is one who makes judgement decisions about the allocation
of scarce resources. However, these decisions may require knowledge
which is not freely available and furthermore, there is no way to know
whether a given decision rule is correct. Moreover, different information is
available to different people and the cost of acquiring information can
vary. Thus individual judgements can differ. When judgements conflict,
those who are sufficiently confident will acquire assets that they believe
are under-valued. The entrepreneurs' role in the economy is the
acquisition and utilisation of information in making and acting upon
judgements.
Although sometimes neglected, for many theorists the entrepreneur plays
a major role in the economy: setting bounds on efficiency, enabling
economic development, generating the entire capitalist system, or
acquiring and utilising information. However, it is unclear the extent to
which much of this theory is applicable also to the micro-entrepreneur,
especially the micro-entrepreneur in developing countries. The definitions
of the entrepreneur considered above typically involve one or both of
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managerial activities or innovative activities, the undertaking of new
projects. The definition seems to be applicable also to the micro-
entrepreneur. Although operating on a smaller scale, the micro-
entrepreneur similarly undertakes new projects. And although the
managerial activities of a micro-entrepreneur without employees are
somewhat simplified, the micro-entrepreneur must still devote some effort
into ensuring the efficiency of the production process. However, although
the definition of the entrepreneur provided by various theorists above is
reasonably applicable also to the micro-entrepreneur, much of the theory
developed thereafter is rendered irrelevant when the scale one considers is
that of the micro-enterprise and when the context is shifted to a
developing country.
For Knight ('921 ), the leadership capacity of the entrepreneur is the chief
limitation on the size of the firm and therefore on efficiency. This
consideration is irrelevant, however, in a situation in which the scale of the
enterprise is perhaps no more than one person. It could be argued that it
is precisely the extreme lack of entrepreneurial skill which keep enterprises
from growing. This issue is taken up again later in this section. Knight
describes various qualities whereby potential benefits may attract qualified
entrepreneurs into entrepreneurial activity. In many developing countries,
however, enterprise in the informal sector may be the only means
individuals have available for survival. In such cases, it is necessity, not an
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appraisal of important entrepreneurial characteristics, that drives
individuals into enterprise. Anderson (1982:928) writes, "The decision to
establish a small firm, for example, is sometimes less a matter of
Leibenstein's first definition (innovation) than it is a product of poor
employment opportunities."
Schumpeter (1934) describes the need of the entrepreneur for credit and
surely this is a relevant consideration for the micro-entrepreneur also, as
the growth of MFls demonstrate. However, as has already been discussed,
the role of the micro-entrepreneur in economic development is
questionable at best. The role of the micro-entrepreneur is hardly the
central one of accomplishing economic change as described by
Schumpeter. Furthermore, prospects for innovation are limited for the
micro-enterprise. Both Schumpeter (1934) and Weber (1930) assume
that there exist sufficient capital and adequate institutional, economic, and
political stability that innovation or capital accumulation can successfully
take place without structural barriers. These conditions simply do not hold
for micro-entrepreneurs in many developing countries.
The relevance of information for exploiting market inefficiencies (Casson
'982, l.eibenstein 1968) also seems limited for micro-entrepreneurs. It is
unclear whether micro-entrepreneurs possess the resources sufficient for
the acquisition and utilisation of this information. Furthermore, research
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indicating that barriers to entry are quite low and that the number of
micro-enterprises tends to grow more quickly than market demand
(Fisseha and McPherson 1991, Grant 1991) suggests that conditions
faced by micro-entrepreneurs might correspond quite closely to perfect
competition.
If much of entrepreneurial theory seems of little relevance to the situation
of micro-entrepreneurs in developing countries, what then is the role of
the entrepreneur in economic development? Better entrepreneurial
abilities could contribute to poverty reduction and, therefore, training in
business and management skills may be of some use in enabling this. But
does entrepreneurship playa larger role in economic development than just
enabling poverty reduction and if so what are some of the barriers which
may prevent this role from being fulfilled?
Adelman (2001) argues that around the mid- 1960s development
economists and policy makers began to identify lack of entrepreneurial
ability as a major barrier to economic development. Because of the
missing entrepreneurial ability or the small number of entrepreneurs,
additional capital became subject to sharply diminishing returns, and this
situation could. only be remedied by increasing the number or ability of
entrepreneurs. Aid programmes began various training activities in
developing countries, the World Bank created its Economic Development
70
Institute (now the World Bank Institute) to teach economics and
management, and governments were told to structure policies so as to
increase the supply of entrepreneurship. Indeed, Baumol (1968), in
addition to proposing a more careful study of the rewards of
entrepreneurship, suggests that the policy-maker should take steps that
encourage entrepreneurial activity. Sinks and Vale (1990:57) draw a
useful distinction between "policy that is engineered to remove constraints
upon potential entrepreneurial activity and policy that is designed to
produce more entrepreneurs." The objective is clear.
However, increasing the prevalence of the required entrepreneurial ability
is not so easily achieved. The size of the informal sector documented in
section 2.1 clearly shows that there is no lack of micro-entrepreneurs.
Clearly something more is needed. Kilby (1988) argues that although
there is no lack of entrepreneurs who are willing to undertake various
small-scale projects, the vast majority of these entrepreneurs lack
managerial skills necessary to coordinate a small or medium size business.
He suggests that "these deficiencies can be traced to a low degree of
coordination and planning, a disinclination to use written records
intensively for purposes of control and the absence of conscientious
supervision in the workplace" (Kilby 1988:225).
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This lack of managerial ability creates a bottleneck that prevents these
micro-enterprises from developing into modern small-scale businesses. His
own empirical work suggests entrepreneurial development cannot be
accelerated by providing a sheltered environment in which businesses are
allowed to grow but rather that such provision can even hinder the building
up of entrepreneurial competence.
After examining several important factors for economic development,
Adelman (2001) ultimately concludes that there is no single cause for
underdevelopment, but that a variety of factors including capital,
entrepreneurial ability, adequate market structure, and reasonable
government policies interact in complex ways dependent on countries'
initial conditions and their economic, institutional, cultural and political
history. Within the context of such an understanding of economic
development, it may not be possible to achieve better entrepreneurship
without gradual changes taking place throughout all areas of a developing
county's economy.
In addition to these difficulties, motivation, psychological attributes, and
managerial skills are often quite difficult to measure and have often moved
from the realm of economics to that of sociology and psychology (Baumol
1968, Kilby 1971). This creates further problems for economists in
designing, 'implementing, and assessing programmes to develop
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entrepreneurship. Indeed such variables are not included in the present
study.
2.2.4 Firm Size and Age Models
The micro-enterprises included in this study were all among the smallest
and youngest. In order to understand the implications of this size and age
restriction on generalising the results to other groups and on policy
measures related to poverty reduction, it will be useful to consider briefly
the literature relating economic growth to firm size and age. It is to be
noted, however, and this is discussed further below, that this literature
comes almost exclusively from studies with data from developed
economies.
Historically, the most important theory concerning firm size and growth is
that of Gibrat's law. Named after economist Robert Gibrat, this law states
that the expected growth rate for a firm is independent of its size. Early
empirical studies (Hart and Prais 1956, Hymer and Pashigian 1962)
provided confirmation of this law for firms in the US and UK. However, it
was shown also that although average growth rates may not differ with
size, smaller firms had a much higher variance in growth rates, and a higher
probability of failure than did larger firms. Subsequent, more careful, .
investigation demonstrated that Gibrat's law held only for firms which were
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sufficiently large (Hall 1987, Mansfield 1962). Evans (1 987a, 1987b)
found that firms which were smaller tended to have higher growth rates
but these smaller firms also have a higher probability of failure; young
firms also had both higher growth rates and higher failure rates. These
results concerning size and age also held when one of these variables was
held fixed and the other tested. Shortly after Evans' work, Bates (1989),
however, suggested that the results concerning failure were somewhat
misleading or exaggerated because many of the small firms that were
reported as having failed consisted of "individuals with small periods of
intermittent self-employment" (Bates 1989:6).
Lucas (1978) explains the size distribution of firms based on managerial
talent: managers tend to oversee the operations of firms which are about
as large as they can handle. The size distribution of firms corresponds to
the distribution of managerial talent among managers. This is the
distribution which will maximise output. Somewhat related to this idea is
the Jovanovic model (Jovanovic 1982). In this model, as firms learn more
about their capabilities, firm behaviour and size change over time. Those
, firms which are successful and adjust their capability estimates upwards
tend to expand output while those which are less successful and revise
their capability estimates downwards tend to contract output or close
their business. Over time survivors acquire precise estimates of their
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capabilities; younger firms have less precise estimates of their capabilities
and thus their growth is more variable and their closure rates higher.
With regard to the "present study, two observations merit comment. First,
the applicability of these results to developing countries is unclear.
Gibrat's law and its various modifications and qualifications are derived
from empirical observation, not from theoretical considerations; it is thus
uncertain whether these empirical regularities would appear also among
firms within developing countries. On the other hand, if Jovanovic's
argument and model is indeed correct, it would seem that this would be
applicable also to developing countries and might lead us to expect similar
empirical regularities within developing economies.
Second, if these relationships between firm size and age and expected
growth and failure rates hold also in developing countries then this would
have implications for micro-finance lending programmes and poverty
reduction strategies. It would suggest that impact is maximised for
enterprises that are the smallest and the youngest, for these are the
enterprises with the highest expected growth. However, the results would
also suggest that these smallest and youngest enterprises have the
highest failure rates,' so that the owners of these enterprises, and those
who lend to them, must be willing to bear relatively high risk. In any case,
if these or other empirical regularities hold among micro-enterprises in
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developing countries, the discussion above suggests that MFls should be
aware of the age and size distribution of their target clients when
designing loan programmes and strategies for poverty reduction.
2.3 Assistance to Micro-enterprises and the Informal Sector
2.3.1 Classification of Assistance
_ Section 2.1.2 reviewed the development of perceptions about the informal
sector and interventions to assist micro-enterprises until the early 1990s.
By that time, there seemed to be a general consensus amongst
economists, policy-makers, donors, and practitioners of economic
development that it was beneficial to provide assistance to micro-
enterprises. The debate in the 1990s shifted to the best way of providing
assistance. Section 2.3 reviews the different types of assistance provided
to micro-enterprises and summarises the debate about which is the best.
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As a starting point, it is helpful to review several different methods of
classifying micro-enterprise assistance. By the late 1980's, USAID was
considered the largest donor to these development programmes. In 1989,
USAID undertook amajor evaluation of its assistance to micro-enterprise
programmes. This evaluation covered 32 programmes in 18 countries. As
part of the evaluation report (Lieberson 1989), USAID acknowledged the
heterogeneity of micro-enterprises and the diversity of their needs, and
found it helpful to classify its assistance into three broad approaches, as
follows:
1. Enterprise Formation Approach: This represents a focus on the lowest
level who are very poor or economically disadvantaged and who want to
start a business. Assistance usually takes the form of a community
development programme designed to overcome the social and economic
constraints that prevent the poor from becoming entrepreneurs. These
programmes tend to have a high cost per beneficiary;
2. Enterprise Expansion Approach: The goal of this approach is to improve
the performance of existing micro-enterprises. This approach usually relies
on a minimum of inputs (usually only credit, although sometimes limited
technical assistance and training) to reach a large number of firms at a
relatively low cost per beneficiary;
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3. Enterprise Transformation Approach: This approach strives to graduate
larger clients up and out of the informal sector. It is more costly per
beneficiary than the other approaches, because it requires more technical
assistance and training.
The USAID report discusses differences in approaches to credit in these
three approaches. Within the enterprise expansion approach, the report
mentions a 'minimalist' model that enables micro-entrepreneurs to increase
their sales and income and, in some cases, to generate new jobs via short
term working capital loans. This is called a 'minimalist' model because it
only provides credit and no other support services. The 'minimalist credit'
approach is further discussed in Section 2.3.2.
In summarising this evaluation exercise for USAID, Lieberson Cl 989:2)
states:
The study found that the enterprise expansion approach, which provides short-
term working capital loans and minimal technical assistance and training, is the
least costly method of reaching the largest number of beneficiaries. When the
problems faced by micro-enterprises go beyond just credit, USAID has much less
knowledge of how to deliver cost-effective technical assistance and training.
While the study was able to examine certain cost factors such as the cost
per beneficiary reached, Lieberson Cl 989) points out that they did not
analyse the benefits of these programmes and much more effort is
needed to examine benefits from the different approaches if appropriate
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cost benefit comparisons are to be made. The report concludes with a
concern that:
The needs of the vast majority of micro-enterprises cannot be satisfied merely
by providing small working capital loans. USAID needs to learn how to use other
approaches to reach entrepreneurs who need inputs other than working capital
and those located 'in less densely populated areas (Lieberson 1989:7).
In a paper focussed on donor strategies that could assist poor women in
developing countries, McKee (l 989) classifies assistance to micro-
enterprises into three broad categories:
1. Area-focused: Focus on a target population in a specified area. These
are often holistic programmes;
2. Sector-focused: Focus on enterprises in a specific sector or industry.
These often try to build vertical and horizontal linkages;
3. Function-focused: These often try to provide a missing function or
input such as credit, training, technology, marketing, etc.
She acknowledges that these are often not clearly distinguishable
classifications and that various forms of assistance may sometimes be
combined. However, regardless of the category, McKee (l 989) indicates
that lack 'of access to capital is often a serious constraint in developing
economies and that most programmes to assist self-employment and
micro-enterprises include a credit component. She also expresses concern
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about the lack of evaluation and impact analysis making it very difficult to
compare different strategies and approaches.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were many debates about
which was the best strategy and which objectives were the most
important. In a relatively early overview of efforts to assist enterprise
development in rural areas, Harper and Shailendra Cl 988) express concern
about efforts at enterprise formation in rural areas. They had noted a
number of failures in their review of case studies.
It would be wrong to suggest that everyone in a given community, rural or urban,
has the potential to go into business successfully, and many so-called
entrepreneurship development programmes have failed because they have been
based on the implied assumption that entrepreneurship is for the majority
(Harper and Shailendra 1988:5).
In response to the debate about which is the best way to assist micro-
enterprises, Mahajan and Dichter (1990) propose a new enterprise
assistance classification scheme and argue that the approach in each
situation needs to be tailored according to the objectives and context.
They argue that there is no single best approach for all situations and the
best strategy for each situation depends upon certain independent
variables. In examining the variables in each context, they suggest an
examination of four broad areas: a. level of development of the area, b.
characteristics of the target group, c. nature of the industry or sector, and
d. types and sizes of enterprises. Within each broad area, they mention a
number of sub-variables. However, when looking at the level of
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development of an area, they pay special attention to the extent to which
financial markets function in the area. They are especially concerned that
"it is generally true that local sources of credit are inadequate to provide
finance for investment in micro-enterprise development" (Mahajan and
Dichter 1990:10).
The classification scheme proposed by Mahajan and Dichter (1990) has
the following broad categories:
1. Missing Input Strategies: Examples of missing inputs include credit,
training, technical assistance, technology, infrastructure, market
development, and organisational development. These strategies assume
that there is one major missing input and that enterprises can be best
assisted by providing this input in an efficient manner. Credit is the
most commonly supplied missing input provided in micro-enterprise
assistance;
2. Integrated Strategies: These strategies are often focussed on a specific
target population and they integrate various inputs to help a specified
group of people or enterprises. Although there are many possible
combinations of inputs, some commonly integrated combinations of
inputs include:
a. Credit, training, and social services
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b. Management training and technical assistance
c. Credit, training and marketing development
d. Credit, training and industry sub-sector linkages;
3. Systemic Intervention Strategies: These strategies focus on changing
the way systems operate such that micro and small businesses can
increase output and profits. Some examples include policy changes,
changing legal and regulatory frameworks, changing financial markets,
large sub-sector approaches and linkages.
Mahajan and Dichter express concern about the ability of enterprise
development strategies to alleviate poverty.
Enterprise development as a strategy for poverty alleviation is a relatively recent
phenomenon and there is not clear evidence yet that it works. What is
increasingly becoming clear is that the poor require special support in order to
become successful entrepreneurs (Mahajan and Dichter 1990:9).
Lassen (1991) introduced the concept of a poverty lending strategy as a
distinct form of micro-enterprise credit. A poverty lending strategy is
identified as any approach that targets small loans to the poorest of the
poor on grounds of equity. A poverty lending orientation assumes that
broad target group definitions of micro-enterprises fail to reach the most
marginal and that only targeted programmes, many of which have income
.
oriented qualifying restrictions, can effectively reach the poorest. A
poverty lending approach also assumes more than just financial inter-
mediation and there is some form of socioeconomic support. Lassen
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(1991) describes poverty lending as the provision of "credit and savings
with a big socioeconomic plus" (Lassen 1991 :2).
Some of the other practitioners (Martinez 1990, Reed and Befus 1992) of
the late 1980s and early 1990s promoted an enterprise transformation
strategy. They felt small working capital loans to micro-enterprises as were
being pushed by the 'minimalist model' did not have the capacity to
generate economic growth and argued for enterprise transformation
lending which is "the provision of credit and services which assists micro-
enterprises to increase their assets and productivity to a level similar to
that of small businesses in the same economic activity, and thereby
increasing their sales, income and number of employees" (Reed and Befus
1992:2).
Transformation lending is viewed as making larger loans which:
• change the means of production and increase productivity
• increase sales sufficient to. support new employees
• change the relationship between the business owner and his or her
employees
• increase assets
• increase specialisation.
83
Martinez (1990) viewed the lack of enterprise formation lending as the
'grey area' in micro-enterprise development. He felt there was a major
lending gap and the lack of these larger transformation loans kept many
micro-enterprise workers in poverty and did not allow them to become part
of the formal sector. Since formal sector banks were clearly not interested
in making these kind of loans, he called on NGOs and other specialised
micro-finance lenders to fill the gap.
Reed and Befus (1992) were careful to distinguish their definition of
transformation lending from programmes that focussed on graduating
businesses into the formal sector or helping businesses with legal
incorporation. These programmes require many different inputs beside
lending and "achieving these results requires vastly different levels of cost
and effort in different countries, which makes it difficult to use across the
board measures" (Reed and Befus 1992:3).
While many early practitioners of micro-enterprise development seemed to
focus mostly on the provision of credit as expressed in the literature cited
in Section 2.3.1 above, several academics expressed concern over a single
input, credit only strategy, for example, Tokman indicates that:
There is always the attraction of the missing piece strategy that is, to identify a
single constraint which, when removed, will allow more productive and profitable
livelihoods for the beneficiaries. At the micro level the most common missing
piece identified for direct assistance is credit. Access to capital is a key factor
affectinq the low incomes of the informal producer, but other significant
constraints must be recognized, such as access to skills and more dynamic
markets. Because of this, what is required is a series of measures that will be
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mutually reinforced. Policy interventions are necessary components of a more
comprehensive package (Tokman, 1989:20).
According to Henk Cl 990), small enterprise development must be
examined using a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach and research is
needed to address the complexity of the sector. He feels that single input
programmes suffer from a narrow focus and an inadequate analytical
framework.
2.3.2 Minimalist Approach
Despite the concerns of some observers about single input strategies for
micro-enterprise assistance, during the 1990s a minimalist model of micro-
credit became the dominant form of assistance to micro-enterprises. A
minimalist approach is viewed as providing small short-term working capital
loans to a large number of existing micro-enterprises (enterprise expansion
approach mentioned in Lieberson 1989) in a financially sustainable manner.
This approach is characterized by relatively high real interest rates (Hulme
and Mosley 1996) which allow micro-finance institutions to become
sustainable. Also, in using a minimalist approach, costs are minimized
because there are generally no training or technical assistance services
provided to clients. Training and technical assistance are considered
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unnecessary because micro-entrepreneurs are viewed as being able to
wisely manage small amounts of capital.
The benefits of this approach include the ability to reach a large number
of clients in a financially sustainable manner. A minimalist approach is also
often characterized by an avoidance of impact evaluation or cost benefit
studies (Harper and Finnegan 1998, Hulme and Mosley 1996, Nubler
1996) because of the costs and difficulties collecting data, difficulties in
measuring benefits and the difficulties in proving causality. In a major book
on micro-finance, Rhyne and Otero (1 991 ) put forth the major arguments
for the minimalist approach, which they call 'a financial systems' approach.
This book includes a discussion of why impact assessment and the
measurement of benefits from micro-enterprise loans is not desirable.
In applying such an approach, the focus of evaluation is on the efficiency
of the lending institution as measured by rates and trends in sustainability,
repayment and cost per borrower ..Proponents of a minimalist approach
generally claim that this is the best way, if not the only way, to build a
financially sustainable micro-finance institution that does not need on-
gOing subsidies (Rhyne and Otero 1991).
This section reviews the development of the minimalist approach to micro-
credit. It should be noted that such an approach may be accomplished
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either with individual loans or with group loans using peer group solidarity
guarantees. Regardless of individual or group methodologies, the important
issue in a minimalist model is the efficiency of the lending methodology in
making loans and achieving high repayment rates (Rhyne and Otero 1991).
Hulme and Mosley (1996) indicate that the work of economists at Ohio
State University, which they call the 'Ohio School', on informal financial
markets influenced the development of a minimalist model of micro-
finance. The 'Ohio School' was strongly opposed to any kind of subsidized
or targeted credit (Adams, Graham, and von Pischke 1984, Meyer 1989).
They were mostly concerned about the sustainability and efficiency of
credit institutions. According to Meyer:
The perception of unsatisfied demand for loans and an inadequate supply of
funds from the banking system has led to policy makers, often in conjunction
with donors, to develop a strategy in which increasing the supply of loans was
expected to lead economic activity. These inputs and services are provided in an
integrated package by a government agency or an NGO. Because of these
policies and programs, a few select borrowers have enjoyed a one-shot increase
in liquidity, but viable institutions have not been built (Meyer 1989:123).
In acknowledging the development of new types of financial institutions
serving micro-enterprises, the economists at Ohio State University suggest
that they should try to copy the general approaches used by informal
lenders, rather than formal banks or the State sponsored development
finance institutions of the 1960s and 1970s (Adams, Graham, and von
Pischke 1984, Meyer 1989).
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Chandavarka (1989:95) indicates that:
The success of institutional lenders in dealing with micro-businesses is strongly
correlated to the extent to which they replicate the desirable features of the
informal credit markets (e.g. flexibility, and credit related to personal appraisal
and net worth, rather than collateral and cash flows).
Adams and Fitchett (1992) seem to extend the boundaries of informal
finance when they define informal finance as consisting of any lending or
savings transactions outside the regulation of a central monetary authority
or a central financial market authority. This definition of informal finance -
external to the family- includes NGOs, credit unions, cooperatives, leasing
companies, pawnshops that may provide credit to micro-businesses and
even money-lenders. They argue that micro-enterprise lending by these
kinds of institutions, whether unregulated or semi-regulated, will not be
effective unless they reduce transaction costs by using minimalist and
character-based approaches similar to moneylenders. However, they
express a concern that this will not happen" ... untillarge amounts of
external donor funds are no longer available to them" (Adams and Fitchett
1992:21 ).
In arguing for a minimalist approach to micro-enterprise lending, a number
of researchers noted the high proportion of working capital provided to
micro-enterprises by the savings of the owner as well as by informal loans
from family and friends (Adams and Fitchett 1992, Chandavarka 1989,
liedhom and Mead 1987, Meyer 1989). In all studies, informal loans and
savings from these internal sources account for more than eighty percent
88
of the financing used by micro-enterprises. If the supply of capital for
micro-enterprise lending is to be increased by donors, they argue that the
micro-lenders should use informal lending approaches and there does not
appear to be a need for any other services.
The growth of minimalist micro-credit in the 1990s was partly supported
by the lack of evidence that micro-enterprises could be effectively
graduated from the informal sector to the formal sector. Progammes
aimed at enterprise graduation by providing credit and other services were
not seen as successful and this further aided those who argued for a
minimalist approach. A review of ten lending programmes in Latin America
by Kathy Stearns (1 991 ) indicated that only 1.8 percent of clients had
graduated to the formal sector.
According to Meyer (1989: 128), "Data on graduation rates are sparse.
However, most program evaluations, if they mention the concept at all, fail
to provide much evidence. The lack of data suggests it might not really be
that important a performance indicator in actual practice."
In a review of micro-enterprise and small enterprise lending for the World
Bank, Webster (1991 :59) indicates that:
whereby micro-enterprises are envisioned as seed-beds for small and medium
firms, little empirical evidence exists as to (i) whether a significant number of
micro-enterprises actually do grow and become organized, small firms; (ii) the
rate at which such graduation occurs and (iii) the best measures of bringing
about such transformations.
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In addition to the lack of evidence on successful enterprise graduation,
other evaluators were commenting that a minimalist approach seemed to
be the most effective way of helping the largest number of micro-
enterprises. In his review for USAID, Lieberson (1989) noted the success
of enterprise expansion programmes using a minimalist credit approach.
While noting the lack of evaluation studies about different models of
assistance, Berger (1989) concludes that minimalist approaches seemed
to be able to help the largest number of poor women. Also, in a review of
, 6 micro-credit programme evaluation reports for UNDP (United Nations
Development Program), Ashe and Cosslet (1989) conclude that efforts at
training have not been very effective and that minimalist approaches to
the provision of working capital seem to be the most effective way to help
micro-enterprises. Ashe and Cosslet (1989:97) write:
There are many millions of informal sector businesses and small firms in
developing countries and, of these, only a small percentage keep records or have
been formally trained in what are considered the indispensable tools of running a
business. This indicates the viability of informal management and credit
mechanisms.
In a review of micro-credit programmes funded by the Ford Foundation,
Tendler (1989) also noted the lack of programme evaluations and cost-
benefit studies. However, she noted that the most successful programmes
all used a minimalist approach.
The dominance of a minimalist approach to micro-credit was also aided by
the lack of evidence that training or technical assistance services were
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very effective in helping micro-enterprises expand or develop. In a review
of training and technical assistance schemes, Harper (1989:187)
concludes that there are "very few programmes which can really be said to
have been a success, in that the additional earnings of the beneficiaries
exceeded the cost of the programme." He indicates that credit provision in
the form of working capital loans may be the only really effective form of
assistance to micro-enterprises. Rudkins (1990) also does not see much
impact from efforts to teach micro-enterprise book-keeping or financial
management skills.
Tendler (1989) and Nubler (1996) indicate that a single input approach
such as minimalist credit may be the most effective approach to micro-
enterprise assistance because of their relative simplicity to execute by
intermediary institutions such as NGOs. Integrated approaches may not
succeed because they are too complex for the implementing institutions to
deliver effectively.
Although Berger (1989) and Lassen (1991) had criticized a minimalist
model as potentially excluding the poorest potential micro-entrepreneurs,
Malhotra (1992) reviewed the major poverty lending schemes and
concluded that most of them were using minimalist approaches. She did
not see conflicts between effective poverty lending and a minimalist
approach to credit.
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As the 1990s progressed, however, there were more critical evaluations of
minimalist credit models. The major criticisms related to the lack of
evidence that working capital loans actually increased productivity and
incomes on a sustainable basis. In arguing for the importance of helping
micro-enterprises to develop the use of appropriate technology to improve
productivity, Jeans, Hyman and Q'Donnel (1990: 15) conclude that
"technology upgrading is often essential in achieving a sustainable
productivity increase in businesses, rather than just shifting employment
and income from one producer or seller to another." They express concern
that the focus on minimalist credit without improvements in technology
and productivity will not lead to sustainable increases in income. There is
also some emerging evidence that working capital loans provided to a large
number of micro-enterprises in a specified area could result in saturation
and displacement of other micro-enterprises. This tendency is noted by
Hulme and Mosley (1996) and by Harper and Finnegan (1998).
In commenting on the prevalence of minimalist micro-credit, Harper and
Finnegan (1998:63) conclude their review with a concern that:
There is also some evidence that the damaging effects of market saturation are
beginning to out-weiqh the advantages of replacing money-lender loans with
institutional micro-credit. Repayments of loan principal and interest may
continue, and group pressure can ensure that members repay, even if they are
worse off than before as a result of their borrowing. The actual impact on the
poorest people may turn out to be negative, long before any evaluation of the
institution or even an open-ended study reveals that anything is wrong.
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2.3.3 Holistic Christian Approach
IDH identifies itself as a Christian organization. It is part of the Opportunity
International Network (01) which is also identified as Christian. Both IDH
and the Opportunity International Network indicate in their mission
statements that they are motivated by "Jesus Christ's call to serve the
poor" (Opportunity Network 1997:2). What is this call and how is it related
to economic development and micro-finance? In section 2.4, the Christian
motivation for micro-enterprise assistance, and specifically a holistic
approach to this assistance, is developed. This section explores the
features of a holistic Christian approach to micro-enterprise development.
Within the micro-enterprise assistance classification schemes described in
Section 2.3.1, the holistic approach would be considered an integrated
approach combining micro-enterprise credit and other financial services,
with training and the development of Christian values.
Enterprise Development International (EDI) and the Opportunity
International Network (01) are both Christian organisations which are
exclusively dedicated to micro-enterprise development. EDI describes its
purpose as "demonstrating God's love by enabling the poor to free
themselves from poverty" (EDI 2001:1). 01 describes its mission as "being
motivated by Jesus Christ's call to serve the poor" (Opportunity
93
International Network 1997:2). In its long-term vision set forth in 1997, 01
describes three primary goals:
1. Outreach: We will provide loans to a cumulative total of two million poor
families, with an overall arrears rate of no more than two per cent, over
the next five years;
2. Quality: We will create a Network that is considered to be one of the
top three leaders in the global micro-finance community;
3. Impact: We will empower poor clients in such a manner that they
become agents of transformation in their own communities.
The impact goal appears to be where 01 expresses its holistic Christian
vision. 01 explains this goal, as follows:
In addition to promoting the transformation of a single client or group of clients,
the goal also incorporates a vision for the transformational impact clients can
affect in their own communities. WhHewe have much to learn in this area, we
believe it is fundamental to realizing our mission and to fulfilling our motivation
to follow Jesus Christ's call to serve the poor. Also, we believe that our own
transformation and that of our donors is central to achieving this vision
(Opportunity International Network 1997:4).
Over the past several years, 01 has worked to develop definitions and
measurement tools to explain what they mean by transformation and
transformational development. While recognizing that there are many
different definitions and viewpoints, 01 has defined transformational
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development as "a deeply rooted change in people's economic, social,
political, spiritual and behavioral conditions resulting in their enjoyment of
wholeness of life under God's ordinances" (Getu 2000:1).
Similar to EOI's goal of setting people free from poverty, 01 also views
transformation as being related to freedom. 01 states that "the whole-
person view of transformational development is about setting people free
from poverty, injustice, deprivations, bondage, and moral corruption and
helping them become relatively prosperous and better people" (Getu
2000:2).
In developing these views on transformational development, 01 does not
want to sacrifice the goals of financial efficiency and financial sustainability
espoused in the minimalist approach as discussed in Section 2.3.2. 01
states that "in our view, the twin goals of transformational development
are financial excellence and biblical transformation that result in the
establishment of freedom, the creation of opportunities and the shaping of
healthy character among the poor" (Getu 2000:2).
It is also necessary to consider what specific actions characterize a holistic
Christian approach to micro-finance and to differentiate this from a
minimalist approach. In a survey of 01 Network members, including IOH in
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Honduras, the following list of transformational activities practised by 01
affiliates was developed (Getu 2001):
1. Training clients on management and business topics
2. Training clients on leadership and values formation
3. Training of loan officers and other key staff on transformation issues
4. Bible studies for staff and clients
S. Annual transformation conference for staff and clients
6. Transformation advisor or pastor hired to work with loan officers and
clients
7. Linkages with churches
8. Linkages with social service agencies
9. Publications on values and other transformational topics
, O. Support clients in lobbying governments and politicians
, 1. Budget allocations for specific transformational work
1 2. Trust bank discussions on HIV/ AIDS and other health issues.
In the survey, 01 also asked affiliates about activities they would like to see
undertaken on a global basis to support their transformation work. The
most often cited answers were:
l, Develop. standardized impact measurement tool and indicators
2. Share experiences and successes between countries
3. Share best practices and case studies between countries
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4. Seminars and training on transformation for managers and boards
5. Raise funds to help implement new transformation programmes
6. Facilitate exchange visits between countries to share experience.
Whilst 01 has a goal of being financially sustainable, the survey pointed out
some concerns over the cost of transformational activities in view of
pressures on local affiliates to achieve sustainability and even profitability.
A number of local affiliates mentioned cost pressures as constraining their
ability to undertake holistic transformation. As summarized by Getu
(2001), there is debate as to whether sustainability and transformation
are incompatible or whether they are in fact inseparable in that
transformation enables sustainability and profitability. As discussed in
Section 9.4, balancing financial sustainability and holistic transformation
activities are an issue for further research and debate.
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2.4 Christian Motivation for Micro-enterprise Assistance
In section 2.3.3 the activities of a holistic approach to micro-enterprise
assistance were described. In this section the Christian motivation for
such assistance, and particularly a holistic approach to such assistance, is
developed.
While on earth, Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom of God. Much of His work on
earth involved announcing the arrival of God's Kingdom. Through His
actions and teachings, He demonstrated that God's Kingdom is broader
than the forgiveness of personal sins. The kingdom of God was to
transform the whole of human life. He showed that:
...we are also reconciled to other human beings and to the creation through the
establishment of this new Kingdom. Jesus did not present forgiveness from God
as an experience that could be separated from reconciliation with people, but
rather demonstrated that the Kingdom of God encompasses the rule of Christ
over every area of life. Forgiveness from God has to be demonstrated through
our activities, as we work for right social and economic relationships (Bussau and
Samuel 1998:13).
Jesus announced one of His primary missions on earth as helping the poor
and needy. This is set forth in Luke 4: 18 " ...because he has anointed me
to preach the gospel to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim freedom for
the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, to release the oppressed,
to proclaim the year of the Lord's favour." From these statements, it is
clear that Jesus' ministry was not just about preaching the forgiveness of
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sins, but included also dealing with issues and structures that made people
poor, sick, weak and vulnerable in this world.
In announcing the kingdom of God, he provided healing and instruction to
the poor, to his followers, and to all in the crowds. And in his teaching, he
again and again challenged the rich to provide for the poor. He tells the
rich young man to sell everything he has to give to the poor and then to
follow him (Mark 10: 17 -31). In the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus,
the fault of the rich man was his living in luxury without having provided
for the beggar Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31). In another parable he warns the
rich who hoard an abundance of possessions (Luke 12: 13-21 ). We see
clearly Jesus' challenge to provide for the poor. And yet, throughout, it is
a renewed relationship with God which will empower the generosity and
concern required for this provision: "With man this is impossible, but with
God all things are possible" (Mark 10:27). True reconciliation with God will
change the whole life of man.
Jesus cared about the whole person, both the spiritual and physical needs
of people. He is concerned about making people whole. As a result, His
approach to ministry may be called "holistic".
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Jesus calls for His disciples and followers to share in His work of bringing
about God's Kingdom. In following Jesus, this work includes manifesting a
special care and concern for the poor and needy.
This is evident in many of Jesus' teachings and parables including the
beatitudes (Luke 6) and the stories of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10), the
Great Feast (Luke 14), and the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16). This
special solidarity with the poor is particularly evident in Matthew 25: 31 to
46 where Jesus explains how people and nations will be judged according
to "whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you
did for me" (Matthew 25:40). Jesus instructed his disciples and followers
to serve others. This is expressed by Bussau and Samuel as:
... the primary call of Christ's followers was not a call to conversion but, far more
than that, it was a call to discipleship-a call to model the same kind of
servanthood that Christ exemplified. The disciples were to be servants of God
and serve as the Son of Man had served: by making whatever resources they
possessed- skills, economic resources, time, and energy -available to enable
others to be fulfilled (Bussau and Samuel 1998:16).
God's concern for poor people, economic justice and access to productive
resources is also evident throughout the Old and New Testaments. This
concern is powerfully and frequently expressed in the Law given to the
nation of Israel in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. The gleaning
laws (Leviticus 19:9-10) required that part of the harvest be left for those
in need and thereby made provision for the poor. However the law also
dealt with social structures that contributed towards poverty. The
economic thrust of the Law was aimed at preventing the poor. from being
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exploited and being made poorer. Much of the Law was intended to make
sure each family had its own land and resources which they were to
manage for the benefit of themselves and the entire community of Israel.
If families had difficult times and had to sell their land or other productive
resources, or even had to sell themselves into slavery, the Law dealt with
measures of fairness and protection so they would not be exploited
(Deuteronomy 15: 1 -15).
Exploitation and loan sharks were common during Biblical times as well as
today. The Bible calls loan sharks 'moneylenders'. They are accused of
being greedy and exploiting people in need. In Hebrew, the word for
moneylender and usury are the same (Thurman 1996). Exodus 22:25 and
Nehemiah 5:7 warns against usurious moneylenders and greedy
exploitation of those in need.
The Law included provisions in which the debts and slavery of fellow
Israelites were to be canceled in the seventh year. According the Bussau
and Samuel,
... the emphasis is not that the debts of the poor were canceled, but rather that
the people of God were responsible to rescue them from their debt. The
responsibility of the rest of the community was to provide for the poor in such a
way that they would not lose their place within society. And those with
resources carried the responsibility of using those resources to provide for those
who had fallen into poverty (Bussau and Samuel 1998:10).
Deuteronomy 15: 12 -14 even requires that the slaves released in the
seventh year " ...were to be liberally provided with flour, wine, and
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livestock, with the presumed intention of facilitating a return to
sustainable self employment" (Belshaw 1997:7).
God instructed the Israelites to- lend to each other as needed. This
probably included loans for assets and supplies needed for production and
enterprise. Deuteronomy 15:7-8 states that "if there is a poor man
among your brothers in any of the towns of the land that the Lord is giving
you, do not be hard hearted or tightfisted toward your poor brother.
Rather be openhanded and freely lend him whatever he needs."
God was also concerned about long term poverty and the Law included a
Year of Jubilee every fifty years. In the fiftieth year, all land reverted to
the family that originally owned it. (Leviticus 25:10) This was designed to
prevent the long-term loss of productive assets and multi-generation
cycles of poverty within families. The Year of Jubilee is based on the
concept that God owns everything and the people of nation of Israel were
stewards for Him. This is set forth in Leviticus 25:23 -24 "The land must
not be sold permanently, because the land is mine and you are but aliens
and my tenants. Throughout the country that you hold as a possession,
You must provide for the redemption of the land."
This concept of stewardship starts with God's creation of the world in
Genesis. Genesis 1.27 -28 states that:
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So God created man in His own image, in the image of God he created him; male
and female he created them. God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful and
increase in numbers; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and
the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground."
Along with being created in the image of God, there is a responsibility to
look after and care for God's creation. This stewardship responsibility is set
forth in Genesis 2: 15: "The Lord God took the man and put him in the
Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it."
According to Belshaw,
Genesis 1:28 is obviously to be read along with Genesis 2:1 S. Human domination
over nature both has a creative and enhancing theological sense; human beings
are God's partners in achieving the potential productivity which was an innate
feature of the original creation. The twin injunction 'to work' (change and
develop) and 'to take care of it' seem to capture entirely the central meaning of
the term 'sustainable development' (Belshaw 1997:6).
When Israel refused to obey God's law, the prophets warned them of their
wrongdoing and of God's judgement if they would not mend their ways.
Other than idolatry, there is perhaps no wrongdoing against which the
prophets so strongly express the Lord's anger as that of social injustice
and the exploitation of the poor.
God warns the house of David, through Jeremiah:
Administer justice every morning;
rescue from the. hand of his oppressor
the one who has been robbed,
or my wrath will break out and burn like fire
because of the evil you have done-
burn with no-one to quench it (Jeremiah 21: 12).
In announcing judgement on Jerusalem and Judah, Isaiah declares:
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The Lord enters into judgement against the elders and leaders of his people:
"It is you who have ruined my vineyard;
the plunder from the poor is in your houses.
What do you mean by crushing my people
and grinding the faces of the poor?"
declares the Lord, the Lord Almighty (Isaiah 3:14-15).
Later in Isaiah it is made clear that religious practices will pass unnoticed
by God if issues of injustice have not been addressed (Isaiah 58).
These judgements and warnings are echoed and reinforced by Isaiah,
Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos, Zechariah, throughout the history of both the
northern and southern kingdoms of the Israelites, through their exile, and
after their return. God identifies with and shows compassion for the "the
alien, the fatherless, the widow," all who are powerless and defenceless.
God is concerned not only about individuals, but about the entire nation.
God delivered Israel out of slavery and bondage in Egypt and throughout
his interaction with Israel he identifies himself as "the Lord, who brought
you out of Egypt."
Later, while in exile in Babylon, hope of overcoming the suffering and
exploitation experienced by the people of Israel is expressed by several of
the Old Test_ament prophets. This includes Ezekiel who longed for a time
when:
The trees of the field will yield their fruit and the ground will yield its crops; the
people will be secure in their land. They will know that I am the Lord when I break
the bars of their yoke and rescue them from the hands of those who enslaved
them (Ezekiel 34:27).
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Also, Isaiah expressed similar sentiments in Isaiah 65: 21- 22:
They will build houses and dwell in them; they will plant vineyards and eat their
fruit. No longer will they build houses and others live in them; or plant and others
eat.
Both of these prophets were praying for a period of peace and prosperity
in which the people of Israel would not be exploited, but were able to work
and be productive. The prophets reaffirm that God is concerned about
freedom and prosperity and that he shows a special concern for the poor
and oppressed.
The economic protections of the Old Testament Law applied primarily to
the Israelites. Aliens and strangers could be enslaved and charged
usurious interest (Leviticus 25: 44-46, Deuteronomy 23:20). This changed
in the New Testament with the teachings of Jesus. The parable of the
Good Samaritan in Luke 10 indicates that help should be provided to all
people, not just Jews. Also, the Great Commission in Matthew 28: 18-20
applied to people of all nations. The Christian Church quickly grew beyond
Israel during the first century and encompassed many peoples and nations.
In many parts of the world, the early Christian Church was known for
alleviating poverty and sharing possessions with those in need (Acts 4:32 -
34).
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As the Apostle Paul ministered to churches around the world, he began to
apply principles of sharing between communities in different places. Funds
were transferred between countries to churches with great material needs.
Paul explained these principles rn 2 Corinthians 8: 13- 15:
Our desire is not that others might be relieved while you are hard pressed, but
that there might be equality. At the present time, your plenty will supply what
they need, so that in turn their plenty will supply what you need. Then there will
be equality, as it is written: "He who gathered much did not have too much, and
he who gathered little did not have too little."
Belshaw points out that the meaning of equality here is disputed
concerning whether it applies to equality in income and assets as well as
consumption. According to his interpretation, the passage seems to imply
continued variation in production and income (gathering) while the equality
is in consumption (having). The passage, he concludes, " ... indicates
increasing inequality of production and income, the condition for which is
achieving equality of consumption. A clear linkage can be traced to the
principles of responsible stewardship of God's resources temporarily
entrusted to the 'tenant"'(Belshaw 1.997:8).
Although the church of the New Testament is marked by charity, sharing
and generosity, there is a clear sense of obligation to work. Jesus
illustrates this with the parable of the talents in Matthew 25. The servant
who was given the least amount of capital was criticized for not working
and not being a good steward of the assets entrusted to him. The owner
expected each person to use their talents and skills fully.
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Paul also expected those in the early Christian church to work and to be
productive. In Ephesians 4:28, he indicates that "He who has been stealing
should steal no longer, but must work, doing something useful with his own
hands, that he may have something to share with those in need." Paul
also criticized those who were idle and did not work in 2 Thessalonians 3: 6
-l , . He points out that "we worked night and day, labouring and toiling so
that we would not be a burden on any of you. We did this, not because we
do not have a right to such help, but in order to make ourselves a model
for you to follow." He then goes on to say that" ...if a man will not work,
he shall not eat." It is also interesting to note that Paul himself is a micro-
entrepreneur, working as a self-employed tentmaker.
Several major Christian theological conferences and declarations have
affirmed that productive creativity were part of God's plan for creation and
that poverty and exploitation are evils that God did not intend. Section 5
of the Lausanne Covenant states that:
Because mankind is made in the image of God, every person regardless of race,
colour, culture, class, sex or age has an intrinsic dignity because of which he
should be respected and served, not exploited (Lausanne Covenant 1974:
Section 5).
Likewise, the Oxford Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics states
that:
Economic production is not only necessary to sustain life and make it enjoyable;
it also provides an opportunity for human beings to express their creativity in the
service of others. In assessing economic systems, we must consider their ability
both to generate and distribute wealth and income justly. Poverty was not part
of God's original creation, nor will poverty be part of God's restored creation
when Christ returns. Poverty and powerlessness are an offence to God and a
denial of His loving provision for His creatures, except when they are a direct
result of His judgment (Oxford Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics
, 990:2).
From the law throughout the history of Israel and the prophets, to the
proclamation of Jesus, the early Church and subsequent Christian
confession we see the following principles emerge: that God created man
to be creative and productive, to be a steward of creation; that God
commands that provision be made for the poor; and that God hates
oppression and injustice against the poor, powerless and defenceless.
The preceding Biblical material clearly shows God's holistic concern over
both spiritual and physical aspects of life. Where does micro-enterprise
assistance fit into this picture of God's will for the economic relations of
man?
Micro-enterprise assistance, through small business loans, enables
entrepreneurs to acquire assets in order to form a business. Successful
businesses provide income for the entrepreneur and his or her family,
thereby alleviating poverty. In this way, micro-enterprise assistance is one
way in which God's charge to serve and provide for the poor is to be
carried out". And it provides assistance in a way that allows the poor to
maintain their dignity: because clients are repaying loans with interest,
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they are not accepting hand outs and are therefore improving their lives by
their own efforts.
Furthermore, unlike"many forms of aid, micro-enterprise assistance not
only alleviates poverty but also enables productivity to rise. The creation
of these small businesses creates work and employment and results in the
production of useful products and services for poor communities. Micro-
enterprise assistance enables some of the world's poorest people to best
steward their talents and resources in productive and creative activity.
However, an approach to micro-enterprise assistance which is Christian and
holistic goes yet further beyond this in fighting poverty and maintaining
economic justice. What specifically is the nature of a holistic Christian
approach to micro-enterprise development?
In section 2.3.3 it was noted that various micro-enterprise assistance
organisations identify their approach as holistic. These organisations, in
addition to providing lending services, also provide a variety of non-lending
services including business and management training, spiritual guidance
and counselling, training in leadership and values formation. It was noted
also that there were two opposing views regarding the value of such non-
lending services:
One perception says that sustainability and transformation do not go together. It
is argued that transformation involves expenses in non-economic activities that
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bring down profitability and hence sustainability. The other perception says that
the two are inseparable as transformation promotes accountability, honesty,
efficiency, discipline, productivity, and stewardship that are critical to
profitability and sustainability (Getu 2001:16).
With an understanding of poverty shaped by Jesus' teaching, God's law,
and the Christian confession, it is this second view that is embraced in a
holistic approach to micro-enterprise assistance. First, by providing
training and advice to help entrepreneurs run successful businesses, the
likelihood of success and business sustainability is increased and
entrepreneurs develop useful skills to bring with them throughout life.
That a loan is made and eventually repaid with interest does not guarantee
a successful business or poverty reduction. Training can provide an
important bridge between the provision of loans and the reduction of
poverty.
Second, for an organization motivated by "Jesus Christ's call to serve the
poor," a holistic approach to micro-enterprise assistance is necessary
because of Jesus' understanding of service. As noted above, Jesus cared
about the whole person, both the physical and spiritual needs of people.
True service will therefore seek to provide support both physically and
spiritually. To provide for only the physical needs of people while
neglecting their spiritual needs would be to ultimately leave them in
poverty .. Jesus asks "For what does it profit a man to gain the whole world
but lose his soul?" (Matthew 16:26). The hope expressed in the writings
of the Old Testament prophets concerned not only an end to Israel's exile
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in Babylon but eternal blessing and peace with God. In the Encyclical
Letter Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII writes concerning associations
organized to aid workmen in poverty:
Speaking summarily, we may lay it down as a general and perpetual law, that
workmen's associations should be so organized and governed as to furnish the
best and most suitable means for attaining what is aimed at, that is to say, for
helping each individual member to better his condition to the utmost, in body,
mind, and property. It is clear that they must pay special and principal attention
to piety and morality, and that their internal discipline must be directed precisely
by these considerations... What advantage can it be to a workman to obtain by
means of a society all that he requires, and to endanger his soul for want of
spiritual food (Pope Leo XIII 1891 :35-36)7
Through linkages with churches, assistance from pastors, and Bible studies
for clients, spiritual transformation can be accomplished. As noted, this is
an end in itself and, as will be discussed below, this spiritual transformation
can also go some way in better accomplishing poverty reduction.
The third reason why a holistic approach is important is that, by training
clients on leadership and values formation and by the spiritual renewal
accomplished by other transformational activities, entrepreneurs are better
equipped to apply their incomes and abilities in ways that will contribute to
the prosperity of the entire community. As Wright (1999:40) notes "if
increased income is spent in the cinema or at the tea stall, or on alcohol,
there is no increase in wealth or reduction in poverty." Entrepreneurs may
temporarily rise above poverty levels only to return to poverty because of
crime or indulgent spending. True poverty reduction will require the
transformation of the person and the entire community. Values formation
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will promote accountability, honesty, discipline and industriousness.
Training in leadership and values formation may subsequently empower
clients to fill leadership roles in the community and oppose exploitation,
crime or corruption. Spiritual transformation will engender a concern for
the well-being of the entire community and a willingness in turn to serve
others. The proclamation of the prophets warns us that there can be no
true prosperity for a community under the yoke of moral corruption.
Though unquestionably imperfect and often sadly insufficient, a holistic
approach can go some way toward the transformation of communities.
In summary, a holistic approach to micro-enterprise assistance can provide
the benefits of poverty reduction and employment creation of a minimalist
approach; but, in addition, a holistic approach can, through training, better
the likelihood of poverty reduction; through pastoral care, provide also for
the spiritual needs of the poor; and through values formation, leadership
training, and spiritual renewal, potentially transform and help prosper entire
communities.
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CHAPTERTHREE
REVIEWOF MICRO-FINANCEIMPACTMEASUREMENTRESEARCH
3. 1 Overview
Sections 2.1.2 and 2.3 reviewed the development of interventions to
assist micro-enterprises in developing countries. These interventions have
led to the growth of specialised development finance institutions called
micro-finance institutions. Through a process of learning, experimenting,
and continuously seeking better answers, micro-finance institutions have
shown that the "option of lending at the bottom end of the capital market
is not a financial black hole" (Hulme and Mosley 1996:206). Successful
micro-finance institutions have tended to follow a minimalist model which
focuses on the scale of outreach and the financial sustainability of the
micro-finance institution itself. This has led to research and
experimentation on techniques to reduce the unit costs of serving poor
customers. However, there is very little research on the economic or social
impact. of micro-finance interventions (Boomgard 1991, Farbman and Steel
<
1992, Liedholm and Mead 1989, Morduch 1999).
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This Chapter reviews research on the economic impact of assistance to
micro-enterprises in developing countries until 2002.
Is access to credit a "basic human right" (ILO 1984) and "the most
important single weapon against rural poverty" (IFAD 1982)7 Or is
providing access to credit "a mere fifth wheel on the coach, an input of
only marginal relevance to the enhancement of poor people's welfare"
(Adams and von Pischke 1992)7 For Adams and von Pischke (1992) of the
'Ohio School,' these new innovative micro-finance institutions constitute
the same approach and same problems as the earlier state sponsored
development finance institutions and they represent a 'deja vu' experience
of inefficiency, subsidy, and targeting. However, Hulme and Mosley
(1996:7) criticise the Ohio School for "failing to produce data concerning
the social rate of return and poverty reduction impact of the institutions
they seek to expose."
A significant portion of the literature on micro-finance impact research
describes various problems and obstacles encountered. These problems
are often used to argue against undertaking such research. Section 3.2
sUmmarises and categorises the various issues and problems encountered
in micro-enterprise impact research. As described in Chapter 5, the
research design of this study attempted to overcome or minimise the
,
various problems encountered in the literature. In planning the research
d~sign, impact assessment tools developed by six international micro-
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enterprise development oganisations were reviewed to determine how
these organisations dealt with the various problems and obstacles. This
study also included a review of all impact assessment materials published
by donor organisations such as USAID, the Department for International
Development (DFID) and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Within the practice of economic development, social cost benefit analysis
has been widely used and much has been written about it (Dasgupta, Sen
and Marglin 1972, Mishan 1988, Scott 1976). However, it should be
noted that none of the practitioner tools reviewed in this study uses a
comprehensive approach to social cost benefit analysis. Several
organisations acknowledge the existence of social cost benefit analysis,
but indicate that it is not useful in their situations. Although social cost
benefit analysis is not being applied by micro-finance practitioners, it is
interesting that each organisation studied uses some definition of income
or value added as the primary indicator of economic impact. This primary
focus on income-oriented measurement may be due to the pervasive
influence of the social cost benefit literature. The most significant
application of social cost benefit analysis to micro-enterprise impact
research is Peter Kilby's (1985) study comparing six micro-finance
institutions in five countries. This study is discussed in Section 3.3 and it is
replicated and expanded using data from this current study ih Chapter
Eight.
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Investment in micro-finance institutions is often justified on the basis of
poverty reduction. However, there is very little quantitative research on
whether micro-loans reduce poverty. The most significant research on
poverty reduction was done by Hulme and Mosley Cl 996) and Gulli and
Berger Cl 999). In the first of these studies the impact of twelve micro-
finance institutions in seven countries was assessed; they developed the
concept of an "impact possibility frontier" which is discussed in Section
3.4. Their approach to studying the impact of micro-loans in reducing
poverty is replicated with data from this study in Section 6.5. Gulli and
Berger (1 999) reviewed a number of impact studies from Latin American
micro-finance institutions to determine their impact in reducing poverty.
3.2 Issues and Problems
As indicated in Chapter 1, there is a lack of research on the impact of
assistance provided to micro-enterprises. Much of the micro-finance
literature argues' why it is not possible to make meaningful measurements
.
(Boomgard 1991, Holt 1991, Kobb 1997, Lieberson 1989, Marseli-
Carstens 1995). Nubler (1996) conducted an extensive review of efforts
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to measure the impact of training provided to micro-entrepreneurs. She
concludes that "the lack of methodologies, measurement criteria, and
indicators has been used as an excuse for not evaluating interventions in
the informal sector'! (Nubler 1996:2). This section outlines the major
issues and problems encountered in micro-enterprise impact research.
3.2.1 Selecting Dependent Variables to Measure Impact
Except for the Kilby (1985) study which is discussed in Section 3.3, social
cost benefit analysis has not been used in the evaluation of micro-
enterprise assistance programmes. According to Boomgard
(1991), Lieberson (1989), and Kobb (1997), this is due to the difficulty
of measuring benefits. In a stocktaking report of all USAID programmes to
assist micro-enterprises, Liberson points out that
"we were able to identify the cost per dollar loaned and cost per
beneficiary reached, but data were rarely available on benefits of micro-
enterprise programs" (Lieberson 1989:7).
Nonetheless, Kilby concludes that "acknowledging the extreme delicacy of
the exercise is not to write-down ex-post benefit analysis
as our most powerful analytic tool for understanding what works and does
.
not in the field of development" (Kilby 1985:8). In applying social cost
benefit analysis, Kilby states "benefit measures most generally are all net
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additions to national income" (Kilby 1985:5). In developing a measurable
proxy for increased national income that can be applied at the level of a
micro-enterprise, Kilby reasons that increased value added (turnover less
cost of goods purchased) is the best dependent variable to use in
measuring the impact of loans (Kilby 1985).
Wright (1 999) argues that income measurement is not adequate. He is
more concerned about reductions in poverty and increases in well being
and quality of life. Wright defines absolute poverty in terms of minimum
consumption levels rather than income levels. Wright states that "on a
simple money determined level, if increased income is spent in the cinema
or at the tea stall, or on alcohol, there is no increase in wealth or no
reduction in poverty" (Wright 1999:40). He indicates that many micro-
enterprise owners experience transitory poverty where they may
temporarily rise above poverty levels only to return to poverty when
unfortunate events happen such as illness, crime, or natural disasters. He
views the greatest concern of many self employed poor people to be
income diversification and income security to help overcome the various
shocks (Wright 1999) that cause and deepen poverty. Wright views
income measurement alone as too simplistic. "It is time to move away from
the preoccupation with measuring income to focusing on improving net
wealth and income security" (Wright 1999:44).
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Although Haggblade is concerned about quality of life and increased well
being of poor people, he concludes that "income offers a stepping stone
to improved nutrition, education, political awareness, and empowerment"
(Haggblade 1992: 11). In developing a simplified approach to impact
assessment, Haggblade uses a definition of "returns to labour" as the
primary dependent variable to measure impact. The "returns to labour"
measurements used by Haggblade are similar to value added calculations,
except for deducting fixed overhead costs from standard value added
calculations. Haggblade's "returns to labour" approach is similar to the
methodology used by Liedholm and Mead (1 987) in analysing productivity
as replicated in Section 6. 3 of this study. The justification for Haggblade's
focus is:
To retain the evaluation focus on raising the welfare of the poor, the system
revolves around measuring returns to labour. Employment and returns to labour
are the key to measuring progress of the very poor, who do not have
landholdings or physical assets, and who have only their labour to sell (Haggblade
1992:16).
While acknowledging the limitations of an income focus and the complex
factors which offset poor people's ability to escape poverty, the impact
studies conducted by Hulme and Mosley Cl 996) use family income and
changes in family income as the primary dependent measurement
variables. These were deemed easiest to measure and valid for making
cross-country comparisons.
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As part of this study, impact evaluation systems and tools developed by
donor organisations (USAID, DFID, Inter-American Development Bank) and
six international micro-finance organisations were reviewed. Each of these
organisations uses some form of income measurement as the primary
dependent variable for measuring impact. The tools developed by USAID
tend to focus on both enterprise net income and household income. The
Inter-American Development Bank (1989) has a primary focus on
enterprise net income. CARE ('991) uses a returns to labour approach
along the lines developed by Haggblade. In a comparative study of four
NGO impact assessment systems, Hymen and Dearden (1998) conclude
that Appropriate Technology Incorporated and Technoserve focus on value
added measurement, while Freedom from Hunger and Save the Children
give more attention to enterprise net income. They also conclude that
these four NGOimpact assessment systems "did not measure household
income separately from the income generated by the enterprise assisted.
Changes in household productive assets or material goods consumed were
not usually addressed" (Hymen and Dearden 1998:262).
The AIMS (Assessing the Impact of Micro-enterprise Services) tools
developed by USAID have extensive guidance for measuring household
assets and changes in household consumption patterns. It is argued that
household expenditure patterns can be a good proxy for income data
(USA1D1987). These tools are intended to be used when it is not possible
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to obtain reliable income data or where there is a need to corroborate
reported income data. These household consumption surveys are
particularly useful when measuring impact on poverty reduction. In these
cases, household consumption can be related to poverty line targets;
enterprise level measurements where the enterprise may only contribute
part of total household consumption will not allow such conclusions about
poverty to be drawn.
Employment creation has also often been considered as an dependent
variable to measure impact. However, most researchers have dismissed
this as too difficult to measure (Boomgard 1991 , Liedholm and Mead
1990, Nubler 1996). Issues of part-time and unpaid employment as well as
family labour generally make changes in employment difficult to detect and
measure accurately. There is also evidence that micro-entrepreneurs tend
to increase unpaid family labour before they will hire paid employees
(Liedholm and Mead 1987) or they attempt to achieve a constant income
with less labour time (Boornqard 1991, Liedholm and Mead 1987). This is
especially true of enterprises operated by poor women (Downing 1991 ,
McKee 1989). Hulme and Mosley (1996) also did not find much
employment creation in their cross country impact studies of twelve MFls
and det~cted the same tendency to use more family labour. They
concluded that:
... the impact of borrowing on employment is a natural consequence of the
technology in which that borrowing is embodied. Across the sample, the
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technical change induced by borrowing was not dramatic, and neither as a
consequence has been its influence on employment outside the family. Further
examination of hiring patterns of different types of enterprise confirms the
impression that rising levels of output financed by loans were initially
accommodated by increased demands for family labour only, with significant
hiring of non-family labour carried out only by larger enterprises (Hulme and
Mosley 1996:102).
The comments of these researchers confirm the direct experience of this
study applied to the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises that
employment changes are not an easily measurable dependent variable for
micro-enterprise research.
3.2.2 Data Gathering and Data Accuracy
Most micro-enterprises do not maintain financial records and enterprise
cash flows are often commingled with household activities (Boomgard
1991, Fisseha and Davies 1981, Liedholm and Mead 1990, Nubler 1996,
Rudkins 1990). As a result, data gathering and data accuracy are very
difficult issues in micro-enterprise research. As indicated in Section 3.2.1,
income and profit oriented measures seem to be the preferred dependent
variables in measuring financial performance. However, the ability to use
these indicators is dependent upon being able to obtain reasonably reliable
financial data from micro-entrepreneurs. Many researchers have not been
able to rely on the accuracy of answers to financial questions and have had
to use other workable indicators. Nubler (1996: 100) indicates that
"monetary indicators were not precise enough or sensitive enough to
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measure effects at the enterprise level. Therefore, a set of workable
indicators was developed. These were estimated change in sales, change in
estimated number of customers and change in number of workers."
There are two general approaches to gathering financial data from micro-
entrepreneurs when there are no meaningful financial records available.
These are simply accepting the memory recall of the entrepreneur and
structured interviews in which the interviewer constructs financial data
together with the micro-entrepreneur based on a series of detailed
questions. However, even constructing financial data in this manner
depends upon the memory, knowledge, and honesty of the interviewee.
Boomgard (1991) mentions a Michigan State University study in Sierra
Leone in which researchers compared a one shot retrospective interview
based on memory with data that had been collected twice weekly during
the same year. "The magnitude of difference was 30 to 40 percent and
entirely unpredictable" (Boomgard 1991 :2).
Kobb (1997) critiqued a major impact study done in Tanzania. This study
attempted'to compare one off memory recall questions about micro-
enterprise net profit with data developed from a structured interview in
which net profit was calculated by the interviewer based on questions
addressed to the micro-entrepreneur. This comparison resulted in a
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systematic bias in which the calculated net profit was generally higher than
the net profit recalled. In analysing this bias, Kobb commented that "this
difference may arise either from interviewees systematically under-
declaring direct income or from' interviewers failing to account for several
of the entrepreneurs' costs" (Kobb 1997:43).
Several researchers have also noticed a bias in which micro-entrepreneurs
tend to understate net income (Boomgard 1991, Kobb 1997, Liedholm
and Mead 1987). Possible reasons for this are summarised by Kobb
(1997:44): "interviewees may understate income due to a fear of taxation
or fears that the disclosure of information may encourage free loading or
loan requests from relatives or friends." These fears overcome the wish to
impress the interviewer with an answer that is perceived to be desired.
Some researchers believe that micro-entrepreneur recall may be more
accurate on questions about turnover and physical volumes of goods sold
rather than monetary net income calculations (Farbman and Steel 1992,
Liedholm and Mead 1990). Kilby (1985) and Liedholm and Mead (1987)
used these broader measures of value added and total returns to family
labour rather than trying to obtain net income measurements in their
.
respective cross country studies. A similar focus on value added estimates
Was used in this study as discussed in Chapter 5.
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3.2.3 Attribution and Control Groups
Most micro-enterprise impact research studies mention the need to use
control groups to help address the issue of attribution. How do we know
the loan recipients would not have done as well or better without the loan?
Although Kilby (1985) mentions the general desirability of using control
groups, he was not able to use them in his cross-country application of
social cost benefit analysis. However, he felt that the use of control groups
tended to understate the net benefits accruing to loan recipients because:
(1 ) loan recipients often had loan diversion benefits which were not
reported in surveys and (2) control groups generally did not include closed
enterprises which tended to overstate control group results in comparison
with groups of loan recipients which included closed firms. As a result,
Kilby did not believe that control groups were needed in his research. The
issues raised by Kilby (1985) with regard to using control groups in social
cost benefit analysis are further discussed in Section 8.6.
In his review of numerous micro-enterprise impact studies, Boomgard
('991) feltthe omission of any counterfactual case was one of the major
consistent weaknesses. He concluded that "we should encourage loud
throat-clearing whenever impact is discussed in a pompous fashion,
without consideration of a counterfactual
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case" (Boomgard 1991 :5).
Haggblade (1992) sees the need for a counterfactual case in micro-
enterprise impact research, but he considers control groups to be too
expensive and time consuming. Haggblade proposes the use of a proxy
estimate instead of a control group. He suggests using economic growth
rates or changes in GOPper capita as typical proxies. These kinds of
proxies could also be applied to a particular region or sub-sector of the
economy to achieve more accuracy. "This short-cut avoids the expense of
sampling non-project firms" (Haggblade 1992: 18).
Even when control groups have been used in micro-enterprise impact
research, there is often a dispute about whether they have been used
properly or whether they have provided meaningful information. In
reviewing two impact studies in Indonesia, Holt (1991) disputed the
conclusions with respect to women loan recipients in the study. Part of her
dispute involved the manner in which the control group of non-loan
recipients was developed. As a result, she viewed these studies as flawed.
likewise, Kobb (1997) critiqued a large impact study in Tanzania. In this
study, the control group was selected from micro-enterprises in the same
areas as those who had not taken loans. Kobb concluded that "what
remained as a control group were those which either failed to meet the
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project conditions or which were uninterested in project support. In
essence, the dregs" (Kobb 1997:43). He believed the control group was
not comparable to the client group because the control group members
had self-selected themselves out of the project. The client group was more
highly motivated and this motivation may have been more important than
loan support in analyzing results. "The problem of screening is modeled by
the inclusion of an entrepreneurship variable. By definition, this variable is
invisible and unmeasured. Ignoring entrepreneurship statistically biases the
result to the extent entrepreneurship is correlated with project
participation" (Kobb 1997:46).
To avoid the problem of self selection in project participation, it has been
suggested that control groups be selected from similar areas or villages in
which the MFI does not operate (Goldmark and Rosengard 1985, Inter-
American Development Bank 1989, USAID 1991).
However, this does not fully .solve the problem with self-selection if other
MFls are operating in that area.
Other researchers have suggested using control groups drawn from clients
who have been approved by the MFI, but are still waiting for their first loan.
These clients would evidently exhibit similar characteristics as loan
- recipients and would avoid the problem of self-selection (Gaile and Foster
127
1997, Hulme and Mosley 1996). This approach to control group selection
was used by Hulme and Mosley (1996) wherever possible.
We generally measure project benefits in terms of the difference between the
material welfare of borrowers and that of a control group of non-borrowers,
selected to be as similar as possible to the borrower group except for the
characteristic of not having received a loan from a case study institution;
wherever possible we selected as a control group people who had been approved
for, but who had not yet received, a loan from the credit institution under
scrutiny (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 14).
There are still possible distortions if the control group includes people who
are borrowing from other MFls in the same area.
However, even when control groups are selected in an unbiased manner,
there is an issue about whether they provide unbiased information in
comparison with client samples. As indicated above and in Section 8.6,
Kilby (1985) believed that control groups understated the benefits
achieved by loan recipients. However, Kobb reached the opposite
conclusion. While he noted the tendency for all micro-entrepreneurs to
understate income due to concerns about taxes and free loading claims by
friends and relatives, he believed that loan recipients had a more trusting
and honest relationship with the lending institution doing the surveys. As a
result, he believed the loan recipients did not understate income to the
degree that the control group did. "Beneficiaries may therefore have not
understated income to the degree their control group counterparts did.
This itself would cause higher income [increases] to be reported for the
Project sub-sample" (Kobb 1997:45).
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3.2.4 Limited Time Sequences
In reviewing micro-enterprise research priorities, Liedholm and Mead
(1991) and Farbman and Steel (1992) both commented that there is lack
of longitudinal time series data in micro-enterprise research. This was
partly due to the early stage of the industry. However, it is also due to the
fragile nature of micro-enterprises and their propensity to change, move,
or close down. As a result, MFls often do not have a long-term relationship
with clients and they cannot do much longitudinal data collection. During
the 1990s, there has been more emphasis on gathering baseline data in
initial client loan applications to facilitate future research (Hulme 1997,
Inter-American Development Bank 1989, Sebstad and Chen 1997).
The limited time sequence of available data has made it particularly
difficult to project future income benefits in impact research. As discussed
in Chapter Eight, Kilby (1985) did not project any income after the survey
date. Also, Kilby used a straight-line assumption as the rate of projecting
income growth from loan disbursement date (baseline) to the survey date.
Kilby assumes that income grows at an even rate over the time period
from the loan disbursement date to the survey date. To replicate Kilby,
similar conventions were used in this study. However, these conventions
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are not consistent with the concept of credit as an accelerator which is
discussed in Section 6.6.
Hulme and Mosley (1996) felt that income reached a plateau after the loan
and this level of income should be extrapolated into the future. However,
since they did not perform any social cost benefit analysis, it is not clear
how they would do such projections. They also noted the limitation that
they could only measure income growth since the client's last loan. They
did not have any base line data .for clients to measure income growth since
the client's first loan. This is viewed as a limitation of their research study.
Haggblade also struggled with similar limitations due to the lack of any
longitudinal data. As a result, he also measured income benefits only to
the survey date. However, he acknowledged that "since assisted firms may
well continue their expanded operations after the project ends, the more
correct procedure is to project these flows on into the ·future and discount
them to determine the present value of the anticipated future income
gains" (Haggblade 1992:23).
Other organisations have made arbitrary decisions on projecting future
income benefits. Technoserve (Dichter 1989) used ten years of future
income projections in their impact evaluation system. For most of the NGO
impact assessment systems, the issue of future income projection is left
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to the judgment and experience of the researcher in view of the specific
context. All the systems reviewed expressed the need for more
longitudinal data collection.
3.2.5 Other Measurement Problems
Other measurement problems may be caused by an inability to measure
the impact of changes in the local and national economy and how these
economic changes affect micro-enterprises. For example, if there are
adverse economic changes, borrower performance and repayments may be
adversely effected. Declining repayment rates would negatively impact
MFls. However, even in these situations, it is possible that there would be a
positive impact in reducing poverty as borrowers may be better off with
the loan than others who did not have access to loan capital.
It is also difficult to measure the impact of an increased supply of MFI loan
capital. Increased supply of loan capital for micro-enterprises may induce
more micro-enterprises to borrow and enter the market. This may either
increase the exit rate of existing micro-enterprises or reduce their scale
and income levels. This is the saturation effect described by Harper and
Finnegan (1998) and it is especially likely if the total market demand for
goods and services produced by micro-enterprises is declining. It is
important, therefore, to understand and monitor over time the trajectory
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of enterprise product demand and/or the composition and performance of
the local economy within which the loanees are operating.
3.3 Social Cost Benefit Analysis
Since the late 1960s, the economic literature includes a number of works
on the application of social cost benefit analysis to development projects
(Dasgupta, Sen and Marglin 1972, Hansen 1978, Mishan 1988, Scott and
MacArthur 1976). Social cost benefit analysis compares the economic
benefits accruing to the economy with the economic costs of delivering
these benefits. The benefits are computed after netting out the effects of
price distortions caused by Government actions and market imperfections
or failures. Shadow prices are used to adjust actual prices for the effects
of Government actions, for market imperfections or failures, and for
externalities. Incremental increases in national income are generally the
focal point in attempting to measure benefits. Since these benefits are
computed at shadow prices reflecting the priorities of a society, this type
.
of measurement is called 'social' cost benefit analysis. Social cost benefit
analysis is contrasted with financial cost benefit analysis as the latter uses
only actual price levels.
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The application of social cost benefit analysis permits the comparison of
cost benefit ratios and internal rates of return for different types of
development initiatives within a country as well as in making cross-country
comparisons. These techniques are intended to help policy makers and
donors select projects with the highest 'real' return to society or to justify
less financially efficient investments based on incremental social benefits
achieved.
There is considerable criticism of social cost benefit analysis as a decision
making tool. These criticisms relate to factors excluded from social cost
benefit analyses such as intangible effects and indirect effects and to
assumptions that must be made in applying social cost benefit analysis.
Some of these key assumptions are selecting shadow prices which may be
different from market prices and selecting a social discount rate/social
opportunity cost of capital when calculating a cost-benefit ratio. This
Section and Chapter 8 review and replicate the social cost benefit work
done by Kilby (1985) and is not intended to broadly critique the overall
application of social cost benefit analyses in development economics.
There are few significant applications of social cost benefit analysis to
micro-finance. The most significant multi-country study is "Searching for
Benefits" (Kilby 1985), published under the sponsorship of USAID. This
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research attempted to apply social cost benefit analysis techniques to six
micro-finance institutions operating in five countries and to make
comparisons between them. The data used for this study were derived
from external project evaluations done in 1982 and 1983. These
evaluations were not specifically designed for the application of social cost
benefit analysis and data needed was absent in some cases. As a result,
researchers had to go back into the field to get supplementary data to
apply the desired analysis.
The six micro-finance institutions are:
1. PFP (Partnership for Productivity) -Upper Volta
2. UNO (Northeast Union of Assistance to Small Business) - Brazil
3. IDH (Institute for Honduran Development) - Honduras
4. DDF (Dominican Development Foundation) Micro-enterprise - Dominican
Republic
5. DDF (Dominican Development Foundation) Solidarity - Dominican
Republic
6~FDR (Rural Development Fund) - Peru
To facilitate cross-country comparisons, all data were converted to U.S.
dollars at current official exchange rates in effect for each country. A
range of economic benefits was estimated (minimum case, maximum case,
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and most likely case) based on a general set of assumptions as outlined
below. For each case, increased enterprise value added as derived from
client surveys was the starting point for measuring economic benefits. This
rationale is summarised in Kilby's introduction, as follows:
The standard of performance from which all conclusions derive is not related to
such conventional norms as loan default levels or the economic viability of the
project in terms of interest income coverage of administrative costs. Rather, the
measuring rod is net economic benefits or additions to national income. This
choice of measuring rod permits us to achieve two secondary objectives. First,
we can compare the benefit- cost ratios of small-scale enterprise projects with
aid programs in other sectors. Second, it provides us with an opportunity to
develop a specially tailored approach to small enterprise, which might serve as a
standard methodology for evaluating all such projects in the future (Kilby 1985:-
x-).
Since the increase in value added as a result of the loan would overstate
national economic benefits if employees in jobs created by loans had left a
previous job and were not replaced or if they were replaced by less
productive workers, an appropriate reduction must be made to the
increased value added for the lost output which is called the opportunity
cost of labour.
Although Kilby notes that many economists consider the opportunity cost
of labour to be zero in poor countries with high unemployment, for
purposes of his research:
A review of the empirical studies support two limited generalisations: (1) during
the peak agricultural season the opportunity cost of labour is well reflected in
the rural wage rate, and (2) male heads of micro-enterprise typically have job
opportunities elsewhere. For. the rest, albeit each case will vary with local
circumstances, we believe the applicable mechanism is that of a "ladder of job
step up." This approach holds that the job vacated by a new micro-enterprise
employee is taken over by someone previously engaged in a less productive
actlvttyand so on down the ladder until the final person is vacating a state very
close to pure unemployment (Kilby, 1985:10).
/ 135
Two polar benefit estimates, a minimum case and a maximum case, are
constructed. Both of these polar estimates start with an estimate of
increased enterprise value added resulting from the loan. The following
conventions were used in both minimum case and maximum case
estimates:
, . Client surveys were carried out from one to four years after the loan. It
is assumed that the increased income (value added) did not materialize
immediately at the time of the loan, but happened gradually. Therefore, it
is assumed value added increased at a uniform straight-line rate from the
time of the loan attaining the magnitude reported at the time of the
survey.
2. The estimation of increased value added was not continued beyond the
survey date. It was assumed that all enterprises ceased producing benefits
at the survey date. It was noted that this is ~ very conservative
assumption since most of the enterprises continue to operate and produce
a continued stream of income. Nonetheless, this assumption was deemed
justified by the unstable nature of micro-enterprises and the estimation
difficulties encountered in extrapolating future income.
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In most social cost benefit analyses, future cash flow benefits are
estimated for twenty to twenty five years and then discounted to net
present value at one or more rates representing the social opportunity
cost of capital and! or the real rate of interest. Kilby points out that such
income extrapolation is not appropriate for micro-enterprises because they
are not stable and very few stay in operation for a long time. As a result,
only actual value added was used and no future value added was
projected. This assumption is more cautious than more recent procedures
used by Hulme and Mosley (1996) which viewed loans as an accelerator to
increase income and output which reached a plateau level and then
continued at the same level. This concept of credit as an accelerator is
further discussed in Section 6.6.
Kilby made the following assumptions in constructing the minimum case,
maximum case, and most likely case estimates of economic benefits:
Minimum Case Estimate
1. The lower end of all range estimates was used in calculating elements of
value added.
2. All labour was treated as having an opportunity cost equal to the
informal sector wage rate. This includes labour provided by the owner,
family labour, and non-family employees.
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3. Training benefits were assumed equal to half the informal sector wage
for each new apprentice.
4. No weighting benefits for improvements in the distribution of income
were assumed.
5. No external economic linkages were assumed. Net forward and final
demand linkages were both assumed to be zero.
6. No consumer benefit was assumed from price decreases or price
increases prevented.
7. No economic benefit was assumed from loan diversions.
Maximum Case Estimate
1. The upper end of range estimated was used in calculating elements of
value added.
2. Only the owner is treated as having a positive opportunity cost of
labour. All other paid and unpaid workers were treated as having a zero
opportunity cost of labour.
3. Training benefits were equal to half of the informal sector wage rate for
each new apprentice.
4. Improved income distribution weight benefits were assumed equal to a
premium of SO percent added to all wage payments.
5. Net final demand linkage benefits were assumed equal to 20 percent of
direct value added, less interest paid.
6. Net backward linkages were assumed equal to 70 percent of total
purchased inputs, exclusive of those purchases attributable to retail
trading firms. This exclusion is because it is assumed that the expansion of
retail trading firmsdoes not normally lead to higher national retail sales but
to a displacement of less efficient firms and forms of distribution (Kilby
1985: 11).
7. Consumer surplus benefits were calculated at the initial quantity of
production times the estimated price reduction plus the additional output
times half the price reduction. This is an estimate of benefits to consumers
due to lower prices resulting from increased competition.
8. Economic benefits from loans diverted to other uses were assumed to
be ten percent of the loans disbursed. This crude estimate had to be made
due to the lack of any survey data on loan diversion.
The issue of loan diversion is important in micro-finance. Since loans
proceeds are fungible, it is not possible for a lender to monitor if all loan
proceeds are used exactly according to the purposes stated in loan
documents. It is likely that many borrowers divert some of the loan
proceeds to other activities and expenditures that may have a higher
marginal rate of return to the family rather than investing all the loan
proceeds in the enterprise described in the loan agreements. Some of the
common uses to which loan proceeds are diverted include emergencies,
repaying other debts (especially to moneylenders), other family income
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generating activities which may have higher returns and family rites of
passage. It is very difficult to obtain information about loan diversions in
client surveys because clients are very reluctant to acknowledge this
behaviour.
It should be noted that a consumer benefit was estimated in only two of
the six cases reviewed by Kilby. This was in Cases 1 and S. In both
situations, most of the loans were made for the same product and this led
to increased competition which caused lower retail prices and increased
quantities produced and consumed.
Having constructed a minimum and maximum estimated range of benefits,
a most likely intermediate estimate for each benefit sub-component was
determined. This was done by:
Bringing into play everything we know about the economy (e.g. unemployment
levels, the. ratio of intermediate good imports to GOP,movements in consumer
income), all the internal evidence from the evaluation report, and the personal
opinions of those with direct knowledge of the project to make fine judgments
about apportioning causality and about the size of the linkages. The sum of
these sub-components is the overall final benefit measure of the project (Kilby
1985:12).
These judgments when applied to the estimated range of benefits resulted
in the following estimates for each of the six cases:
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Table 3.1: Range of Total Benefits USAID Five Country Study, 1982-1983
(in 1981 US dollars)
1. PFP-Peru
2.UNO-Brazil
3. IDH-Honduras
4. DDF Micro-DR
5. DDF-Solidarity-DR
6. FDR-Peru
82,360
2,607,035
120,781
251,781
258,011
15792 000
852,900
12,248,358
759,959
608,993
543,443
55645 000
647,873
7,632,039
385,766
557,177
543,433
36653_.000
Programme Minimum Case Maximum Case Most Likely Case
Source: Kilby (1985: Tables 5, 9, 18, 22, 26, 29).
The most likely case estimate was near the mid-point between the
minimum and maximum estimates in Cases 2, 3 and 6. These were all
micro-finance institutions which lent to a significant proportion of retail
traders and the economic benefits did not include a high level of external
economies. In the cases of micro-finance institutions 1, 4, and 5, the most
likely estimates are closer to the maximum case in the range. In Cases 1
and 5, this is due to the strong impact of consumer benefits, resulting
from a concentration in one industry which led to increased output and
lower prices. In Case 4, the maximum case estimate had high levels of
direct value added benefits.
In estimating economic cost's, the three elements included are (' )
,
.administrative expenditures, (2) bad debts, and (3) capital, erosion. Kilby
(1985:12) notes that economic costs are much easier to estimate than'
/
economic benefits. Capital erosion. due to inflation is the most variable
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economic cost between the six reviewed. In reviewing the impact of
external environments for the six projects, it is noted that high inflation "is
powerfully detrimental to project performance. It (the problem) arises
because governments and micro-finance institutions are reluctant to set
interest rate charges that are, at a minimum, equal to the rate of inflation"
(Kilby 1985:1 11).
The varying proportion of capital erosion to total costs is best seen in
footnote b to Kilby's Table 31 which is reproduced as Table 3.2 below.
Capital erosion varies from 4 percent to 94 percent of total economic
cost.
Table 3:2: . Benefit Components as a Proportion of Total Costs (%)
Item PfP UNO IDH D(M) DDF(S) FDR
Direct Val ue Added" 18.1 63.6 33.6 393.8 397.4 51.5
Training Benefit 0.3 1.2 3.6 8.1 - 0.4
Distribution Benefit 10.3 2.8 9.7 42.0 197.8 3.8
External Economies
Forward Demand Linkage 4.9 10.8 29.0 89.0 76.0 11.0
Backward Linkage 10.4 14.1 31.9 20.9 - 26.6
Consumer Benefit 53.6 - - - 140.0 -
Qiversion Benefit 4.3 40.2 16.7 - 6.0 12.1
Total Benefit. 101.9 132.7 124.5 553.8 817.2 105.4
Total Cost" 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0._
.Notes:
a Wages, profit, interest, rent less labour opportunity cost.
b Capital erosion from inftation accounts for the following proportion of
total cost: PfP = 4%, UNO = 34%, IOH = 10%, OOF(M) = 8%, OOF(S) =
14%, FOR= 94%.
Source: Kilby (1985: 109, Table 31).
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With the estimated total economic costs of each project at 100 percent,
Table 3.2 presents the composition of total benefits as a percentage of
total costs. It is interesting to note that only the two organisations in the
Dominican Republic (DDF-Micro and DDF-Solidarity) had total direct value
added benefits in excess of total cost. These two projects also had the
highest ratios of total benefits to total costs. In the other four
programmes, direct value added benefits are less than total costs. In these
four cases, total benefits exceed total costs due to the significant impact
of external economies and distributional benefits.
Kilby also compares GDPgrowth rates with cost benefit ratios. In general,
there is not much correlation. It is noted that most of these economies
were growing until about 1979 which was followed by a period of
stagnation and contraction during which the surveys were done. These
economic problems are attributed to the OPEC- generated increases in oil
prices which had a recessionary effect on these economies. While UNO in
Brazil and FDR in Peru were adversely effected by the economic problems,
the DDF programmes in the Dominican Republic and IDH in Honduras did
not seem to turn down with their national economies.
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In the cases studied by Kilby, most of the micro-enterprises were involved
in retail activities. The loans were intended to provide working capital to
increase inventory levels such that sales turnover could be increased.
Finally, some important comments must be cited regarding the use of
control groups. This results from the question of causality. Kilby questions
whether it is " ...Iegitimate to attribute an observed increase in sales over a
two or three year period of time solely to the receipt of a loan? Taking the
polar case, could it not be that the same increase in sales would have
occurred without the loan?" (Kilby 1985:9).
To test this it would be necessary to use a control group, and only
measure the differential increase in value added between the loan
recipients and a control group. Although theoretically desirable, Kilby does
not feel that control groups are a practical option in most cases and he did
not use control groups in his study.
As a general rule, control groups are not an available choice. Firms only
cooperate with those who demand sensitive information if it is a precondition for
a loan or technical assistance. Except under unusual circumstances,
entrepreneurs will not agree to serve as a control group (Kilby 1985:9).
In considering the relatively small ratio of total benefits to costs in Cases
1,2,3, and 6 in Table 3.2 (1.02, 1.33, 1.25, and 1.05, respectively) it is
necessary to ask whether the use of control groups would have
significantly altered these ratios?
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Nubler attempts to review prior cost benefit studies as part of her impact
evaluation of micro-enterprise training schemes in Africa. She concludes
that:
In spite of almost two decades of serious efforts to promote micro-enterprises,
few general lessons have emerged. This is due to the almost complete neglect of
careful ex post evaluations. The discussion is mainly based on individual project
experience rather than on evidence from evaluation studies measuring the
impact, benefits, and costs of projects (Nubler 1996:29).
More recently, Morduch (1999) attempts to review empirical cost benefit
analyses of micro-finance institutions. However, he concludes that
"perhaps the most difficult problem-and the one most relevant from the
vantage point of the current debate into micro-finance-is that simple cost
benefit calculations fail to provide insight about the relevant counter-
factual scenario" (Morduch 1999: 1594).
In a study conducted by Khandker (1998) on the incentive group-lending
assistance provided by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, a marginal impact
figure estimated in another study (Pitt and Khandker 1998) is used in a
calculation to compute a simple cost-benefit ratio. The marginal impact
figure of 18 cent increase in household consumption increase for every
additional dollar lent to women and 11 cent increase in household
consumption for every additional dollar lent to men corresponds to cost-
benefit ratios of 0.91 .and 1.48 for lending programmes directed at women
and men.
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3.4 Poverty Reduction
Since investment in micro-finance is often justified on the basis of poverty
reduction, what evidence is there on the impact of micro-finance in
reducing poverty? This was of concern to Hulme and Mosley who
introduced their impact study of twelve micro-finance institutions in seven
countries with the admonition "that contrary to much recent writing,
micro-enterprise and/or small enterprise development should not be
equated with poverty reduction. At times the two will coincide but this
needs empirical validation and should not be assumed, as is commonly the
case" (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 108). Before conducting research on the
impact of micro-finance in reducing poverty, it was necessary for them to
define poverty, how it might be measured and who constituted the poor.
HUlme and Mosley (1996) outlined two opposing views of poverty based
on whether poverty is largely about material needs or whether it is about a
much broader set of needs that permit well being. Although the material
needs approach, which usually uses income as a surrogate, is often
criticised as being "reducttonist' (Chambers 1995), it has the advantage
of being measurable and objective (Greeley 1994). The broader view of
poverty as developed by Chambers (1995) documents many forms of
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deprivation experienced by poor people that cannot be captured by income
oriented poverty measures. Many of these deprivations have psychological
implications related to a lack of security and lack of control over daily
circumstances.
Hulme and Mosley (1996) point out that the definition of poverty is not
only analytical, but also has strategic dimensions. An absolute income
poverty approach is associated with the concept of moving households
from a below poverty line situation to a level above the poverty line. This
leads to a focus on 'promotional' (Dreze and Sen 1991) financial services
which emphasize credit for income generation and asset acquisition. In
contrast, a broader and more holistic view of poverty sees all income levels
as fluctuating and believes the dampening of dramatic reductions in
income and consumption are the best means to reduce poverty (Wright
1999). This approach sees poverty as transitory and it leads to
'protectional' (Dreze and Sen 1991) financial services that focus on
voluntary savings mechanisms, emergency consumption loans, and low risk
income generating activities that do not increase risk or indebtedness.
Hulme and Mosley (1996) do not see the promotional and protectional
strategies as polar opposites competing with each other, but are a matter
of relative prioritisation based on the definition of poverty being used.
They do not have a pre-defined framework for choosing between the two
approaches to poverty and they base the choice on personal values and
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judgments about each situation. However, they conclude that "where
absolute poverty exists we believe in the primacy of material needs"
(Hulme and Mosley 1996: 108). As a result, they used an income-oriented
approach in this research. In stodying the impact of the twelve micro-
finance institutions in reducing poverty, they disaggregated the data for
clients with household incomes below the poverty line and those with
household income above the poverty line at the time of the last loan. This
approach led them to the following three general conclusions:
, . Well designed lending programmes can improve the income of poor
people and a portion of cases can move from incomes below the poverty
line to incomes above the poverty line;
2. The impact of income generating credit in the medium term cannot be
understood solely in terms of a promotional model of credit, investment
and income;
3. There is clear evidence that the impact of a loan on a borrowers' income
is related to the level of income.
With regard to the first conclusion, the starting point in using micro-loans
to reduce poverty is the extent to which people with incomes below the
Poverty line can access loans from micro-finance institutions. Some micro-
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finance institutions use strict income and asset criteria to ensure that
loans only go to poor clients. Although these targeting procedures impose
extra costs on the lender, those institutions with poverty targeting
procedures had a larger percentage of clients below the poverty line than
open access schemes in the Hulme and Mosley (1996) study. However,
the study also mentioned several open access schemes that had a majority
of clients below the poverty line through well designed policies such as
tapered interest rates and extremely small initial loan sizes which served to
screen out richer clients. They also noticed tendencies toward serving a
richer clientele as pressures for financial sustainability increased.
"Institutions seeking to provide income generating credit to the poor while
pursuing their own financial viability will have a tendency to concentrate on
the upper and middle income poor" (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 113).
The second conclusion led to the concern that
... this notion of sustained growth in income, production, credit, and investment
captures a part of the experience of poor households that borrow, but only a
part. The differing abilities of borrowers, their initial economic and social
positions and the wider economic environment and its fluctuations ensure that
no simple model can explain the complex empirical findings of our research
(Hulme and Mosley 1996:108).
The second conclusion also led to further discussion of the vulnerability of
poor people to dramatic income reductions caused by various downward
mobility pressures and proposes more research on protectional financial
services to help poor people cope with these pressures.
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With regard to the third conclusion, "this finding should not be
unexpected given that those with the higher incomes have a greater range
of investment opportunities, more information about market conditions
and can take on more risk thanthe poorest households without
threatening the minimum needs for survival" (Hulme and Mosley
1996: 109). The empirical data across the twelve programmes led to the.
modeling of an "impact possibility frontier." This model shows an upwardly
sloping curve when graphing the percentage increase in average borrower
household income against the average borrower income as a percentage of
poverty line income before the last loan. It can be seen from Hulme and
Mosley's (1996:183) Figure 8.1 a (replicated as Figure 3.1 below) that the
size of the average percentage increase in income was directly correlated
With the average client income in relation to the poverty line across the
various programmes.
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Figure 3.1: Hulme and Mosley (1996)- The Relationship of Average
Borrower Income to Increase in Household Income Since Last Loan
Hulme and Mosley also tested to see if this relationship between the
percentage increase in income and pre-loan income as a percent of the
-
poverty line applied to clients within lending programmes as well as in
comparing averages between programmes. They noted that the impact
possibility frontier also applied amongst clients within programmes because
the upward sloping relationship repeated itself within most of the schemes.
As a result, they concluded "that the existence of this relationship imposes
a limit on the extent to which it is possible to increase impact and reduce
poverty simultaneously" (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 181 ). In interpreting
why the poorest groups generally had less relative income increase from
micro-loans, Hulme and Mosley explain that the poor cannot afford to take
much risk and they use credit mainly for protectional, non-risk increasing
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purposes which sustain family routines and consumption, rather than
promotional projects which alter routines and have greater risks.
On such (protectional) projects the rate of return is small; hence the measured
impact of our case study schemes on poorer borrowers is, on average, small.
Only the better off, by contrast, can afford to take some risks, hence only the
better off borrow for promotional purposes such as the purchase of green
revolution technology or other capital deepening. Hence only the better off
experience the high returns on capital which go with such promotional uses of
loan funds, hence the measured average impact of our schemes on them is
larger. Needless to say, not every loan to a middle or higher income earner is
productive: some loan-supported investments fail. But these failures, in the
schemes we have examined, are more than balanced by the successes, with the
consequence that measured scheme impact is higher amongst richer than
amongst poorer borrowers. This outcome will obviously feed through into
borrowers' expectations, and may make it harder to persuade poor people to
take the first step on to the credit ladder than to take subsequent ones (Hulme
and Mosley 1996:182).
As a further explanation, they noted a high correlation between average
loan size and borrower income. Poorer clients took smaller loans to reduce
risk. The relationship between loan size and borrower income was tested
via regression analysis and was significant at a five percent level in six of
the seven programmes studied. This leads to the conclusion that offering
very small initial loan sizes is the best way to target the poorest clients
and get them to start on the credit ladder. "We argue that the most
effective way of targeting credit on the poor was not to apply an explicit
means test, but rather to offer very small loans, as these would only be
taken up by the poor,would inflict less risk on them and save the lender
the administrative cost of targeting" (Hulme and Mosley 1996:195).
While acknowledging the tradeoff between the poverty of persons reached
Via loan schemes and the average impact per household, the important
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issue for Hulme and Mosley is maximising the total impact of micro-finance
in reducing poverty. This results in two primary strategic options:
, . Implementing programme design features which move the impact
possibility frontier outward; and
2. Taking the impact possibility frontier as a given, but deliberately seeking
to attract poorer borrowers and then moving them up the credit ladder at
a faster rate of growth.
Programmes which had certain design features seemed to have better
financial performance and a higher level of relative impact per household at
a given level of poverty. Hulme and Mosley ('996)
discovered a positive correlation between the average impact per
household and the institution's financial performance as measured by the
levels of real interest rates and loan delinquency. These well performing
programmes were viewed as using a strategy of pushing the impact
possibility frontier outward. The specific programme design features
associated with this strategy are:
* Measures to reduce risk via, borrower savings;
* Measures to reduce risk via better borrower screening;
* Measures to reduce transaction costs;
* Measures to increase real effective interest rates;
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* Measures to strengthen loan collection and increase repayment rates;
* Measures which remove demand constraints to which borrowers are
subject.
Each of these measures affects the quality of the loan portfolio by
screening out bad projects. As a result, the average impact per borrower is
increased at the same level of poverty. Programmes that use all or most of
these features are financially more successful and have a larger economic
impact because they have moved the impact possibility frontier beyond
programmes that do not have such features. Section 8. 5 includes a
discussion of changes made by IOH during the 1980s. These changes by
IDH include many of the measures discussed by Hulme and Mosley and
these changes had the effect of improving the social cost benefit ratios
(increasing impact) by moving the impact possibility frontier outward.
Some researchers have argued that solidarity group lending schemes which
Use group screening and peer pressure are more successful (Lassen 1991,
MCKee 1989, Malhotra 1992) because they transfer some of the cost of
loan screenfng and collection from the lender to borrower groups. This
.helps the lender reduce unit costs and maintain high repayment rates.
While Hulme and Mosley acknowledge the success of many group lending
schemes, they conclude "that across sample regressions, finally, confirm
that, contrary to the arguments of some recent NGO based work, the
/
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organisation of borrowers in groups is neither necessary nor sufficient for
success" (Hulme and Mosley 1996:55). In looking at the loan design
measures in relation to loan access for the poorest people, group schemes
may restrict loan access to the poorest households and to start-up
activities because other potential group members screen out these
potential group members with whom they do not want to share risk.
Although this group screening process tends to reduce risks and costs for
the lender, the proportion of poor households below the poverty line able
to get loans is also reduced. Hulme and Mosley Cl 996:1 74) conclude that
"self exclusion and group exclusion keep the poorest out of group based
schemes and thus individualized approaches will be more likely to meet the
needs of the very poor."
Hulme and Mosley do not discuss how MFls will be able to make very small
individual loans to the poorest.clients in a financially viable manner. Such
loans are generally not profitable for MFls and there is little evidence of
MFls making these kind of loans in practice ..
The second strategy takes the impact possibility frontier as a given, and
attempts to maximise pover,ty reduction by rapidly increasing the
proportion of new clients below the poverty line.
/
155
This is illustrated by a model which shows the short-term trade-off
between maximising poverty reduction and total economic impact. This
model is based on reducing the "poverty gap" for clients below the
poverty line. This is illustrated by the following formula (Hulme and Mosley
1996: 36)
Delta P= P/NP (w-w') Delta E
Delta P is the total reduction in the poverty gap (numbers below the
poverty line multiplied, for each individual, by the distance that she or he
falls below the poverty line) which results from the number of individuals
whose employment and incomes are affected by the loan programme,
taking into account any persons who directly or indirectly lose employment
as a result of the loan (Delta E) and where (w - w') is the average change
in their incomes and P/NP are the proportion of poor beneficiaries (versus
non-poor beneficiaries) of all those to whom loans have been given. If the
objective of a programme is to reduce poverty, Hulme and Mosley (1996)
argue that the proportion of poor beneficiaries should be raised to as close
as possible to one. This would mean that all clients are below the poverty
line and represent the poorest groups in society.
Using this formula for reducing the poverty gap and building an illustrative
model, Hulme and Mosley show how a lender can theoretically increase
156
total impact on poverty Cdefined as a reduction in the poverty gap) and
counterbalance the lower average impact per borrower while achieving the
same level of total long-term income impact. The poverty gap can be
reduced by increasing the proportion of new borrowers below the poverty
line and achieving increasingly larger loans in successive loan cycles. They
note that this process cannot be accomplished in one loan cycle because
the very poor will not be interested in large borrowings that increase risk.
The model requires a continual intake of new borrowers below the poverty
line and building up loan sizes and borrowers' ability to undertake increased
risk through a sequence of multiple increasingly larger loans. Hulme and
Mosley Cl 996) show that several of the micro-finance institutions they
studied had done this by maintaining a high proportion of clients below the
poverty line and reaching a very large numbers of clients. The poverty gap
reduction model used by Hulme and Mosley is applied to the IOH data and
the poverty impact of IOH is discussed in Section 6.5.
Pitt and Khandker Cl 998) examined the impact of micro-enterprise
assistance to the poor in Bangladesh provided by Grameen Bank. This
assistance included dynamic-incentive group lending and various training
and educational services. Using a large sample of households which
included household from villages with no access to credit programmes as a
control group, various econometric techniques were applied to estimate
. that household consumption increases by 18 taka for every 100 taka lent
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to women and 11 taka for every 100 taka lent to men. However, using
more simple comparisons across treatment and control villages, controlling
for both household and village level characteristics and not making
distinctions by gender, Morducli (1999) finds that this increase in
household consumption disappears.
Gulli and Berger (1999) reviewed a number of impact studies from Latin
American micro-finance institutions to determine their impact in reducing
poverty. They concluded that:
" .urban micro-enterprise development programmes may not necessarily reach
poor people. Non-targeted micro-enterprise programmes may indirectly reduce
poverty through the creation of new employment for poor people and increased
spending by wealthier micro-enterprises, but special measures may be needed to
reach poor micro-entrepreneurs directly. Conventional micro-credit programmes
provide loans to owners of micro-enterprises who are generally less poor than
wage-employees in micro-enterprises. The poorest people in the micro-enterprise
sector are the sole operators (self-employed) (Gulli and Berger 1999:19).
After considering various MFI options to better reach poorer people
including strict targeting, they conclude that "poorer strata of the
population might be reached if a broader range, of financial services, such
as savings and consumer credit, is provided for both wage-employees and
the self-employed, and if products are better tailored to client needs"
(Gulli and Berger 1999:26). This conclusion supports 'protectional'
financial services as the best means to meet the needs of the poorest
.
People. Rutherford and Singh (1997) concur with this view based on their
work with OFIO-sponsored programmes that provided savings services to
the poor in urban India.
/
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CHAPTERFOUR
HONDURANECONOMYAND IDH
4. 1 General Economic Situation
This section describes the macro-economic context of the field survey
data collected in the period 1989- 1992. The later trajectory of the
Honduran economy, while of considerable interest (especially to the
author), is outside the scope of this thesis which focuses on the choice of
methodology for micro-credit impact evaluations.
Honduras ranks amongst the least developed countries in the Western
Hemisphere. Although some economic progress was made during the
1970s and 1980s, per capita GNP in 1991 remained low at an estimated
$580 (UNDP 1994:165). Twenty seven percent of the adult population
was illiterate and over twenty percent of children under 5 years of age
were suffering from malnutrition in the early 1990s (World Bank
1993:222). According to a UNDPstudy based on 1991 data, Honduras was
ranked as the thirty fourth poorest country in the world and the third
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (UNDP 1994).
Throughout the 1980s, the development strategy of Honduras was based
on structuralist policies i.e. import-substitution behind high protective
barriers and extens!ve government intervention involving credit subsidies,
price controls, tax incentives, and a fixed overvalued exchange rate. As a
result of this. strategy, manufacturing became inefficient, prices paid in .
local currency under-remunerated producers of agricultural exports, with
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resultant loss of international market share, and open urban unemployment
reached more than ten percent in the late 1980s (Economist Intelligence
Unit 1994). Despite a protective trade regime and high import tariffs,
imports grew rapidly and reached more than forty percent of GOPby the
middle 1980s (World Bank 1993). The combination of strong domestic
demand for imports and declining exports resulted in growing balance of
payments problems during the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the Government
resorted to arrearages on external debt, which intensified the pressure on
the balance of payments and precipitated increased inflation. By the end of
1989, arrears on external debt amounted to more than $600 million and
the black market exchange rate reached 14 lempira to the US dollar (World
Bank 1993). The official exchange rate had been fixed at 2 lempira per US
dOllar since the early 1960s (IMF 1993).
In early 1990, a new administration took office which was committed to
dealing with the economic crisis and to re-establishing Honduras' credibility
With the international financial community. The government introduced an
economic·reform programme in March 1990 aimed at eliminating major
macroeconomic distortions, simplifying the regulatory framework, reducing
subsidies, and encouraging private sector investment. This stabilization
and macroeconomic adjustment programme continued through 1993 with
the support of the IMF. By the end of 1992, import tariffs were reduced
Within a 5 to 20 percent band, price controls were reduced, lending rates
Were liberalized and credit subsidies were eliminated (World Bank 1993).
As a result of the initial impact Of the economic reform measures and the
oil shock arising from the Gulf Crisis, real GOPgrowth fell from 4.3 percent
in 1989 to 0.1 percent in 1990. However, real GOPgrowth resumed to 3.2
Percent in 1991 and 5.6 percent in 1992 (Economist Intelligence Unit
1994). The fiscal deficit, which was approximately 8 percent of GOPin
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1989 and 1990, was reduced to 3.9 percent of GOPin 1991 and 4 percent
of GOPin 1992 (World Bank 1993).
As part of the economic reform measures introduced in 1990, foreign
exchange rates were liberalized and the government began to authorize
commercial banks to buy and sell foreign exchange at market prices,
without reference to central bank exchange rates. The market exchange
rate of the Honduran lempira quickly adjusted from the long term fixed
exchange rate of 2 lempira per US dollar to approximately 5 lempira per US
dollar by the end of 1990. However, the exchange rate remained
reasonably stable during 1991 at about 5 lempira per US dollar and the
market exchange rate at the end of 1991 approximated 5.4 lempira per US
dollar. This relative stability continued during 1992 and the market
exchange rate was 5.83 lempira per US dollar at the end of 1992 (IMF
1993).
The economic reforms introduced in 1990 and related devaluation of the
Honduran currency, combined with oil price increases caused by the Gulf
Crisis, resulted in large increases in inflation. The consumer price index,
which increased by about ten percent in 1989, increased by twenty three
percent in 1990 and thirty four percent in 1991 (Economist Intelligence
Unit 1994). Average annual inflation during the 1980s had been
approximately 7 percent (UNOP 1994). However, due to the stabilization
of the exchange rate and reduced fiscal deficits, inflation began to subside
and the consumer price index increased by 8.7 percent and 10.8 percent
in 1992 and 1993, respectively (Economist Intelligence Unit 1994).
According to the ILO, seventy four percent of the urban population and
eighty perc~nt of the rural population of Honduras were living below the.
national poverty line in 1990 (ILO 1994). This represents a significant
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increase in poverty since 1980 when forty percent of the urban population
and seventy five percent of the rural population were estimated to be in
poverty (ILO 1994). According to UNDP, approximately thirty seven
percent of Hondurans were living below the absolute poverty line in 1990
(UNDP 1994). This estimate of people in absolute poverty amounted to
fourteen percent of the urban population and fifty five percent of the rural
population. The ILO and UNDP studies do not explain how poverty was
defined or measured.
In an earlier study published by the World Bank, Altimer (1982) carefully
defines measures used to estimate the extent of poverty in eleven Latin
American countries, including Honduras. Altimer explains that:
the idea of poverty is based in value judgements as to what the minimum
adequate levels of welfare and the absolutely essential basic needs are and what
degree of deprivation is intolerable. Such judgements consequently imply a
reference to some norm of basic needs and their satisfaction makes it possible
to distinguish between those who are poor and those who are not. The concept
of poverty is essentially normative, and its actual content varies as does the
norm of basic needs or welfare on which it depends (Altimer 1982:10).
Altimer reviewed various definitions of poverty, absolute poverty and
destitution. He explained that "the absolute poverty lines drawn were
based on diet, an estimation being made of the cost of a food basket to
cover minimum nutritional needs adequately" (Altimer 1982:40). He
carefully developed an absolute poverty line for the eleven countries
studied based on the cost of a food basket of minimum nutritional needs in
each country. He converted this local cost to US dollars at 1970 prices
, and exchange rates to facilitate cross-country comparisons. After carefully
establishing the absolute poverty line for each country, he concluded that
the poverty line should be set at twice the level of absolute poverty. The
basis for this conclusion is carefully explained. Based on his study, Altimer
Concluded that the absolute poverty line for Honduras required an average
77 US dollars in annual consumption per capita. This is an average
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comprised of 92 US dollars in urban areas and 71 US dollars in rural areas.
He applied his poverty line estimates to income data gathered by the ILO
in 1976 and estimated the extent of poverty and absolute poverty as set
forth in Table 4.1 below:
Table 4.1: Estimated Extent of Poverty and Absolute Poverty in Honduras
in 1976
Urban Rural National
Percent of Population Below Absolute Poverty Line
Honduras 15 57 45
Eleven Countries 10 34 19
Percent of Population Below Poverty Line
Honduras 40 75 65
Eleven Countries 26 62 40
Source: Altimer 1982.
4.2 informal Economy and the Micro-enterprise Sector
Throughout the 1980's, the average annual population growth of Honduras
was 3.3 percent (World Bank 1993). This growth rate resulted in a total
population of approximately 5 million people in 1991 (World Bank 1993).
Of this population, approximately 2.7 million people were more than
sixteen years old (World Bank 1993). According to the Economist
Intelligence Unit (1994), the economically active population grew from 1.5
million people in 1988 to 1.7 million people in 1992. At the end of 1990,
the economically active population was estimated to be 1.6 million people.
Open unemployment increased from eight percent of the economically
active population in 1988 to more than ten percent in 1992. However,
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (1 994:43):
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... open unemployment is only the tip of the iceberg of underutilised labour. Rural
unemployment is very high. The UN Commission For Latin America and the
Caribbean estimates total unemployment (including underemployment) to be
about double the rate for open unemployment.
Using these estimated rates, the total number of unemployed and
underemployed people in Honduras increased by more than 100,000
people between 1988 and 1992. The economy could not create enough
formal sector jobs to meet the needs of an increasing population.
There are no estimates available of the number of micro-enterprises in
Honduras or the number of people working in the micro-enterprise sector
between 1988 and 1992. However, based on the estimated increase in
open unemployment, the estimated population increase, and general
survey data from other countries (Liedholm and Mead 1987), the
researcher estimates that between 400,000 and 600,000 people were
working in micro-enterprises in the early 1990s. This represents between
25 percent and 40 percent of the economically active population.
Based on research in Honduras (Stallman and Pease 1983), approximately
68 percent of the workers in Honduras worked for micro and small
enterprises with less than ten workers. They further disaggregated this
research in three rural areas of Honduras and found that 95 percent of the
Workers were employed by informal micro-enterprises with one or two
Workers.
Recognising the importance of the informal sector and micro-enterprises to
the economy of Honduras, USAID commissioned several research projects
in 1989 and 1990. The first survey (Nathan 1989) studied one thousand
small and micro-enterprises in March, 1989. This survey focussed on urban
areas and 68 percent of the respondents were in the capital city of
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Tegucigalpa. The objectives of this survey were to determine the growth
potential and growth barriers facing these enterprises. Among the most
frequently mentioned problems were a lack of access to financing and the
low level of demand caused by general economic conditions. It is
interesting to note that 25 percent of the respondents indicated that they
had received some kind of loan for the business. This is a higher
percentage of loan recipients than most micro-enterprise surveys and this
may be due to the large proportion of respondents being in the capital
city.
With the start of the economic structural adjustment programme in early
1990 as explained in Section 4.1, USAID commissioned a second survey to
consider the effects of the economic adjustment policies on micro-
enterprises. This was designed as a longitudinal survey attempting to
survey the same 330 micro-enterprises in March 1990 and March 1991.
The report (Nathan 1991) indicates some of the methodological
challenges faced in this kind of longitudinal research due to the mobility
and transient nature of micro-enterprises. The report generally concludes
that the economic adjustment programme did not have a significant
negative impact on these micro-enterprises between March 1990 and
March 1991 (Nathan 1991). Average revenues increased by almost 25
percent per micro-enterprise, which is slightly more than the 23.3 percent
inflation rate in 1990. Total employment by these 330 micro-enterprises is
estimated to have declined by 1.70 percent during 1990.
It is relevant to note that while private consumption in Honduras increased
by an average of 3.1 percent between 1985 and 1989, total private
consumption grew by only 0.3 percent in 1990 (Economist Intelligence
Unit 1994). This represents a net reduction of about three percent in
private consumption per capita. This slow down in private consumption is
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generally attributed to the economic adjustment programmeme
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1994).
It is interesting to note that the micro-enterprises surveyed had
experienced a real growth in revenues during a year in which total private
consumption had grown very little and private consumption per capita had
declined. This may reflect a counter-cyclical tendency in the demand for
goods and services produced by micro-enterprises. During periods of
economic difficulty and uncertainty, many middle class and lower-middle
class consumers become less economically secure and more price
sensitive. Many such consumers change their buying patterns away from
more expensive and higher quality formal sector goods to informal sector
goods which are usually purchasable in smaller quantities and are perceived
to be cheaper. This counter-cyclical tendency has been noted in other
countries- Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Bulgaria and Russia (Vander Weele and
Markovich 2000). This counter-cyclical tendency was also observed in the
survey of 92 micro-enterprises at the end of 1992 conducted as part of
this research. Question 2Sc of the field survey (Annex I) asked about the
general direction of "the volume of your own business?" Of the 92 micro-
enterprises surveyed, 47 answered with Response number 1, meaning
"much increase;'.
Another interesting observation in the USAID survey of 330 micro-
enterprises between March 1990 and March 1991 was the perception that
. many new micro-enterprises selling similar goods and services were'
entering the market (Nathan 1991). When the formal sector comes under
ec;onomic stress and begins to reduce paid employment, many new people
start micro-enterprises in the informal sector due to low entry barriers and
the need to make a survival income until the formal economy improves
again (Liedholm and Mead 1987, Nubler 1996). This trend of an increasing
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number of micro-enterprise competitors was also noted in the field survey
of 92 micro-enterprises conducted as part of this research. Question 25 b
of the survey (Annex I) asked about "the change in the number of
businesses like yours in the area?" Of the 92 respondents, 66 answered
with Response number 1, indicating "much increase".
In considering the applicability of this research in Honduras to the other
countries, the effects of economic structural adjustment in Honduras
during the period studied (1989 to 1992) are applicable to many other
developing countries which have experienced similar structural adjustment.
These effects include a sudden increase in inflation, currency devaluation,
reduced investment, capital flight, declining consumption per capita, a
decline in the formal economy, and an increase in the number of micro-
enterprises trying to survive in the informal economy.
4.3 Profile of IDH
El Instituto Dessarrollo Hondureno (IDH) was legally registered as a not for
profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) on March 6, 1979. The
organization was formed by a group of thirteen Honduran Christian
business and professional people. These thirteen founders formed the
general assembly. The initial discussions leading to the formation of IDH
were initiated in 1977 by an NGO in the United States called the Institute
for International Development Incorporated (1101). 1101 changed its name to
Opportunity lnternational in 1985. 1101 was formed in 1970 to help small
and micro-enterprises in developing countries. It was formed and funded by
a small group of Christian business people in the United States. Its first
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projects were direct loans to small businesses in Colombia in 1971. By
1975, 1101began to explore a partnership model of working in several
countries in South and Central America. Under this approach, 1101partnered
with a local NGO founded by local Christian business people who had the
common vision to help poor people via job creation.
Soon after the legal formation of IDH, 1101began to provide funding
according to a Memorandum of Agreement under which 1101promised to
grant IDH initial capital of $250,000 over three years. This capital was
fully granted by 1982.
IDH identified itself as a group of "Honduran Christians motivated to work
voluntarily to develop an institution to serve the poor by providing
initiatives and education for production and job creation" (Translation from
the Charter of IDH 1979).
Over the twelve years period until 1991, IDH provided individual loans,
training programmes, and direct technical assistance. To the end of 1991,
IDH had made 3,246 individual loans totaling 11.4 million lempira (1991
Annual Report of IDH). IDH claimed that these loans had generated 5,546
jobs and had sustained another 6,926 jobs (Annual Report of IDH 1991).
From the beginning of IDH, there is a clear concern for the holistic
development of its clients. The founding documents of IDH mention the
. "betterment of the lives of beneficiaries in moral, ethical, and economic
aspects" (translation from the Charter of IDH 1979). In addition to loans,
I~H implemented its vision of holistic development via formal training
programmes and direct technical assistance visits to clients. The training
programme provided formal courses on various administrative and
technic~1 subjects. T_hesetraining courses were voluntary. Although IDH
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charged a nominal fee, they did not intend to fully cover training costs and
management felt that the training costs were subsidized by the interest
being charged to clients. (interview with Edgardo Vargas, Executive
Director of IDH in June, 1992.)
During these formal training courses, there were often discussions of
moral, ethical, spiritual, family and personal concerns. The training
curriculum included verses from the Bible and the sessions were always
opened with a brief prayer. Based on interviews with the senior
management of IDH in 1992, they felt that IDH was strongly identified by
clients and the general public as an Evangelical Christian organisation. All
the senior managers in 1992 identified themselves as Evangelical
Christians (interviews with senior managers of IDH in June, 1992).
Loan officers were supposed to make monthly technical and supervisory
visits to each of their clients. These visits often provided an opportunity to
discuss family and personal issues and the loan officers were encouraged
to help provide spiritual guidance for interested clients. In December 1992,
the Executive Director of IDH was concerned that these monthly visits
were becoming merely loan collection visits as IDH had grown rapidly and
the loan officers seemed to have less time to spend with individual clients
(interview with Edgardo Vargas in June, 1992).
IDH began with a vision of lending to borrowers:
.... that not only demonstrated direct employment creation, but also the ability to
grow rapidly and create additional employment in the future. The goal was to
provide initial financial assistance so that businesses could then be able to apply
for credit in the formal banking sector, and no second loans were given (Befus
1992:1 ).
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This policy of no second loans was changed in the later part of the 1980s
after IDH had taken a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank and
they had a larger fund to deploy.
Due to economic conditions in Honduras, it also became apparent that the formal
banking system was not providing assistance to growing businesses, and second
loans became a safe and inexpensive means of placing loan funds. The need to
find a safe and profitable place to put the funds superseded the desire to find
entrepreneurs capable of managing growing businesses (Befus 1992:2).
The individual loan portfolio grew from 1987 to 1992 as set forth in Table
4.2 below:
Table 4.2: IDH Individual Loan Portfolio from 1987 to 1991
(In Lempira)
Year Number of loans Value of loans Number of Value of
Outstanding Outstanding loans made loans made
1987 691 1,817,000 360 1,061,148
1988 824 2,032,000 363 1,111,620
1989 1,051 2,554,000 675 1,916,937
1990 1,213 2,996,000 722 2,156,700
1991 1,326 3,260,000 581 2,707,998
Source: IOHAnnual Reports for 1989, 1990, and 1991
In line with the growth if its lending activities, the training activities and
visits to clients also grew as indicated in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: IDH Training Courses, Participants and Clients Visits from 1983
to 1991
Year Training Participants in Client visits
Courses Training Courses
1983 32 384
1984 14 220
1985 18 247
1986 34 466
1987 45 834
1988 34 926
1989 50 - 1,154 5,182
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1990
1991
45
70
690
1,160
5,962
7,426
Source: IDH Annual Reports of 1989, 1990, and 1991.
At the end of 1991, IDH had a board of directors of five people who were
elected by the General Assembly for a term of three years. The board of
directors appointed an Executive Director and there were 21 staff
members, including nine loan officers. IDH had five branch offices covering
the five largest cities in Honduras. During the latter half of the 1980's, the
amount of loan capital available to IDH appeared to be growing in relation
to the size and capacity of the organization. IDH had been making progress
in its operational sustainability, increasing from less than SO percent
operational sustainability in 1985 to almost 96 percent in 1989.
(Operational sustainability was defined by IDH as the ratio of operating
costs covered by income earned from client interest and fees. However, in
computing operating costs IDH did not include any loan loss provisions.)
As indicated in Table 4.4 below, the trend of increasing operating
sustainability began to reverse in 1990 and 1991.
Table 4.4: IDH Operations Summary from 1989 to 1991 (In Lempira)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year Earned Operating Operating Amount of Cost per
Revenue Costs Sustainability Loans Unit Lent
Percentage Disbursed
(2/3) (3/4)
1989 486,200 506,812 95.9 1,916,937 .264
1990 515,349 548,027 . 94.0 2,156,700 .254
1991 750,412 899,956 83.3 2,707,998 .332
Source: IDH Annual Reports for 1989, 1990, and 1991
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Due to inflation in 1990 and 1991, operating costs increased at a faster
rate than the loan portfolio and earned income. The consumer price index
increased by 23 per cent in 1990 and IDH tried to compensate for cost
increases by increasing interest rates on individual loans from 15 per cent
to 24 per cent. The interest rate increase was put into effect near the end
of 1990. However, inflation increased to 34 per cent in 1991 before it was
reduced back under 10 per cent for 1992 and subsequent years.
Even more alarming than the decline in operating sustainability was a large
increase in delinquency in 1991. At the end of 1991, 700 loans
representing more than 50 percent of the total loans were delinquent by
more than 30 days and these delinquent loans totaled about 682,000
lempira of principal, representing a portfolio at risk of 22 percent (1991
IDH Annual Report).
The board of IDH became very concerned about the increasing portfolio
delinquency and the declining operating sustainability in 1992. Although
the Executive Director attributed these problems to general economic
conditions caused by structural adjustment in Honduras, the board of
directors commissioned an independent review of operations by
Opportunity International. This review was done by David Befus, the
Opportunity International Regional Director of Latin America. This review
(Befus 1992) pointed out many operational problems and inefficiencies
. that needed to be corrected. Although the Executive Director began to
make some of the changes needed, he resigned in early 1993 after he had
S~cured a position with another NGO.The review by Befus and the
appointment of a new Executive Director in early 1993 led to a change in
IDH strategy to focus on smaller loans to poorer clients, especially women.
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The social cost benefit implications of this strategy change are discussed
in Section B.S.
According to the report by Befus (1992:3):
... board members of IOHwere concerned about the increasing collateral and
experience restrictions used to qualify individual loan prospects. These
requirements were viewed by management as necessary for promoting better
collection performance, but also created a barrier for the poor, the original target
population of IOH.
By the middle of 1993, the new group loan strategy of IOHwas being
implemented to reach poorer clients via solidarity group loans to groups of
between four and ten clients and 'community bank' loans to groups of
between 14 and 50 people. In addition to reaching poorer clients, these
new group loan products allowed IOH to move in the direction being
desired by Opportunity International and other donor agencies of increased
outreach. In 1995, the 'community bank' loans were changed to 'trust
bank' loans in line with the new product developed by affiliates of
Opportunity International on a global basis. By 1996, most of the IOH loans
were via 'trust banks' and there were very few individual loans being made.
This trend has continued through 2002 when 94 percent of the 15,1 10
loans made by IOHwere via trust bank groups (Annual Report of IOH
2002).
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CHAPTERFIVE
RESEARCHMETHODOLOGYAND DESCRIPTIVEINFORMATION
5.1. Research Methodology
s.1.1 Smallest and Youngest Firms
Empirical research from industrialized countries indicates that the smallest
and youngest firms have the highest growth rates and also the greatest
rates of failure (Bates 1989, Evans 1989a, Evans 1989b, Simon and Bonni
1958). There has been little empirical research on the growth and
dynamics of the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises in developing
countries. Little is known about the economic impact of assistance
provided to these smallest and youngest micro-enterprises.
Micro-enterprise assistance schemes are often classified as involving either
enterprise formation, enterprise expansion, or enterprise graduation
(Martinez 1990). The clients involved in enterprise formation are generally
the poorest and least experienced. As a result, loans made for enterprise
formation are perceived to be the riskiest and least profitable for the
lender. Nonetheless, since assistance to micro-enterprises is often
justified on the basis that it contributes to poverty alleviation, it is
important to study whether enterprise formation services for this riskiest
client group have a positive economic impact.
Since micro-finance institutions around the world are under pressure to
become financially sustainable and even profitable, there is evidence that
they select clients and use methodologies which minimize risk (Liedholm
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1991, Martinez 1990, Otero 1989). As a result, many micro finance
institutions have discontinued enterprise formation loans because they are
perceived to be too risky and are not considered cost effective. In
practice, for those micro-finance institutions that make enterprise
formation loans, there is a growing trend to make them on a group basis.
These group loans involve cross-guarantees by the borrowers and they are
considered to be less risky and more cost effective by the lending
institutions. In part, this is usually attributed to the mutual support and
peer repayment pressure generated amongst the group members.
However, a comparison of individual and group enterprise formation loans
is beyond the objectives of this study.
This study examines the impact of individual enterprise formation loans
made by IOH in Honduras during the period from 1988 to 1992. As
discussed in Section 3.2, empirical research on the impact of assistance to
micro-enterprises has been hampered by the issue of causality. How do we
know that the enterprises studied would not have performed as well or
even better without credit or other assistance? There have been some
attempts'touse control groups to address this issue. However, the use of
Control groups in micro-enterprise research has been limited (Boomgard.
1991, Farbman and Steel 1992, Liedholm and Mead 1990) The research
design used in this study introduces a matching control group in an
attempt to address the issue of causality. The research selection
parameters provide that both the IOH subjects and the control group
subjects are from the same neighbourhoods and are similar in enterprise
age and size. Since the enterprises are of a similar age, size, and
neighbourhood, the receipt of credit is the major differentiating enterprise
variable between the two groups. As a result, it is possible to determine if
access to credit at the enterprise formation stage makes any difference in
the economic impact.
176
As discussed in Section 4.3, IDH provided other services that were
connected to its loans. These other services included formal training
courses, informal consulting by project officers, and networking with other
clients. These other services were related to IDH's holistic Christian view of
development. The study design did not attempt to distinguish between the
effects of lending services and other, non-lending, services. The statistical
tests in Chapters Six and Seven are thus tests of the joint effectiveness of
the lending and non-lending services combined.
The research design described in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 does not
attempt to control for differences in personal factors such as the
proprietor's age, gender, religion, education, and experience. The literature
is not clear whether any of these personal factors make a meaningful
difference in the success of micro-enterprises (Bates 1990, Gartner 1989,
Liedholm and Mead 1987, Liedholm and Mead 1991). As further discussed
in Chapter Seven, multiple linear regression techniques are used to
evaluate if any of these personal variables are significant in measuring
differences in economic performance.
5.1.2 Survey Document
The research is considered ex-post facto field research for classification
purposes. The field research and data collection was done during the last
half of 1992 whilst the researcher was residing in Honduras. The data were
collected via a survey document administered in personal interviews with
both the IDH and control group subjects. An English translation of the final
survey document is provided in Annex I.
The initial draft of the survey document was done in early 1992 whilst the
researcher was residing in the UK. This initial draft was given to the
Supervisors for review and comment, after which it was revised. It was
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then given to Dr. David Befus and to Mr. Edgardo Vargas, the Executive
Director of IDH, for review and consideration of the data that could be
gathered efficiently in the context. (Dr. Befus was the Regional Director for
Latin America for a micro-enterprise NGOnamed Opportunity
International.) Dr. Befus was consulted on issues related to data collection
in Honduras. Following these suggested revisions, the survey document
was translated into Spanish by a professional translator. To test the
translation, a second professional translator translated the Spanish draft
back into English. After some minor translation refinements were made in
consultation with Dr. Befus, the survey document was completed in English
and Spanish.
The Spanish survey document was then field tested with eight IDH clients
who did not qualify as research subjects. Several final amendments were
then made to the survey document as a result of the field-testing.
5.1.3 IDH Client Selection
The research subjects selected for the study were the smallest and
youngest enterprises served by IDH in Tegucigalpa, Danli , and Juticalpa.
To select the smallest and youngest enterprises, the following selection
parameters were used:
1. Enterprise started between January 1, 1988 and December 31,
1990, and
2. First time loan client of IDH, and
3. First individual loan received from IDH in 1989 or 1990, and
4. First loan was received within 12 months of date enterprise
started, and
S. No more than two employees in addition to the proprietor at
inception of the enterprise, and
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6. No more than two employees in addition to the proprietor at the
time of the first loan from IDH.
Since the survey was conducted at the end of 1992, a condition for
inclusion in the sample was that the business started in 1988, 1989, or
1990. As a result, each enterprise was at least two years old at the time
of the survey. As indicated in the review of empirical research in Section
3.2.5, time sequence is a problematic issue in micro-enterprise research
(Boomgard 1991, Leidhom and Mead 1991). Most researchers and
practitioners collect data at the time loans are issued for ease in data
collection. However, this does not permit the researcher to determine what
really happened to the enterprise after the loan was made. For example, at
the time of the loan, the client may indicate they will hire three new
workers. However, will these jobs actually exist in one year? There is a lack
of longitudinal data in the micro-enterprise field because it is often hard to
locate and interview micro-enterprise owners after much time has elapsed
(Leidhom and Mead 1991). Research indicates that this is due to the
mobility and vulnerability of micro enterprises (Liedholm and Mead 1987,
Leidhom and Mead 1991). By selecting only enterprises started in 1988,
1989, or 1990, each enterprise in the survey is between 24 and 60
months old at the time of the survey in December, 1992. Twenty-four
months is considered to be a sufficiently long term period for making
meaningful measurements. It is believed that 60 months is the longest
realistic period in which most clients could still be located and interviewed.'
The selection parameters resulted in a mean enterprise age at the time of
the survey (December 1992) of 39 months for the IDH clients and 40
I It should be noted that most IDH individual loans are for a term of between 12 and 24 months. After the
client has repaid the loan, IDH does not have an ongoing monitoring relationship with the client. Therefore,
60 months was considered the longest possible time period in which clients could still be found and
interviewed.
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months for the control group. This difference in mean is not statistically
significant at the 5 percent level.
Criterion 5 provides a limit of two employees at the inception of the
enterprise to exclude enterprises started with larger amounts of capital
and with greater growth potential. Since research indicates that most
micro-enterprises are started with two or fewer employees (Fisseha and
Davies 1981, Mead, Fisseha and McPherson 1991, Rubio 1991, Stallman
and Pease 1983), this limitation is considered an important factor in
making sure the sample only included the smallest firms at inception. This
condition resulted in excluding three IOH clients who had more than two
employees at inception.
The limit of two employees at the time of the first loan from IOH in
Criterion 6 is intended to exclude enterprises that had already showed
signs of success before their first loan from IOH. This reduces the possible
attribution of differences between IOH clients and the control group to the
selection by IOH of clients that were already evidencing success. This
condition resulted in excluding two clients who had started with two or
less employees, but had grown to more than two employees at the time of
their first loan from IOH.
Similarly, Criterion 4 requires that the first loan from IOH be within twelve
months of the date the enterprise started to also eliminate the possibility
of self-selection censoring. By limiting the sample to clients who received
their first loan within 12 months of enterprise inception, it could not be
argued IOH selected clients because they already had a successful history.
This condition was also imposed to ensure that the clients selected for
research were the youngest- enterprises at the time of the first loan from
IDH and the credit could be classified as enterprise formation assistance.
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The IDH clients were selected by a review of all IDH loan files for 1989 and
1990. This was done in the Tegucigalpa office of IDH on December 1 and
2, 1992. There were over 1,300 loans during this period. However, based
on the criterion established for this research, only 68 clients qualified. The
file data for these 68 potential clients was listed. This included information
about the client's location.
5.1.4 Survey Procedures and Control Group Selection
With the help of IDH, a number of possible research assistants were
interviewed. They were all graduate students at the University of
Honduras. Three of these students were hired to be research assistants.
The researcher met with these assistants on December 3 and 4, 1992 to
review the final survey document, explain instructions, and answer
questions.
The researcher was accompanied by the research assistants in the conduct
of the field survey from December 7 to 15, 1992. The survey was
conducted with clients selected in the City of Tegucigalpa and the Villages
of Danli and Juticalpa. The most difficult and time-consuming aspect of the
field research was locating the 68 pre-selected IOH clients. Address
information was incomplete and inaccurate. Housing for many of these
people is makeshift and insecure. As a result, 'many of the clients had
moved since their loan from IOH. This problem has been identified by
other micro-enterprise researchers (CARE 1991, Liedholm 1991, Mead,
Fisseha, McPherson 1991). Efforts were made to track down each
potential pre-selected client. These efforts resulted in 46 complete client
surveys being conducted. A total of 22 pre-selected clients could not be
-
located and interviewed. Attempts were made to find some information
about these missing clients. Section 5.4 provides some observations on
the clients which could not be interviewed.
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After the completion of each client interview, the research team began to
search for a control group enterprise in the immediate area. This was done
by a door to door canvass of each house in the immediate neighbourhood.
The questions on page 1 of the' survey were asked at each location to
determine if there was an enterprise that could qualify for the control
group. These are questions 1 to 4 of the survey document. To qualify for
the control group, the person must have started an enterprise in 1988,
1989, or 1990. It must have had no more than two employees in addition
to the proprietor when the enterprise started. The owner must not have
received any credit from formal lenders for the enterprise under
consideration. (An enterprise would not be excluded, however, if credit
Was received from informal sources such as friends and family or informal
money lenders.) This method of matching control group selection was also
very time consuming. It took an average of over 30 home visits to locate
an enterprise which met the conditions to be included in the control group.
However, the research team did not continue to the next IDH client
interview until a matching control group enterprise was identified and
interviewed. As a result, 46 control group surveys were obtained to match
the 46 IDH client surveys.
The surveys were conducted in Spanish by the research assistants. The
researcher was present for each interview and was consulted by the
assistants during the survey if there were any questions or problems. At
the end of each day during the field-work, the researcher reviewed all the
surveys completed during the day and identified any surveys that were
incomplete or unclear. These questions were addressed the next morning.
In several cases, this resulted in going back to the research subject to
clarify an answer.
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5.2 Personal Descriptive Information
In this survey, personal information about the proprietor was gathered in
Section B (Questions 5 to 14) of the survey document. This information
was processed and analyzed. The principal tool used in the analysis has
been to consider differences in group means and group proportions (t
tests) to determine if the IOH subjects and the control group have similar
personal characteristics. These statistical tests are provided in Annex II.
The results of this analysis are discussed in the following sections.
Although the primary purpose of this research is to determine if access to
credit at the start of a micro-enterprise has a measurable economic
impact, personal factors are also analyzed to determine if they contribute
to differences in enterprise performance. This analysis is done in Chapter
Seven using multiple linear regression analysis techniques which enable the
joint effects of various possible casual factors to be assessed
simu1taneously.
5.2.1 Income
Question 11 asked for the proprietor's average monthly income for the
period immediately prior to starting the enterprise identified in the survey.
The mean monthly income of the IDH clients was 672 lempira per month
and the mean monthly income of the control group was 522 lempira per
month. This mean difference is not significant at the 5 percent level.
Based on ILO income surveys, the average wage in the Honduran formal
wage sector at the end of 1989, was approximately 1,200 lempira per
183
month (ILO 1990). Both the IDH subjects and the control group were
significantly below this wage level. On the other hand, both the IDH
subjects and the control group had pre-enterprise average incomes in
excess of the poverty line. Based on World Bank information, the absolute
poverty line was at a monthly level of approximately 300 lempira per
month (World Bank 1993). Also, based on UNDPestimates, approximately
55 per cent of the rural population and 14 per cent of the urban
population were below the absolute poverty line in 1990 (UNDP 1994).
Based on these statistics, the mean average monthly income of the IOH
clients and the control group members did not put them in the poorest
quartile of Honduran society. On the other hand, they earned significantly
less than the formal wage sector and starting a micro-enterprise was
possibly one of the few routes available for them to increase their
incomes.
5.2.2 Age
Question 7 of the survey asked for the client's date of birth from which
his/her age was determined as of December, 1992 when the survey was
taken. Both the IDH subjects and the control group had a significant age
span from under 25 years old to over 65 years old. However, the mean
age for the IDH subjects was 33.6 years and 35.7 years for the control
group. The difference in mean age is not statistically significant at the 5
Per cent level.
5.2.3 Education
QUesti()n 8 asked for the highest level of education obtained. From these
answers, the number of years of formal education was determined. The
range of education within both groups was very large. Each group had
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people with no formal education and each group had respondents who had
attended university. The mean period of education was 10.91 years for
the IOH clients and 9.09 years for the control group. This difference in
means is just statistically significant at the 5 percent level based on a t
test of the mean difference. However, the absolute difference is not
particularly large and given the number of personal variables examined, it is
not surprising that the two groups would differ slightly in at least one
respect. Based on UNOPdata (UNOP 1994), the average years of
education for the population as a whole is about 6 years.
5.2.4 Experience
Question 12 asked for the client's years of experience in the same type of
business or industry as the enterprise identified in the survey. The mean
period of experience for the IOH subjects was 5.3 years and the mean for
the control group was 6.7 years. A t test was conducted to evaluate the
difference in means between the two groups and there is not a
statistically significant difference at the 5 percent level.
Question 10 asked what the proprietor had been doing prior to starting the
enterprise identified in the survey. Most of the respondents in both groups
had either been an employee of someone else or had been unemployed.
However, eight of the IOH subjects and nine of the control group members
had owned another enterprise before starting the enterprise identified in
the survey. Based on a t test of the difference in group proportions, this is
not a statistically significant difference between the two groups at the 5
percent level.
185
5.2.5 Gender
Question 6 asked for the gender of the proprietor. Of the 46 respondents
in each group, 27 of the IDH subjects were women and 26 of the control
group subjects were women. Based on a t test of the difference in group
proportions, this difference was not statistically significant at the 5
percent level. For IDH, this proportion of women generally reflects the
gender mix of its client base. From 1988 to 1990, approximately 50
percent of the IDH loans were made to women.
5.2.6 Religion
Question 9 asked for the religious affiliation of the proprietor. The answers
available were: Catholic, Protestant, Other, None.
A majority of Honduras have historically been Catholic. However, the
Protestant churches grew rapidly during the 1980's and membership was
estimated to approximate almost 20 per cent of the population in 1990.
The survey results for this question are summarized in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Religious Distribution
-
Reli,gion IDH Control
Catholic 28 19
Protestant 16 19
Other 2 2
~one 0 6
....Total 46 46
.
Source: IDH Client Survey
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5.3 Enterprise Descriptive Information
Section C of the survey asked various questions about the enterprise. This
enterprise descriptive information is summarized in the following
paragraphs. Also, this information is included in the econometric analysis
discussed in Chapter Seven to determine if any of these enterprise
variables has a statistically significant relationship to performance.
5.3.1 Location
Due to the matching control group structure of the research design, both
the IDH subjects and the control group have the same locational
distribution. Both groups have 24 respondents in Tegucigalpa, 19 in
Juticalpa, and 3 in Danli. Tegucigalpa is an urban setting and both Juticalpa
and Danli are semi-urban areas.
5.3.2 Industry Type
Question 14 asked about the type of industry. There were a wide range of
both manufacturing and service businesses. Also, in the rural areas, a
number of respondents were involved in various aspects of agriculture. To
classify the types of enterprises for further econometric evaluation, the
following categories were used: Manufacturing, Vendors, and Agriculture.
The distribution by type of industry for the two groups is in Table 5.2.
The manufacturing clients cover a diverse range of activities. The most
-
prevalent activities were woodworking, shoe and sandal making and brick
making.
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Table 5.2: Industry Distribution
Type of Industry IDH Control
Manufacturing 34 31
Vendor 2 5
Agriculture 10 10
Total 46 46
Source: IDH Client Survey
5.3.3 Employees
Question -4 of the survey asked for the number of paid employees in
addition to the proprietor when the enterprise started. As previously
discussed, the research design did not include enterprises with more than
two employees when the enterprise was started. The mean number of
employees at inception was 0.59 for the IDH subjects and 0.69 for the
Control group. A t test was applied to determine if this was a significant
difference in the means between the two groups. The difference in the
mean between the two groups is not statistically significant at the 5
Percent level.
.
Question 22 asked for the number of paid employees as of December,
, 992 when the survey was conducted. The mean number of employees for
the IDH clients was 0.52 and the mean for the control group was 0.54.
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Based on a t test, the difference in the mean was not statistically
significant at the 5 percent level.
Question 26 asked whether the owner would add employees if the
enterprise could overcome barriers to growth. It also asked about the
ideal number of employees if the enterprise could grow. The purpose of
these questions was to understand what the attitudes of the proprietor
were to growth and optimum workforce size. Both groups would like to
add employees. The mean ideal number of employees was 3.05 for the IOH
subjects and 2.84 for the control group. Using a t test, this difference in
mean between the two groups was not statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
5.3.4 Sources of Initial Capital
Question 18 asked about the principal source of financing to start the
enterprise. As set out in the research design, there was a significant
difference between the two groups. Of the 46 IOH subjects, 39 indicated
thatDl-l was the principal source of initial financing. The other responses
were two who received credits from family or friends and five who used
their own capital. This question confirms that the research design
identified the youngest clients served by IOH.Of these 46 clients, the
mean time from official enterprise start date 'as identified in Survey
Question 2b until the first loan from IOHwas just under two months. For
33·of these enterprises, the loan was made on the same day as the
enterprise start date identified by the client.
For the control group, none of the respondents identified a formal lending
.
institution as the principal source of initial financing to start the business.
Of the 46 respondents in the control group, 33 identified their own capital
as the principal source of initial financing. Four respondents indicated they
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had received gifts to start the enterprise and six indicated they had
received loans from family or friends. Three respondents indicated that
informal moneylenders were the primary source of initial financing.
5.3.5 Business Closure
Question 3 asked whether the business identified was still in operation as
of the date of the survey (December 1992). Of the pre-selected IDH
clients surveyed, 12 of the 46 businesses were no longer in operation. For
the control group members selected by a door to door canvass, seven of
the 46 indicated that the business they had started during 1988, 1989, or
1990 was no longer in operation. The logical question to be considered is
Whether IDH clients have higher failure rates and, if so, why?
It should be noted that other researchers have indicated that door to door
household surveys of micro-enterprises will under-report the proportion of
bUsiness closures (Liedholm 1991, Mead, Fisseha, McPherson 1991). This
is because the proprietor is often no longer working near the household
during the day but has obtained a wage job from someone else at another
location. Since the IDH subjects and the control group were chosen in a
different manner, there may be a bias in the data and the proportion of
bUsiness closures in the control group is under-reported. This is a
limitation resulting from the selection of the control group via a door to
door canvass.
Nonetheless, Questions 33 to 35 tried to gather some information for the
closed businesses. The principal re~sons cited by the IDH group were poor
health, too much competition, 'no profit, high cost, and inflation. Only one
.
of the 12 IDH respondents indicated that lack of capital was a major
reason for closing the business. The control group respondents listed many
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of the same reasons for closing. However, four of the seven respondents
listed lack of access to capital as one of the principal reasons for closing.
Regarding their activities since the business was closed, three of the IDH
clients had started a different business. Each of these had obtained
another loan from IDH. Five were unemployed and four were employees of
other enterprises. Of the control group, four were unemployed and three
were employees of other enterprises.
Regarding disposition of the IDH loans for the closed businesses, nine of
the twelve had repaid in full as of December, 1992. This includes the
three clients who had another IDH loan to start a different business. One
loan had been written off and two were still in the collection process, the
outcome of which was uncertain.
5.3.6 Competition, Problems and Barriers to Growth
Question 23 asked about major competitors. A large majority of both IDH
and 'control group members indicated that their principal competitors were
other nearby micro-enterprises. Most did not face competition from large
businesses. Question 25 asked about how they perceived their market
opportunities had changed since they started the business. All
respondents indicated that the markets had either not changed or they
had become more competitive. There were no responses that the markets
had become less competitive. As indicated in a nation-wide micro-
enterprise survey (Nathan 1991), which is discussed in Section 4.2, the
structural adjustment programme seemed to be causing the markets for
micro-enterprise outputs to be growing. However, the number of micro-
,
enterprises was growing even faster.
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5.4 Comments on Missing IDH Clients
Of the 68 pre-selected IDH clients, the researcher could not locate 22,
despite extensive efforts to find them. The research team asked many
questions in the neighbourhood about the people we were trying to
interview and what had happened to them. As observed by both Liedholm
and Kilby, it is possible some of these unlocated clients thought we were
with the Government or law enforcement bodies and they were trying to
avoid the research team (Kilby 1985, Liedholm 1991). However, an
attempt was made to document what had happened to these missing
clients. It is not possible to know how accurate the answers are that were
given by people in their former neighbourhoods.
Of these 22 clients, no information was found regarding the whereabouts
of nine. Of the remaining 13, nine were purported to have moved to other
locations 'in Honduras and four were said to have immigrated to the United
States. Of those who were still in Honduras, it was not possible to
determine how many were still operating the micro-enterprise financed by
IDH.
Of these 22 missing clients, 19 had repaid their loan in full as of December,
, 992. Three had not fully repaid their loans and legal actions were in
process.
5.5 Comments on Micro-enterprise Graduation
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None of the IOH clients or control group enterprises surveyed appeared to
be 'graduating' into modern small-scale enterprises. According to the
criterion developed by Little and Schmitz (Little 1987, Schmitz 1982) a
modern small scale 'enterprise would have ten or more employees, growing
and stable revenues, a secure place of business, and be a legally registered
activity. They would also be able to qualify or consider trying to qualify for
commercial bank financing.
Micro-finance institutions often mention client 'graduation' as a goal.
However, most researchers have found little evidence of micro-enterprises
'graduating' to become modern small-scale firms (Webster 1991 , Stearns
1991). Research on small-scale enterprises in several countries confirms
that very few of them began as micro-enterprises (Cortes, Berry, Ishag
1987, Little 1987, Schmitz 1982).
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CHAPTERSIX
RESULTSOF ANALYSIS REGARDINGTHE IMPACT OF CREDIT
6.1 Analytical Technique
As indicated in Chapter Five, the research was planned such that the major
variable differentiating the IDH subjects and the control group was access
to a formal enterprise formation loan in the early stages of the business.
Most of the IDH clients received a loan within two months of starting their
business and all the IDH clients received a loan within twelve months. The
control group members did not have any credit from a formal lending
institution. As explained in Chapter 5, the research criterion were designed
such that the IDH subjects and the control group were similarly the
smallest and youngest enterprises. This chapter analyzes the growth and
performance of the enterprises in both groups from inception to the
survey date in December 1992. The dependent variables studied to
analyze performance are: 1) Revenue, income, and income growth in
Section 6.2, 2) Productivity per hour in Section 6.3, and 3) Employment
and employment creation in Section 6.4. The enterprises in each group
were between 24 and 60 months old at the time of the survey. In
December 1992, the mean age of the IOH enterprises was 39 months and
the mean age of the control group enterprises was 40 months.
This Chapter is intended to evaluate whether access to credit made any
difference in the growth and development of these enterprises. This is
.
done by comparing the mean of the IDH group with the mean of the
control group on various dependent performance variables. Mean
difference tests (t tests) are conducted to determine if the mean
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differences were statistically significant. The statistical tests Ct tests) are
provided in Annex II.
Also, the impact of these loans in reducing poverty is analyzed and
discussed in Section 6.5. This discussion refers to impact possibility
frontier and a poverty gap models developed by Hulme and Mosley Cl996).
6.2 Revenue, Income and Income Growth
QUestion 32a of the survey asked for the average monthly revenue of the
enterprise. Revenue is the simplest dependent variable to measure. The
average monthly revenue of the IOH clients was 4,860 lempira and the
average monthly revenue of the control group was 3,889 lempira. In
conducting a t test of the difference in means between the two groups,
the difference in group means is not statistically significant at the 5
percent level. With respect to revenue, it appears that access to credit
may not have a significant relationship. However, it is to be noted, that
the absolute difference in revenues is substantial and that the difference in
means may not have been statistically significant because of the large
variability in the revenues and the small sample size of the study C46
SUbjects in each group).
To analyze income differences between the two groups, it is first
necessary to determine which definition of enterprise net income to use.
Unlike research involving larger' businesses in which historical financial
.
statements are generally available, micro-enterprises do not usually
prepare financial statements. This was addressed in Question 27a of the
survey which asked if formal financial records were kept for the enterprise.
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Only two of the IDH clients and three of the control group members
answered affirmatively. Since historical financial data is not available, it is
necessary to define simpler measures of micro-enterprise income. One
definition that has been used by other micro-enterprise researchers is
value added (CARE·1991, Dichter 1989, Goldmark and Rosengard 1985).
This is computed by subtracting purchased goods and services from the
revenue generated. It is also generally the measure of income used in
social cost benefit analysis (Hansen 1978, Kilby 1985, Mishan 1988) It has
the advantage of being relatively easy to compute. However, it is not
precise as it ignores both returns to labour (actual or imputed payroll
costs) and returns to capital (debt service and return on equity invested).
For purposes of this research, it was decided that value added was the
best measure of enterprise income because of its ease in computation and
the respondents' ability to estimate the data. When the survey document
was field tested, all respondents were able to quickly estimate the monthly
revenues and purchases needed to compute estimated value added. On
the other hand, they were generally not able to provide payroll, debt
service or equity information needed to develop a more refined measure of
enterprise income.
The survey document included average monthly revenue in Question 32a
and average monthly purchases in question 32b. By subtracting the latter,
monthly value added was determined. The mean monthly value added for
the IDH clients was 2,261 lempira. The mean monthly value added for the
control group was 1,513 lempira. This difference in mean value added is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The IDH clients had a
statistically significant higher mean monthly value added than the control
group.
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Income growth was estimated by comparing enterprise value added at the
time of the survey in December 1992 with estimated monthly income
before the enterprise was started (see Question 11). This is considered to
be baseline income. The results are summarized in Table 6.1:
Table 6.1: Increase in Mean Monthly Income (In Lempira)
IDH Control
Mean value added 2,261 1,513
Mean base income 672 522
Mean income increase 1,589 991
Source: Computed from IDH Survey
The IOH clients seemed to be able to use the financing they received to
generate more income growth. However, it is not apparent whether this
income growth is sufficient to justify the investment of development funds
into the support of the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises. This
question is addressed in Chapter Eight via the tools of social cost benefit
analysis.
It is recognized that value added gives an overly optimistic picture of
enterprise net income because it excludes the cost of labour and the cost
of capital. To correct for these exclusions, the following estimates were
made to adjust value added and get a more accurate estimate of
. enterprise net income.
1~Estimated paid wages were computed based on the answers to question
22 of the survey;
2. Unpaid family labor was imputed based on the information in question
22. This was calculated at an estimated shadow wage of 2 lempira per
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hour. Question 22 indicates that wages paid by the micro-enterprise
respondents generally ranged from 60 to 120 lempira per week. The hours
worked generally ranged from 30 to 60 per week. The estimate of shadow
wage is based on the mid-point of these ranges. Average wages of 90
lempira per week divided by an average of 45 hours worked per week:"
3. It was not possible for the proprietors to estimate the capital invested
in the enterprise. For estimation purposes, the owner's equity was
considered to be equal to 1.5 times the monthly revenue. This was
approximately the average relationship found in another empirical study in
which both equity and revenues were measured (Liedholm and Mead
1987). The monthly cost of capital was imputed at one per cent per
month on this equity amount. This was the approximate average deposit
rate that banks paid on demand deposits in December 1992. This deposit
rate represents an estimate of opportunity cost of capital that the
proprietor could have earned on their equity in a relatively riskless bank
deposit. This is slightly above the monthly inflation rate at the end of
1992;
4. Debt service was excluded since almost all the loans had been paid off
as of December 1992.
This adjusted measure of enterprise monthly 'net income is shown in Table
6.2.
2 It should be noted that this estimated wage is substantially lower than the minimum wage and the average
wage in the formal sector of the economy, The shadow wage is actually below the estimated poverty line.
This is not unusual in low income countries with substantial excess labour (Scott 1976).
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Table 6.2: Mean Adjusted Monthly Net Income (In Lempira)
IDH Control
Mean value added 2,261 1,513
Less mean wages paid . 247 226
Less imputed wages-family labour 120 130
Less imputed capital cost 48 39
Mean adjusted monthly net income 1,846 1,128
Source: Computed from IDH Survey
Honduras experienced relatively high inflation from 1990 to 1992.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine if the increase in real income after
adjusting for inflation is also significant. This was determined by deflating
the adjusted enterprise net income in December 1992 as computed in
Table 6.2 to the date of business inception based on monthly increases in
the Honduran consumer price index (IMF 1993). This deflated real income
is then compared with the baseline income before the enterprise was
started to determine the change in real income. This comparison is shown
in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Mean Increase in Real Monthly Income (In 1989 Lempira)
IDH Control
Mean deflated net income 937 573
Mean base income
. 672 522
Mean increase-real monthly 265 51income
Percentage increase 39.4% 9.8%
Source: Computed from IOHSurvey
The IOH clients were able to increase their real incomes at a faster rate
than the control group.
Although the IOH clients were able to increase their nominal and real
incomes at a faster rate than the control group, have they improved their
position in relation to the economy as a whole? ILO statistics indicate that
the average monthly wage in the formal wage economy of Honduras at the
end of 1989 was approximately 1,200 lempira per month (ILO 1990). The
baseline mean monthly income of the IOH clients before starting their
enterprise was 672 lempira per month. This was 56 percent of the mean
average salary in the formal economy. On the other hand, this was more
than two times the level of absolute poverty which was estimated at 300
lempira per month (World Bank 1993).
By the end of 1992, the mean adjusted monthly net income of the IOH
clients was 1,846 lempira. Based on ILO statistics, the average wage in the
formal sector was 1,978 lempira per month at the end of 1992 (ILO
1994). The mean IOH client adjusted net income had risen to 93 per cent
of the average monthly earnings in the formal economy at the end of
1992. As a result, it seems as though the economic situation of the IOH
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clients has progressed in relation to the economy as a whole. Also, by the
end of 1992, the mean adjusted IDH net income of 1,846 lempira rose to
become almost 3.5 times the absolute poverty line.
6.3 Productivity
For purposes of this research, productivity is defined as the value added
per hour worked by the proprietor. This is the simplest possible measure of
productivity. The computation of value added was discussed in the
preceding section. Hours worked per week by the proprietor were
determined in Question 20 of the survey. The mean hours worked per
week by the proprietor was 62 hours for the IDH clients and 70 hours for
the control group. Although this difference was not statistically significant
at the 5 percent level, it is significant at the 10 percent level.
The shorter number of hours worked by the IDH clients confirms the
observations of other researchers who had observed that as micro-
enterprises provided a certain level of income for the family, the owners
tend to work less hours and/or diversify their activities into other
businesses (Liedholm and Mead 1987, Liedholm 1991). This is especially
true of enterprises owned by women (Downing 1991, McKee 1989).
In computing the monthly value added per hour worked by the owner, the
mean for the IDHgroup was 9.23 lempira per hour and the control group
mean was 5.58 lempira per hour. This mean difference between the two
.
group~ is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. As a result, it is
reasonable to conclude that the financing received by the IDH clients
. ..
helped them to achieve higher levels of productivity per hour worked than
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the control group. Although these clients still worked long hours, there is
some evidence that they were able to work fewer hours due to their
increased income.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the most extensive empirical research
available on returns generated by micro-enterprises was published by
Liedholm and Mead (Liedholm and Mead 1987). In this study, they
analyzed data that had been collected from a number of countries. For
purposes of making cross-country comparisons, they converted the data
into US dollars at official exchange rates. This study included data from
Honduras that was collected in 1980 (Stallman and Pease 1983). In
making these cross-country comparisons, they attempted to look at the
net return per hour of family labour. They used a concept of economic
profit which was derived in a similar manner to the adjusted net income
calculated in the preceding section. However, they further reduced
economic profit by the hours worked by the owner computed at the
shadow wage. For purposes of replicating the calculations of Liedholm and
Mead, the owner's time is charged at an estimated shadow wage of two
lempira per hour worked. Table 6.4 applies the Liedholm and Mead model
to the survey data and calculates the mean return per hour of family
labour.
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Table 6.4: Mean Return per Hour of Family Labour (In Lempira)
IDH Control
Mean adjusted monthly net income 1,846 1,128
Less hours worked per month by .
owner at shadow wage (541) (609)
Adjusted monthly profit 1,305 519
Divide by mean hours per month
worked by all family members 330 369
Mean return per hour of family labour (in 3.95 1.41
1992 lempira)
Source: Computed from IDH Survey
Based on the above calculations, both the IDH clients and the control
group had a net residual economic profit per hour of family labour. This is
similar to the results derived by Liedholm and Mead from the 1980 data.
They stratified the data to look at returns per hour based on firm size as
measured by the number of workers. Their categories were less than five
Workers, five to ten workers, and ten to 49 workers. Based on their data
for Honduras, the mean economic profit per hour worked was positive for
all firm size categories. However, they concluded that there was a strong
cross-country correlation between firm size and the economic profit per
hour of family labour. The smallest firm size category (less than five
Workers) in each country studied had the lowest level of mean economic
profit per hour worked. Since all of the enterprises included in this study
have less than five workers, the results above are compared with the
smallest category of firms in the Liedholm and Mead study.
Based on 1980 survey data" used by Liedholm and Mead which included
398 randomly selected micro-enterprises in Honduras with less than five
. ..
Workers; they calculated a mean net economic return per hour of family
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labour of 0.60 lempira per hour. Adjusted for inflation, this equates to
1.85 lempira per hour in 1992. This is more than the 1992 control group
mean as calculated above at 1.4 1 lempira per hour of family labour. This is
probably because the Liedholm and Mead stratification included firms with
three to five workers, whereas the control group excluded firms with more
than two employees. However, both groups were lower than the IDH client
mean of 3.95 lempira per hour.
Based on these calculations, it seems that access to credit at the early
stage of the enterprise enabled the IDH clients to achieve significantly
higher levels of productivity and economic returns per hour worked
compared with the control group.
6.4 Employment and Employment Creation
A comparison of the mean number of employees at enterprise inception
and as of the December 1992 survey is shown in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Change in Mean Number of Paid Employees
IDH Control
Employees in December, 1992 0.54 0.52
Employees at Enterprise inception 0.58 0.69
Change in Mean Number of Paid (0.04) , (0.17)
Employees
<
Source: Computed from IDH Survey
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Based on Table 6.5, both groups had a reduction in the mean number of
paid employees per enterprise from business inception to the survey in
December 1992. However, the control group had a larger percentage
reduction.
This result seems to confirm the observations of other researchers that
the smallest micro-enterprises do not generally create new employment
(Liedholm and Mead 1987, Liedholm 1991, Malhotra 1992). This is
particularly true of enterprises operated by women (Downing 1991, McKee
1989). Both the IDH and control groups had almost 60 percent female
owned businesses. The explanation of these researchers is that the goal of
the smallest micro-business owners is generally to find a more secure and
stable source of family income and they are adverse to the risk of reducing
their income by adding paid employees. They are more likely to use unpaid
family labour to help during busy periods. The use of unpaid family labour
is the most likely reason for the decline in mean number of paid employees
in Table 6.5.2
However, 'this explanation is not fully consistent with Question 26 of the
SUNey which asked for the ideal number of employees. The responses to
this question indicate that the proprietors would like to add employees if
they could grow and overcome other business problems. Further study
may be needed to better understand the business' problems facing these
micro-enterprises and what factors prevent them from growing and
creating· new jobs.
The lack of paid employment creation also confirms a micro-enterprise
sectoral study done in Honduras in 1989 and 1990 (Nathan 1991). In this
2 This may be analogous to the theory proposed by Chayanov (Chayonov 1925) for decision making by semi
sUbsistence farm households. He develops the criterion of. returns to family labour and asserted that farm-
households 'make allocative decision based on the gross product of activities minus paid out costs in a
Illanner that provides the highest return to family labour.
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study, there was evidence that the number of micro-enterprises had
grown. However, there was no evidence of growth in the average number
of employees per enterprise. This study concluded that the difficult
economic conditions caused by structural adjustment caused a reduction in
real purchasing power which resulted in many consumers switching from
the formal sector to cheaper and lower quality goods in the micro-
enterprise sector. Although the total market for micro-enterprises was
expanding, the number of micro-enterprises was growing even faster. This
was attributable to the lack of opportunity in the formal wage sector of
the economy.
This study confirms research in other countries that because entry barriers
are small, the number of micro-enterprises tends to grow more quickly
than market demand (Fisseha and McPherson 1991, Grant 1991) As a
result, micro-enterprises face increased competition and it is difficult for
individual micro-enterprises to grow. The smallest micro-enterprises do
not have the capital or experience to differentiate their products or
services. As a result, they remain in highly competitive markets and they
will not .be able to create or even retain paid employment. This conforms
to Tokman's(l 989) definition of the 'vulnurable' micro-enterprise sector.
It is interesting to note that the IDH clients estimated they would create
an average of 0.76 new paid jobs per enterprise as a result of the loan.
This would have represented an increase of 140 percent in the combined
paid employment of these enterprises. This information was derived from
the loan applications. However, based on the survey in December 1992,
there was no. net increase in paid employment. It is not clear whether
these jobs were created and then discontinued or if they ever really
existed. It is possible that the clients were responding to this loan
application question optimistically and in a manner that would make the
loan application more attractive to IDH. Alternatively, it is possible they
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intended to create these jobs at the start of the business. However,
business reality and competitive conditions may have prevented them
from actually growing to a size where it was economically efficient to add
employees.
6.5 Poverty Reduction
Section 3.4 reviews the work Hulme and Mosley (1996) on measuring the
impact of micro-loans in reducing poverty. They focus on an upwardly
sloping impact possibility frontier when graphing the percentage increase
in average borrower household income against the average borrower
income as a percentage of poverty line income before the last loan. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.1, which replicates Hulme and Mosley's Figure 8.1 a
(Hulme and Mosley 1996:183). This upwardly sloping impact possibility
frontier applied across the twelve programmes they studied and also
applied to' clients within most of the individual lending programs as well.
An upwardly sloping impact possibility frontier means that loans made to
the poorest clients produce less economic impact than loans made to
relatively wealthier clients. Poorer clients have less economic impact
because they cannot afford to take as many risks and they have fewer
opportunities. Hulme and Mosley (1996) discuss various ways that micro-
finance schemes can increase poverty impact despite the limitations of a
given upwardly sloping impact possibility frontier.
Figure 6.1 below graphs the impact possibility frontier of the 46 IDH
clients surveyed in this study using the same methodology as Hulme and
Mosley.
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Figure 6.1: The Relationship Between Borrower Income and Increase in
Household Income for IOHClients in the Survey
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Contrary to Hulme and Mosley's model of an upwardly sloping impact
possibility frontier, Figure 6.1 shows a downwardly sloping curve. In other
words, clients with lower incomes relative to the poverty line prior to the
IOH loan had relatively larger percentage increases in nominal income at
the time of the survey. To further analyze this downwardly sloping curve, a
test of mean differences was applied to the percentage increase in nominal
income of the 13 IOH clients in the survey who had pre-loan incomes below
the poverty line and the 33 clients who had pre-loan incomes above the
poverty line. The mean percentage change' for the group initially below
the poverty line was 1733 percent. The mean percentage change for the
group initially above the poverty line was 260 percent. The mean
difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 5
percent level. This confirms that clients with pre-loan incomes below the
poverty line had relatively larg,~r percentage increases in 'income than
clients who started with pre-loan incomes above the poverty line. These
1 For the test of mean differences and also for the impact possibilities frontier presented above, those clients
whohad no prior income were assumed, for the purpose of calculating percentage increases in income, to
have an income of 100 lempira (one third the poverty-line income) ,
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results appear to contradict the model of an upwardly sloping impact
possibility frontier as described by Hulme and Mosley Cl 996).
It should be noted that whilst IOH did not experience an upwardly sloping
impact possibility frontier on its initial loans to the smallest and youngest
clients, it is possible that IOH still had an upwardly sloping impact
possibility frontier across its overall portfolio when including repeat clients.
In analyzing why the IOHsurvey results differ from an upwardly sloping
impact possibility frontier, it is necessary to consider differences in client
selection and loan sizes.
1. Client Selection
As discussed in Chapter 5, alilOH clients in the survey had taken their first
loan and had recently started their business. By definition, these were the
smallest and youngest enterprises in the IOH portfolio. They were starting
out without a credit history. In contrast, Hulme and Mosley were measuring
the percentage of income increase since the prior loan. Many of the clients
they surveyed had already taken multiple loans from the same credit
programme. It is presumed that both the clients and the lenders had
gained sufficient experience in working with these specific clients to adjust
loan terms and sizes to enterprise capacity and need. Since those clients
who had more success in previous loan cycles would have higher incomes,
the incremental percentage increase in income from their 'n th' loan could
also be presumed to be larger based on their past performance.
2. Loan Sizes
HUlme and Mosley Cl 996) noted a high correlation between loan sizes and
borrower incomes. Clients with larger incomes could bear more risk and
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were able to take larger loans. Larger loans gave them more capital to
invest and increased their income generating potential. This seems to be
the major reason why those with relatively larger incomes had larger
percentages of income increases as modeled in an upwardly sloping impact
possibility frontier. -ln the IDH survey, there does not appear to be any
correlation between income and loan size. This was tested by estimating
the correlation between loan size against prior income from Question 11 of
the survey. Details of the test are presented in Annex II. The correlation
between loan size and prior income was not statistically significant at the
5 percent level. This supports a conclusion that there was no correlation
between loan size and prior income. Most of these initial IDH loans were
between 2,000 and 4,000 lemperas. Loan sizes were discussed with IDH
management at the time of the survey and they confirmed they were
using an arbitrary fixed loan size for most of these first time loans. IDH
considered this size range for initial loans to be small enough to reduce
risk, yet not too small as to render them unprofitable.
Since the IDH loans to these smallest and youngest enterprises did not
encounter an upwardly sloping impact possibility frontier, did these loans
have a significant impact in reducing poverty? As discussed in Section 3.5,
Hulme and Mosley developed the "poverty gap formula" as a model to
measure poverty reduction (Hulme and Mosley 1996:36). Under this
formula, reductions in poverty are computed as the increase in net income
earned by people below the poverty line. This includes increased net
income of the proprietor's family if they were below the poverty line as
well as income generated by increases in net employment of persons below
I
the poverty line. To maximize poverty reduction under this model, most
of the loan clients must start below the poverty line and, as the incomes
.
of these clients move above the poverty line, an increasingly large number
of new clients must enter the programme who have incomes below the
poverty line. In this manner there is always a high proportion of total
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clients who have incomes below the poverty line. It is noted that initial loan
sizes need to be very small to attract the poorest people and to minimize
their risk. Income growth from the first loan may be minimal and it
generally requires repeat loan cycles with increasingly larger loan sizes to
bring poor clients above the poverty line. This approach generally involves
short loan cycles of three to six months and rapidly increasing loan sizes
commensurate with clients' ability to repay. Hulme and Mosley (1996)
point out that poverty reduction is only maximized when a very large
number of clients are reached using this approach since the incremental
income increase per loan is relatively small. Gulli and Berger (1999) and
OFIO(Rutherford and Singh 1997) point out that more poor people may be
attracted to poverty reducing loan schemes if the institution not only
offers enterprise loans, but if it also provides other financial services
tailored to the life cycle needs of the poor such as savings, insurance,
emergency credit, and consumer credit for things such as weddings and
school fees. Oreze and Sen (1991 ) view these non-lending financial
services for the poor as belonging to the 'protectional' role of
development programmes. They contrast 'protectional' services with
'promotional' services intended to finance asset acquisition, enterprise
development and employment creation.
In using Hulme and Mosley's (1996) approach to decreasing the poverty
gap to assess the impact of IOH loans to the smallest and youngest
enterprises, it is would seem that the IOH loans did not have a very large
impact in reducing poverty. Only 13 of the 46 clients (28 percent).
started with prior incomes below the poverty line. Also, as discussed in
Section 6.4, these loans generated no net increase in paid employment.
However, as discussed above, the clients receiving the IOH loans did not
have the upwardly sloping impact possibility frontier - the incremental
increase in income for the poorest group was not relatively small.
. ..
Returning to the Hulme and Mosley (1996) poverty gap formula, a
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substantial reduction in the poverty gap can be achieved, even without a
very large proportion of poor people in the programme, provided that the
average change in the incomes of this poorest group is substantially large.
Of the 13 clients at or below the poverty line before starting their new
enterprise, 12 of these were above the poverty line by the time of the
survey. This suggests that in contrast to programmes that lend to clients
who have already taken multiple loans from the same MFI, programmes
that lend to the smallest and youngest enterprises which have had no prior
access to credit have the potential to achieve substantial poverty
reduction by the provision of a single loan.
Nevertheless, whilst most of these clients who started below the poverty
line generated income increases to levels above the poverty line, the
percentage of poor clients taking these loans was significantly less than
most of the other programmes measured by Hulme and Mosley. Clearly
the effectiveness of the IOH programme in reducing poverty could still be
improved by attracting a larger proportion of poorer clients. The primary
reason for attracting such a low percentage of clients below the poverty
line seems to be the relatively high initial loan size. The IOH loans to the
smallest and youngest enterprises had an initial loan size averaging 3,260
lemperas. This was approximately 160% percent of GOPper capita in
Honduras at the end of 1989. As noted by Hulme and Mosley (1996:
185), the programmes that had the most relative impact in reducing
poverty designed their loans specifically to attract new clients below the
poverty line with very small initial loan sizes. "The most obvious reason for
this is that only poor people will want to take very small loans. In the
jargon, loan size acts as a self-targeting device" (Hulme and Mosley
1996:185). The schemes that Hulme and Mosley (1996:188) cite as
.
desiqned to have the most impact in attracting poor borrowers have initial
loan sizes averaging less than 50 percent of GOPper capita. The IOH loans
did not attract a majority of clients with incomes below the poverty line
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because poor people felt that they could not bear the risk of repaying such
a large loan."
6.6 Summary of Results
Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 compare the results of IOH clients with a
matched control group of similarly small and young enterprises that
started operating at about the same time as the IOH clients. These
comparisons are done by analyzing statistical differences in group means
via t tests. After 24 to 60 months from enterprise inception, the IOH
clients had higher levels of income and productivity per hour than the
Control group. These differences were statistically significant at the 5
percent confidence level. However, there was no difference in employment
creation as neither group demonstrated any long term paid employment
creation.
These results showing no net employment creation are similar to the
results derived by Hulme and Mosley (1996: 102) in their study of twelve
programmes. They conclude that:
...the impact of borrowing on emp\oyment is a natura\ consequence at the
technology in which the borrowing is embodied. Across the sample as a whole, as
we nave seen, the technica\ change induced by borrowing was not dramatic, and
neither as a consequence have been its influences on employment outside the
tami\y (\-\u\me and Mos\ey i996:i02.).
2 Since the survey in 1992, IDH completely redesigned its programme to serve more clients and to attract a
larger percentage of poor clients. This.was initiated in 1996 when all new clients had to enter the programme
via a group loan called a "trust bank". These group loans were designed to attract poor people by using
Srnallloans for short periods in the initial loan cycles. Clients could then graduate to individual loans after
sUccessfully completing four group loan cycles and developing a credit history. In the year that ended
Decembe.r 31, 2001, the initial loan size to a trust bank group member was less than 20 percent of GDP per
capita. IDH made more than 16,000 loans in 2001 and is serving more than ten times the number of clients
Which were served in 1990.
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Although the smallest and youngest clients served by IOHwho had pre-
loan incomes below the poverty line generally increased their incomes to
levels above the poverty line and these poorer clients had income growth
rates which were higher than those clients who had pre-loan incomes
above the poverty tine, the IOH loans did not have much relative impact in
reducing poverty in comparison with other loan schemes studied by Hulme
and Mosley (1996). As explained in Section 6.5, this is due to loan design
features in which the initial loan sizes were too large to attract a high
percentage of poor borrowers. (Only 28 percent of the IOH loans to the
smallest and youngest enterprise were given to people with pre-loan
incomes below the poverty line.) The poorest potential borrowers decided
not to apply for these IOH loans because the risks of not being able to
repay were perceived to be too great at the fixed initial loan sizes being
offered by IOH (2,000 to 4,000 lempira).
In analysing the impact of these IOH enterprise formation loans, it is helpful
to consider how these loans should be classified according to two different
models: 1. 'promotional' vs. 'protectional' (Oreze and Sen 1991) and 2.
'capital widening' vs. 'capital deepening' (Hulme and Mosley 1996). As
discussed in Section 6.5, the IOH loan sizes were too large to attract the
poorest potential clients. These loans were designed to foster enterprise
development, asset acquisition and income growth. As a result, these loans
should clearly be classified as 'promotional 'rather than 'protectional'.
However, even within a promotional approach to enterprise development,
Hulme and Mosley (1996) differentiate 'capital widening' approaches which
expand the stock of an existi~g technology such that returns per unit of
capital remain constant from 'capital deepening' approaches which bring in
new technology and increase the productivity of capital. Based on
observations during the IOHsurvey, there was no evidence of new
technology being used. This observation is consistent with the conclusions
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of Hulme and Mosley (1996) over the twelve programmes studied. "First,
we may recall, that the use of micro-enterprise loans to upgrade
technology is actually the exception rather than the rule" (Hulme and
Mosley 1996:95). However, Hulme and Mosley did find limited evidence of
technical innovation amongst richer borrowers who had taken multiple
loans already. "Technical innovation is generally confined to this group, but
only to a minority within it" (Hulme and Mosley 1996:95). Since the
enterprise formation loans made by IOHwere the first loan received by
each borrower in this study (Section 5.1.3), it is reasonable to conclude
that these loans should be classified as being used for 'capital widening'.
These IOH enterprise formation loans increased the stock of capital
(mostly inventory) and borrowers used existing technology to generate
increased income, income growth and productivity per hour compared with
the matching control group. However, with regard to capital widening,
Hulme and Mosley (1996:103) conclude that "it was unusual for credit to
trigger a continuous increase in technical sophistication, output or
employment: it was much commoner for each of these variables to reach a
plateau after one or two loans and then remain in a steady state." While
these capital widening loans may not trigger continuous increases in
income and productivity, the results of this study support a conclusion
that credit serves as an accelerator for enterprise growth and expansion.
However, does this acceleration of enterprises owned by loan recipients
result from the displacement of non-loan recipients? This study did not
attempt to test for displacement. However, very few of the micro-
enterprises in Honduras had access to loans. Whilst loan access may have
given a slight advantage to these IOH clients, it is not likely that micro-
enterprise loan provision caused significant displacement effects.
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6.7 Critique of Methodology
Although this research was designed so that access to credit was the
principal differentiating variable between the IOH clients and the control
group, it is recognized that causality is a complex phenomenon and it is
never possible to completely isolate one variable in ex-post facto field
research involving the performance of human beings (Kratwohl 1977). The
interaction of various personal and enterprise variables may also playa
significant role in determining performance. The research design did not
attempt to control for these personal and enterprise variables. However,
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 address these independent variables within the initial
composition of the two groups. Based on the baseline mean differences
tests discussed in Chapter Five, it does not appear that the mean
differences between the two group is statistically significant for any of
these personal or enterprise variables.
However, in trying to determine if access to credit was the principal cause
of differences in performance, it is important to be aware that it is possible
other independent variables were as important or even more important in
explaining differences in performance. Chapter Seven addresses this
possibility and the effects of other variables via the econometric tool of
multiple linear regression analysis.
Another limitation of this approach is time sequencing of measurements.
By measuring the survey data at one point between 24 and 60 months
after the loan and enterprise inception, this study attempted to get a
- ..
longer view than most other micro-enterprise impact research. However, it
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may have been more precise to obtain more frequent measurements at
shorter time intervals. While Section 6.6 concludes that credit serves as an
accelerator for the growth of micro-enterprises, this conclusion could have
been tested more precisely if multiple measurements were taken at more
frequent intervals. For example; if credit is primarily an accelerator of
enterprise growth, it is possible that almost all of the differences between
the IOH clients and control group occurred within the first three to six
months after the loan and there was little difference in performance after
that initial period. Without more frequent measurements, it is not possible
to analyze the precise time sequences in which new enterprises develop
and the role of borrowing in this process.
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CHAPTERSEVEN
RESULTSOF MULTIPLELINEARREGRESSIONANALYSIS
7.1 Analytical Technique
Section 6.2 of this thesis demonstrates that the IOH clients had a larger
mean level of income than the control group. The difference is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. For purposes of this research, value
added is used as a proxy for income as explained in Section 6.2.
However, a statistically significant difference in mean value added between
the two groups is not sufficient to conclude that the loan from IOHwas
the primary cause of the increased income and income growth. Although
the IOH loan may have contributed, there may be other independent
personal or enterprise variables which were even more important.
Furthermore, it is possible that the difference in income between the IOH
and control groups is attributable to differences in personal or enterprise
characteristics other than the IOH loan. That is to say, other independent
variables might be confounding the relationship between income growth
and the loan from IOH. It is possible to test the impact of other defined
independent variables and to test the impact of the IOH loan while
controlling for other variables by using the econometric tool of multiple
linear regression analysis. This Chapter describes the approach used to
apply multiple linear regression analysis and the results of such analysis'.
I It should be noted that multiple regression analysis is not sufficient to determine causality. However it is
useful to determine if there were any other defined variables which are more strongly associated with income
growth than the loan from IDH
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A primary purpose of using multiple linear regression analysis is to develop
a predictive model. If the data are not random and if there are statistically
significant associations between variables, the model will have predictive
value provided the independent variables are approximately linearly related
to the dependent one. This type of predictive model could be valuable for
micro-finance institutions which are looking for simple and cost effective
means to predict the success or failure of broad categories of applicants.
As discussed in Section 6.2, value added was a simple and reasonably
accurate measurement for research subjects to estimate based on
memory. Memory recall is necessary because most subjects do not have
any written financial records. As a result, value added was chosen as the
dependent variable to analyze via multiple linear regression techniques. It is
considered a reasonably good proxy for income and a primary indicator of
enterprise success.
The application of multiple linear regression analysis required identification
of all major personal and enterprise independent variables collected in the
field survey. The following are the independent variables used in the initial
multiple regression:
Personal Variables
* Years of formal education-linear variable
* Gender-male-dummy variable
. * Religion (categorized by dummy variables as Catholic, Protestant, or
None/Other)
* Age (categorized by dummy variables as under 30, between 30 and 45,
or over 45)
* Years of experience-linear variable
* Owned an enterprise prior to current one-dummy variable
220
* Income level before starting this enterprise-linear variable
Enterprise Variables
* Manufacturing enterprise-dummy variable
* Hours worked per week in the enterprise-linear variable
* Employees hired at enterprise inception-dummy variable
* IDH Loan-dummy variable
The thirteen independent variables used in the regression include four
linear variables in which there are a range of numerical values and nine
dummy classification variables in which there are either positive or
negative answers to each question. The notation used for dummy variables
is a 1 or O. Using this notation, a positive answer is indicated by a 1 and
the default answer by a O.
Multiple linear regression analysis techniques are useful in this type of
research because both types of variables can be tested simultaneously to
see how strongly associated they are with the linear dependent variable.
Table 7.1 shows the dummy variable (indicated as 1) and the default
position (indicated as 0) for the dummy variables used in this analysis.
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Table 7.1: Dummy Variables Used in Multiple Linear Regression
Analysis
Variable Yes No
Gender 1- Male O-Female
Religion 1-Protestant 0-Non Protestant
Religion l-Catholic O-Non Catholic
Age I-Middle(30 to 45) O-not between 30 and 45
Age 1-Young( under 30) O-over 30
Owned an enterprise prior I-Yes O-No
to current one?
Type of business activity? I-Manufacturing O-Non-manufacturing
Employees hired at business I-Yes O-No
inception?
IDH Loan? I-Yes O-No (Control group)
The application of multiple linear regression analysis used in this study
involved a series of successive iterations to reduce the number of variables
to only those whose coefficient estimates were statistically significant.
This approach was used because with so many variables at the beginning
there was significant random noise. The random noise comes from
including many variables which have little association with the dependent
variable and this random noise reduces the overall predictive value of the
. model and may interfere in the estimation for the variables which are
statistically significant. The successive iterations gradually eliminated
insignificant variables and random noise to determine which variables were
most consistently significant. this process resulted in four variables which
Were the most significant and the association between them and the
dependent variable ~re studied in more "detail.
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The initial iteration included all thirteen of the independent variables. For
each consecutive iteration, the variable with the highest p value (least
significant coefficient estimate) on the previous iteration was eliminated
and the remaining variables were tested", Thus, after the first iteration,
years of education, the variable with the highest p value (least
association), was eliminated and the second iteration was run with the
remaining twelve variables. This iterative process of eliminating the
highest p value was continued until there were only four remaining
variables which were the most statistically significant. Although they were
not always statistically significant in the various iterations, these four
variables had the greatest association with the dependent variable in
almost all the iterations. The association of these four remaining variables
with value added was then tested more extensively. The output of the
multiple linear regression analyses is provided in Annex III.
The independent variable with the least association (highest p value) on
each of the ten successive iterations is listed below in the order in which
the variables were eliminated.
* Years of education
* Age
* Gender
* Manufacturing enterprises
* Religion
* Hours worked per week
* Years of experience
2 It should be noted the' p' value is inversely related to the 't' statistic. Therefore, the lower the absolute
value of the 't' statistic, the higher the 'p' value. For age and religion, either all or none of the relevant
dummy variables were eliminated. F tests were used to calculate the p-value for the hypotheses that each of
these groups of variables had no association with value-added.
223
The four remaining variables which were tested further are:
(' ) IOH Loan;
(2) Owned an enterprise prior to the current one;
(3) Whether there were any employees at enterprise inception;
(4) Prior income.
These four variables were tested in a series of five multiple linear
regressions in which all four variables were included in the first regression
and then with four successive regressions in which one of the four
variables was excluded and the association of the other three were
analyzed. The output of these five multiple linear regression analysis tests
is summarized in Table 7.2 and the detailed output is provided in Annex III.
It should be noted that variable (2) "owned an enterprise prior to the
current one" is negatively associated with value added which means that
the experience of owning a business previously produces lower value
added. This is further discussed and interpreted in Section 7.2.
The t statistic and p value from each regression analysis are shown in
Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis: t statistics
(p values in brackets)
Variable IDH Loan Prior Employee Prior
Business Income
All four variables 1.8586* -2.1613** 1.4795 1.6659*
(.06647) (.03342) (.1426) (.0993)
Exclude IDH Loan- - -2.2610** 1.3149 1.9277*
Variable 1 (.02623) (.1919) (.0571)
Exclude prior 1.9687* - 1.1849 1.2932
business - Variable 2 (.0521) (.2374) (.1993)
Exclude employees 1.7326* -1.9757* - 1.8761 *
Variable 3 (.0866) (.0513) (.0639)
2.0992** -1.8884* 1.7093* -
Exclude prior
(.0386) (.0622) (.0909)
income - Variable 4
** Significant at a 5 percent level. * Significant at a 10 percent level.
Source: Computed from IOHClient Survey
In reviewinq the five multiple regression analyses involving these four
independent variables, variable (1) " IOH loan" and variable (2) "owned an
enterprise prior to the current one" have the strongest association with
value added, These two variables were significant at the 10 percent level
in each of the four tests in which they were included. Variable (2) "owned
an enterprise prior to the current one" was significant at a 5 percent level
in two of the four tests in which it was included and Variable (1) "IOH loan"
was significant at the 5 per cent level in one of the four tests in which it
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was included", The other two variables were not always significant at the
10 percent level and were never significant at the 5 per cent level.
7.2 Personal Variables
One purpose of studying personal characteristics is to determine if there
are any personal classification variables which are strongly associated with
income growth. These could provide important predictive information if
supported by statistical significance in multiple linear regression testing.
In reviewing the multiple regression analyses, the two personal variables
discussed above which have the most consistent association with value
added are Variable (2) "owned an enterprise prior to the current one" and
Variable (4) "prior income." Prior income is a linear variable which is
Positively _associated with value added. Although not significant at a 5
percent level in the multiple regression tests, it seems that those with a
higher prior income will tend to generate a higher enterprise value added.
This is logical and confirms other research that economic success in
previous activities may be predictive of success in .new enterprises
(Cortes, Berry and Ishaq 1987). Also, a higher level of prior income may
be related to higher levels of potential savings and investment in the
. enterprise and this creates greater growth potential.
"Owned an enterprise prior to the current one" is a dummy classification
Variable which is negatively associated with enterprise value added. In
other words, if the person owned another business previously, the new
3 In TableZ.z The cases in which a variable was significant at the 5 percent level are marked with an **; the
Cases in which a variable was significant at the 10 percent level are marked with an *.
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enterprise will probably not have as much value added. This negative
association is significant at the 5 percent level in two of the four multiple
linear regression tests. However, there does not appear to be any other
empirical research which relates the owner's success or failure in a
-
previous business to the success or failure of new enterprises. There
appear to be two conflicting opinions amongst practitioners on this issue.
The primary view holds that it is most likely the prior business was not
very successful because, if it had been successful, the entrepreneur would
still be operating it. This view holds that the prior business most likely
failed and this raises the probability of the new enterprise failing as well.
This view relates enterprise failure to weaknesses in management skills or
flaws in personal character. This view emanates primarily from
industrialized countries (Bates 1989). The minority contrary view amongst
practitioners is that entrepreneurs learn from their failures and, as a result,
it is less likely the new enterprise will fail. There is little empirical data on
entrepreneurial failure and re-entry against which these views can be
tested.
The results of this multip!e linear regression analysis support the former
view that people who owned another enterprise prior to the current one
had lower levels of value added and are more likely to fail. Micro-finance
institutions should be concerned if a potential client owned another
enterprise prior to the one for which a loan is being sought. They should
carefully evaluate why the prior business was closed and whether this prior
closure rniqht have negative implications for the new enterprise being
started. They should be especially wary if prior debts had to be written off
by a lender.'
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7.3 Enterprise Variables
Based on the multiple linear regression analyses, the two enterprise
variables in the survey which had the most consistent association with
value added are Variable (1) "IOH Loan" and Variable (3) "whether they
had any employees at enterprise inception." Performance comparisons
between the IOH clients and the control group are discussed in detail in
Chapter 6 based on statistical tests involving differences in group means
and group proportions. However, the multiple linear regression analyses
seem to confirm that getting a loan from IOH is one of the variables most
consistently associated with enterprise value added. This positive
association was significant at the 10 percent level in all the final multiple
linear regressions and it was significant at the 5 percent level in one of the
four final tests in which it was included. The multiple linear regression tests
indicate that an IOH loan was one of the most significant variables in the
level of enterprise value added and there are no other enterprise variables
(of those, defined) which are more important.
Although there is a positive association between Variable (3) "having
employee(s) at inception" and value added, it is not very strong and was
not significant at the 5 percent level in any of the multiple linear regression
tests. It was only significant at the 10 percent level in one of the four final
analyses in which it was included.
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7.4 Summary of Results
Multiple linear regression analysis was applied to determine if any personal
or enterprise variables could explain a significant amount of the differences
in value added", Based on the multiple linear regression analyses discussed
in this Chapter, the existence of an IOH loan is clearly one of the most
significant factors in explaining differences in value added. This supports
the results discussed in Chapter 6 that a loan from IOH had a significant
impact on micro-enterprises generating higher mean levels of value added
and productivity. The only other variable which was consistently
meaningful in explaining performance differences among the research
subjects is whether they had owned another enterprise prior to the current
one. This variable had a negative association with value added.
7.5 Critique of Methodology
Although these associations are interesting and significant, caution must
be enjoined when trying to use these multiple linear regression analyses to
explain causality. Multiple linear regression only analyzes variables for
4 In interpreting the multiple linear regression results, the low level of R Squared and Adjusted R
Squared should be noted. These are standard statistical measurements which indicate the percentage of the
total change in the dependent variable which is explained by the combination of all the independent variables
used in the multiple regression. The Adjusted R Squared is generally considered a better measurement
because it is adjusted for the number of variables which is called the "degrees of freedom." In the final
multiple regression iterations, the R Squared measure varies from .08 to .13 and the adjusted R squared from
.05 to .09. Based on these measurements, it seems the identified variables explain a relatively small
proportion of the total changes in the dependent variable. This is most likely due to the level of random
noise in the measurement of value added and in the variability of enterprise performance. It could also be
caused by the existence of potentially significant unidentified variables.
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which information was collected. It is possible there are other potentially
more important variables which were not included in this research and
these unidentified variables may really have been the primary cause of
performance differences. For example, competition and attitudes about
competition were not included. Also, the literature review in Section 2.2.3
mentions various entrepreneurial models. Some of these models explain
entrepreneurial behavior primarily in terms of personality characteristics
and psychological profiles. It is beyond the scope and objectives of this
research to test and measure any of these variables. This research also did
not try to measure entrepreneurial motivation which is another complex
phenomenon discussed in some entrepreneurial models. Also, micro-
enterprises operate within economic, social and political environments
which may be significant in interpreting results and performance. The
omission of these and other potentially significant unidentified variables
should be viewed as a limiting factor in interpreting the results.
Finally, the sample size of 92 entrepreneurs is relatively small which
affects the power of multiple regression to detect association. It is
Possible that some other personal or enterprise variables were of some
importance, but that the sample size was insufficiently large to detect
these associations.
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CHAPTEREIGHT
RESULTSOF SOCIAL COST BENEFITANALYSIS
8.1 Replication and Expansion of the Kilby Model
Section 3.3 summarized the work of Peter Kilby published in the book
"Searching for Benefits" in which he applied the principles of social cost
benefit analysis to six micro-finance institutions including IOH in Honduras.
This was done using survey data from external evaluations carried out
between 1982 and 1984.
Sections 8.2 and 8.4 replicate the social cost benefit measurements done
by Kilby using the 1992 survey data from the smallest and youngest IOH
clients collected for this thesis. Forty-six IDH,clients were surveyed based
on the criteria described in Section 5.1.3. These criteria were developed to
select the smallest firms which were all essentially start-ups when they got
their first loan from IDH in 1989 or 1990. Section 8.5 draws conclusions
with regard to the social costs and benefits of serving this clientele. Since
the 1992 data intentionally did not include larger and older enterprises, it
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is not possible to compare social cost benefit ratios between different
groups of IOHclients.
Section 8.3 expands the Kilby model of social cost benefit analysis by
using a matching control group surveyed in 1992. The identification and
survey methodology applied to the control group was explained in Section
5.1.4.
As further discussed in Section 8.5, it is possible to compare the social
cost benefit ratios for the smallest and youngest IOH clients surveyed in
1992 with the IOH results from 1977 to 1982 as measured by Kilby. This
comparison helps to explain some significant trends in the evolution of IOH
policy and practice from 1982 to 1992.
8.2 Measuring Benefits
Following the methodology applied by Kilby, a minimum, maximum, and
most likely range of economic benefits were estimated. These benefit
ranges are summarized in Table 8.1
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Minimum Case:
Step 1. Increase in direct value added
The increase in monthly value added was calculated from business
inception in 1988,1989 or 1990 to the survey at the end of 1992. It is
assumed that this value added increased uniformly throughout this period.
Following the Kilby model, no value added is extrapolated beyond the
survey date and it is essentially assumed that the business stopped at the
end of 1992. Based on the survey, it is estimated that the IOH clients
generated 2,078,1 SO lempira of direct value added.
Step 2. Reduce direct value added by the opportunity cost of labour
The opportunity cost of labour was calculated for all labour inputs, as
follows:
* Owner: shadow wage of 2 lempira per hour based on estimated hours
worked. (This choice of a shadow wage of 2 lempira per hour was
discussed in Section 6.1.)
* Paid labour: Actual wages paid during the survey. (This is very close to
the estimated shadow wage of 2 lempira per hour.)
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* Unpaid family labour: Shadow wage of 2 lempira per hour.
These calculations resulted in atotal deduction of 261,508 lempira for the
opportunity cost of labour.
Step 3. Training Benefits.
Training benefits were calculated at fifty percent of the wages paid to new
apprentices. From survey question 22, it is not possible to identify which
of the paid employees are new apprentices. Using the same assumptions
as Kilby, it is assumed that twenty five percent of the paid labourers were
new apprentices and the training benefit is applied to their wages. This
results in_anestimated training benefit of 14,040 lempira.
Maximum Case
Step 1. Increase in direct value added
Calculated in the same manner as the minimum case-2,078,1 50 lempira.
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Step 2. Deduct the opportunity cost of the owner's labour
Only the owner's labour is assumed to have an opportunity cost of labour.
This is calculated at the informal sector shadow wage of 2 lempira per hour
times the number of hours worked by the owner (question 20 of the
survey). The total opportunity cost of the owner's labour is 149,188
lempira. In the maximum benefit case, Kilby assumes that there is
substantial excess labour available in the economy and there is no
opportunity cost for paid or unpaid labourers other than the owner.
This assumption seems reasonable in the Honduran context, where there
was substantial unemployment and underemployment.
The economic context of Honduras from 1989 to 1992 was discussed in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Step 3. Training Benefit
Training benefit is calculated in the same manner as the minimum case in
the amount of 14,040 lempira.
Step 4. Distribution Weight Benefit
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An amount equal to fifty percent of paid wages is assumed by Kilby to be
an income distribution weighting benefit. From the survey data, this results
in a benefit of 56,160 lempira. Distribution weight benefits are included
due the high levels of unemployment and underemployment that were
present and the social benefit of having fewer idle people.
Step 5. Final Demand Linkage
Final demand linkage benefits are assumed to equal twenty percent of the
increase in direct value added less interest paid. Kilby assumed this was
the percentage of increased income that would be spent by consumers.
Based on the surveys conducted, a 20 percent net margin is a reasonable
average. This amounts to 406,196 using the IDH survey data.
Step 6. Net Backward Linkage
This represents the net backward linkage benefit for firms who produce
the various intermediate inputs purchased by the firms surveyed. Kilby
assumes that the net backward linkage is seventy percent of purchased
inputs, except for retail activities for which no net backward linkage is
assumed. It is assumed that purchases grow uniformly over the time
period of the survey. In applying these measurements to the IDH clients
surveyed, the net backward linkage is 1,743,280 lempira.
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Step 7. Consumer Benefits
There is no measurable evidence of consumer benefits due to increased
competition or production efficiencies. This is because IDH lends to a wide
variety of activities and there is no concentration in particular sectors or
products which would produce any economies of scale or other
competition effects which might benefit consumers. No consumer benefits
were estimated in Kilby's previous analysis of IDH.
Step 8. Diversion Benefits
This is the economic benefit obtained from diverting loans to other
business or family activities which produce higher returns than the stated
purposes set out in the loan documents. In the Kilby model, the loan
diversion benefit is assumed to be ten percent of amounts lent. Kilby
acknowledges that clients will not honestly answer questions about loan
diversion and, therefore, it is necessary to use an arbitrary estimate. In
applying this convention to the IDH survey, the ten percent loan diversion
benefit amounts to 19,000 lempira.
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Most Likely Case
Step 1. Increase in direct value added
The increase in direct value added is the same as in the minimum and
maximum cases as calculated from the IOH survey data. This is 2,078,150
lempira.
Step 2. Reduce direct value added by the opportunity cost of labour
To replicate Kilby's model, it is assumed that the opportunity cost of
labour is one hundred percent of the owners' labour and fifty percent of
other paid and unpaid labour calculated at the shadow wage. This results in
a total opportunity cost of labour of 205,348 lempira which is the mid-
point between the minimum and maximum case estimates. Based on the
situation in Honduras, this seems to be a reasonable estimate.
Step 3. Training Benefit
Training benefits are calculated in the same manner as the minimum and
maximum case estimates of 14,040 lempira.
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Step 4. Distribution Weight Benefits
Step 5. Final Demand Linkage
Step 6. Net Backward Linkage
Step 8. Diversion Benefits
In replicating Kilby's most likely case estimates, all these benefits are
assumed to be fifty percent of the benefits calculated in the maximum
case. Kilby explains that these mid point estimates were chosen arbitrarily
due to the lack of survey information about these benefits. However,
sensitivity analysis in Section 8.5 indicates that variations in these benefit
estimates did not significantly change the cost benefit ratios.
Step 7. Consumer Benefits
No consumer benefits are estimated for reasons discussed under the
maximum case estimate.
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8.3 Use of Control Group
As indicated in Section 3.4, Kilby did not make use of a control group in
calculating economic benefits. Although acknowledging the desirability of
control groups in social cost benefit analysis, control groups were not a
practical option because Kilby was limited to the use of previously
completed survey data. He concluded:
... a final word about the future use of this type of methodology for estimating
benefits. Where one is not limited to reanalysis of completed survey data, it is
possible to improve the reliability of benefit measurements by entering additional
items into the survey instrument and by conducting interviews with non-assisted
firms (Kilby 1985:14).
As discussed in Section 5.1.4, a matching control group was planned as
part of the research design. Therefore, it is possible to expand the model
of social cost benefit analysis used by Kilby to determine net incremental
economic benefits. This is done by subtracting the economic benefits
generated by the matching control group of non-assisted firms from the
economic benefits generated by the IOH loan clients. The net incremental
benefits generated by the IOH loan recipients relative to the control group
provides a better measurement of the economic impact of loans to the
smallest and youngest firms. The resultant net incremental benefit helps to
better answer the question of what would have happened if these loans
had not been made.
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The net incremental economic benefits are calculated in Table 8.1. The
economic benefits of the 46 control group firms were calculated in exactly
the same manner as for the 46 IDH clients as discussed in Section 8.2.
This was done by developing a range of minimum, maximum, and most
likely benefit measurements for the control group. Table 8.1 is derived by
subtracting the most likely case economic benefits for the control group
from the most likely case benefits calculated for the IDH clients.
Table 8.1: Range of Estimated Economic Benefits- IDH Clients
(In Lempira)
Minimum Most Likel):: Maximum
Value Added 2,078,150 2,078,150 2,078,150
Opportunity Cost of Labour -261,508 -205,348 -149,188
Training Benefit 14,040 14,040 14,040
Distribution Weight ° 28,080 56,160Final Demand Linkage ° 203,098 406,196Backward Linkage ° 871,640 1,743,280Diversion Benefit ° 9,500 19,000Control Group:
-Value Added - 1,421,350 - 1,421,350 - 1,421,350
- Opportunity Cost
of Labour 300,560 234,000 167,440
-Training Benefit -16,640 -16,640 -16,640
-Distribution Weight ° -33,280 -66,560-Final Demand Linkage ° - 142,135 -284,270-Backward Linkage ° -785,715 -1,571,430Total Net Benefits 693,252 834,040 974,828
Source: Computed from IDH Survey Data
The most likely case estimate of net benefits of 834,040 lempira is very
close to the mid-point between maximum case and minimum case
estimates of 833,000 lempira. Based on the information available in the.
. .
survey, this mid-point estimate seems reasonable.
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8.4 Measuring Costs
Costs are classified as administrative costs, bad debts, and capital erosion
in the same manner as the Kilby model.
With respect to administrative costs, most of the cost for a specific loan is
incurred in the year the loan is disbursed. This includes the evaluation of
risk due to both client moral hazard and business factors. Since the IOH
loans have relatively short terms ranging from six to twenty four months,
very little cost would be incurred after the year of loan disbursement. For
purposes of measuring the costs of the loans disbursed to the 46 clients in
the IOH~urvey, it is reasonable to apply a standard convention in which all
administrative costs incurred in a specific year relate only to loans
disbursed in that year. In using this convention, the total administrative
costs incurred in 1989 and 1990 for the 46 loans disbursed to the IOH
clients surveyed were 32,154 lempira; the calculations are set out in Table
8.2.
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Table 8.2: Administrative Costs for IDH Loans Disbursed in 1989 and 1990
(In Lempira)
1989 1990
1. Total Administration Costs 416,000 508,000
(excludes bad debts)
2. Total Number of Loans 675 637
Disbursed
3. Average Cost per Loan Disbursed 616.30 797.49
(Line 1 .;-Line 2)
4. Number of Clients in Survey 25 21
5. Estimated Administrative Costs -Clients in 15,407 16,747
Survey (Line 3 x Line 4)
Source: Computed from IOHAnnual Reports for 1989 and 1990
For bad debts, 43 of the 46 loans included in the IDH survey had been paid
in full when the survey was completed at the end of 1992. Three loans
were delinquent-survey numbers 19, 42, and 43. The loan for survey 19
had been written off in the amount of 4,000 lempira. The outcome of the
loans for surveys 42 and 43 were not yet de~erminable and IOHexpected
to collect a portion of these loans. The assumption used in the Kilby model
is that 50 per cent of these loans will become bad debts. Applying this
assumption to the IOH survey data, the bad debt calculation is set out in
Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3: IDH Bad Debt Costs (In Lempira)
Loan Number Principle Amount Estimated Write off Estimated Bad Debt
% Cost
19 4,000 . 100 4,000
32 3,500 50 1,750
43 5,000 50 2,500
8,250
Source: Computed from IDH Survey Data
With respect to capital erosion costs, these were estimated to be a total
of 60,572 lempira as calculated in Table 8.4. These calculations were done
in a similar manner to the Kilby model using a monthly capital erosion index
times the amount of loans outstanding at the end of each month. The
capital erosion index is defined as:
1-( 1/1 + inflation rate)
Kilby used annual inflation rates in his calculations ,of capital erosion costs.
During Kilby's study period, 1977 to 1982, annual inflation ranged from six
per cent to twelve per cent and the average annual inflation rate was
approximately nine per cent. IDH loans had an average maturity of two
years during this period and an average interest rate of twelve per cent.
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The calculations of capital erosion shown in Table 8.4 are done on a
monthly basis using indicated monthly inflation rates. These are the
monthly changes in the Consumer Price Index-Urban as published by the
ILO (ILO 1993). The Consumer Price Index for urban consumers was used
because most of the IDH clients live in urban areas. The monthly inflation
rate was used to calculate a monthly capital erosion index which was
applied to the actual principle balance of loans outstanding at the end of
each month. Due to the variability of monthly inflation in Honduras
between 1989 and 1992, a monthly approach to calculating capital
erosion provided more accurate measurements than annual calculations.
During most of the 1980s, Honduran inflation averaged about eight to nine
per cent per year. As a result, IDH charged average interest rates of 17
per cent per year through 1989. However, as discussed in Section 4.1,
Honduran inflation rates increased dramatically in 1990 and 1991 to 23
per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. This increased inflation resulted
primarily from a significant devaluation of the Honduran lempira to correct
for its perceived overvaluation. The currency .devaluation was intended to
increase Honduran exports as part of an IMF structural adjustment
programme. By early 1992, inflation had subsided, falling to nine per cent
in 1992 and eight per cent in 1993.
However, the sudden increase in inflation in 1990 and 1991 caused
considerable capital erosion in the'IDH portfolio. The loans disbursed in
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1989 at a 17 per cent interest rate had average maturities of about 18
months. Most of the capital erosion cost in Table 8.4 is applicable to the
loans disbursed in 1989. By the first quarter of 1990, IOHwas well aware
that inflation had increased and that effective interest rates had to be
adjusted to protect the portfolio from capital erosion. The board of IOH
decided to increase annual interest rates from 17 per cent to 24 per cent.
They also shortened loan terms from 18 months to 12 months. These
actions reduced the negative impact of capital erosion for loans disbursed
in 1990.
The significance of capital erosion for IOH during the period from 1989 to
1992 is apparent in Table 8.5 which compares the percentage composition
of costs as calculated in this survey with the relative cost measurements
done by Kilby for the period from 1977 to 1982. Capital erosion
represents 60 per cent of total economic costs from 1989 to 1992
compared with only 32 per cent of costs as calculated by Kilby from 1977
to 1982.
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Table 8.4: IDH Capital Erosion Costs, 1989 to 1992 (In Lempira)
Loans .Loans .Loans Inflation Capital Capital
Month PaidOut Received Outstanding Rate Erosion Index Erosion
Jan-89 2000 0 2000 0.00988875 0.00979192 19.5838433
............Eet:l:~~ 800Q~0. . 1QOOQ. Q,Q1J6?]~JO·Q1J4~4?~ lJ4,.~4?~?~,
11500 0 21500 0.0030248 0.00301568 64.8371532.. '" " , , '" "" ".,' .,' " ..o 0 21500 0.00482509 0.00480192 103.241297
o 0 215000.00780312 0.0077427166.468136
o 0 21500 0.01131626 0.01118963 240.57715
J§~QQ .....Q.. .. ~~QQQ ,Q·OJZQZ~~? ..Q,OJ§]~?J.~§~~·JQQZ~~
25500 0 63500 0.00694847 0.00690052 438.182864
4000 0 67500 0.00632547 0.00628571 424.285714
12500 0 80000 0.016 0.01574803 1259.84252
7500 0 87500 0.00787402 0.0078125 683.59375
"J 2500, .... .. 0 1000QQ ..Q,QO~~~O}§ .0,QO~54~}~~54,9}~~5?
8738 2000 106738 0.02108768 0.02065217 2204.37174
o 5000 101738 0.03043478 0.02953586 3004.91983
Mar-90 3000 8500 96238 0.01002110.00992167954.841775
Apr~9Q 5500 0 ,. 101738 Q.0402Q888 0,0386§4§2 .~~3?,§4~57
,.,..."MClY:~O 0 .3QQQ ....~.8738 Q,Ol}0~22J 0,OJ2~~4Q4 1?7?,J44]
Jun-90 17000 0 115738 0.02329039 0.02276029 2634.23051
Jul-90 10500 12000 114238 0.03196126 0.03097137 3538.10793
Aug-90 4000 4500 113738 0.01548569 0.01524954 1734.45194
$ep~~O 3~QQ 20QO ,JJ~?~~ Q,QJ4~?~}? .Q,OJ4JnOJ J§?],~QTQ§
Oct-90 8700 4500 1194380.05375854 0.0510166093.24859
Nov-90' 8000 12500 114938 0.03285776 0.03181247 3656.46212
Dec-90: 21000 2000 133938 0.02888238 0.0280716 3759.85435
Jan-91' 0 2500 131438 0.04109032 0.03946854 5187.66628
Feb-91 ..Q ..... J,,1000 ...1.?04 38 Q,O~~J§~~~ .0,O}3~7~0~ 40~ J,§9J?,8
Mar-91 0 10000 110438 0.01321253 0.01304024 1440.13785
Apr-91 0 8000 102438 0.03278689 0.03174603 3252
May-91 0 0 102438 0.01154401 0.01141227 1169.04993
Jun-91 0 5500 96938 0.01783167 0.01751927 1698.28311
..........JLlJ:~J 0 ...~?'QO ..... ....~~4 3~ 0,01611]73 ..0,QJ?'~§?O?J40?,~0!:)§§
Aug-91 0 0 884380.012413790.012261581084.38965
,Sep-91 0 0 88438 -0.0040872 -0.004104 -362.94665
Oct-91 0 18700 69738 0.00991792 0.00982052 684.863529
Nov-91 ...Q~QOO 61738 O·OO~12T33 Q,008Q6J~J4~7.?1~~S2
.QJ~00042738 0,OQ?3S136 ..0,OO?H?~4 10Q·?~§70?
o 7500 35238 0.0016756 0.0016728 58.9461358
o 4000 31238 0.01104048 0.01091992 341.116479
o 8738 22500 0.00231635 0.00231099 51.9973589
o . .....Q.....?250Q ....Q,OJ02}440,OJ0130Z? ..??].~411]§
o 0 22500 0.00392157 0.00390625 87.890625
o 5000 17500 0.00065104 0.00065062 1l.3858165
o 0 17500 0.00553025 0.00549984 96.2471692
o 0 17500 0.00194112 0.00193736 33.9037778
Q01]500 0.0009§8§~Q.oOQ~§n4J§,!:)~~4~~ 9
o 0 17500 0.00419355 0.00417604 73.0806296
o 0 17500 0.01188564 0.01174603 205.555556
o 17500 00.008888890.00881057 0
.IQTALCAPIIALERQSIQN 60572,~OQ2
Mar-89'
Apr-89
May-89
Jun-89
Jul-89.............. - ", ' ".".' .
Aug-B9
Sep-89
Oct-89
Nov-89
..[)E!c:~139
Jan-90
Feb-90
..........PE!c:!:)J
Jan-92
Feb-92
Mar-92
.......APT:!:)?
M,ay-92
Jun-92
Jul-92
Aug-92
.$ep:!:)?
Oct-92
Nov-92
Dec-92
Source: Computed from IDH Survey Data
lLD, Bulletin of Labour Statistics, 1993
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Table 8.5: Comparison of IOHCost Components, 1977 to 1982 and 1989
to 1992 . 1989-1992 1989-1992 1977-1982
Cost in lempira percentage percentage
Kilby *
Administration Costs 32,154 32 57
Bad Debts 8,250 8 11
Capital Erosion 60,572 60 32
Total Costs 100,976 100 100
Source: Computed from IOHSurvey information.
* Kilby (1985:61 )
The significance of estimated capital erosion is also evident in comparing
capital erosion costs as a percentage of amounts lent. For the loans to the
smallest and youngest clients from 1989 to 1992, capital erosion
represents approximately 32 per cent of amounts lent. Based on the Kilby
measurements, capital erosion is only 19 per cent of amounts lent.
8.5 Summary of Results
Table 8.6 provides the cost benefit ratios for the impact of IOH loans to
the smallest and youngest firms from 1989 to 1992.
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Table 8.6: Summary of IDH Cost Benefit Ratios, 1989 to 1992
(In Lempira)
Minimum Most Likel): Maximum
Direct Value Added . 2,078,150 2,078,150 2,078,15C
Control: -Value Added - 1,421,350 -1,421,350 -1,421,350
Direct Valued Added 656800 656800 65680C
Opportunity Cost of Labour -261,508 -205,348 -149,188
Control - Opportunity Cost
of Labour 300560 234000 167.44C
Net Value Added 695852 685452 675.44C
Training Benefit 14,040 14,040 14,04C
Distribution Weight 0 28,080 56,160
Final Demand Linkage 0 203,098 406,196
Backward Linkage 0 871,640 1,743,280
Diversion Benefit 0 9,500 19,000
Control:
-Training Benefit -16,640 -16,640 -16,640
-Distribution Weight 0 -33,280 -66,560
-Final Demand Linkage 0 -142,135 -284,270
-Backward Linkage 0 - 785,715 -1,571,430
Total Benefits 693252 834040 974828
Economic Costs 100976 100976 100976
Ratios:
Direct Value Added 6.505 6.505 6.505
Net Value Added 6.891 6.788 6.685
Total Benefits 6.866 8.260 9.654
Source.. Com uted from IDH Surve Datap y
Benefits and social cost benefit ratios are calculated for direct value
added, net value added, and the total benefits. Net value added is
calculated by substracting the opportunity cost of labour from direct value
added. The net incremental benefits are calculated by a deduction of
control group benefits. As can be seen the cost benefit ratios all exceed
one. The impact of credit provision exceeds and therefore justifies its
costs. Sensitivity analysis shows that even in the minimum case scenario
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the cost benefit ratio is substantially greater than one. The cost benefit
ratios estimated here also potentially allow for comparison with other
types of development initiatives.
It is also of interest to assess the importance of the inclusion of the
control group. Table 8.7 shows the benefits generated by IOHclients
without a deduction for the matching control group (left column) and for
the net incremental benefits after deducting for the economic benefits
generated by the matching control group of non-assisted firms (right
column). In both cases, benefits are most likely case estimates.
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Table 8.7: Comparison of IOH Cost Benefit Ratios with and without a
Control Group (In Lempira)
Direct Value Added
Less Opportunity Cost
of Labour
Net Val ue Added
Training Benefit
Distribution Weight
External Economies
Final demand linkage
Backward linkage
Consumer benefit
Diversion Benefit
Total Benefits
Economic Costs
Ratios:
Direct Value Added
Net Value Added
Total Benefits
2,078,150
-205,348
656,800
28,672
IDH Client Net Incremental Benefits of IDH Clients
Survey * in excess of Control Group **
1,872,802 685,472
14,040 -2,600
28,080 -5,200
203,098 60,963
871,640 85,925
0 0
9,500 9,500
2,999,160 834,040
100,976 100,976
20.581 6.505
18.547 6.788
29.702 8.260
Source: Computed from IOHSurvey information
* IOHclient benefits are from Table 8.1, column 3 most likely case
estimates.
** Net incremental benefits after deduction of control group benefits are
from Table 8.5, column 3 most likely case estimates.
There are clearly significant differences in cost benefit ratios when the
control group data is applied. The net cost benefit ratios generated by the
IOH clients after deduction for the control group are about 30 per cent of
the gross cost benefit ratios generated by the IOH clients. Conversely, the
control group of non-assisted firms generated about 70 per cent of the
economic benefits generated by the IOH loan recipients. The incremental
difference in economic benefits attributable to the IOH loan is not more
than about 30 per cent. The differences show clearly the need for a
control group and that failure to use a control group can lead to significant
over-estimation of cost benefit ratios.
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Using a comparative framework similar to Kilby's comparison across
countries, it is possible to compare the cost benefit ratios from Table 8.6
as determined from the 1992 survey with the ratios calculated by Kilby for
IOH from the 1977 to 1982 survey data. This is done by expressing the
economic costs as 100 per cent and the various benefit components as a
percentage of total costs. This comparison is provided in Table 8.8 based
on most likely case benefit estimates.
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Table 8.8: Comparison of IOHCost Benefit Ratios (Benefit components
expressed as a percentage of total costs)
IDH Client Net Incremental Kilby- IDH Clients
Survey Benefits of IDH from 1977 to 1982*
Clients in Excess of
Control Grou
Direct Value Added 2,058.1 650.5 144.6
Less Opportunity Cost -203.4 28.4 -111.0
of Labour
Net Val ue Added 1,854.7 678.8 33.6
Training Benefit 13.9 -2.6 3.6
Distribution Weight 27.8 -5.1 9.7
External Economies
Final demand linkage 201.1 60.4 29.0
Backward linkage 863.2 85.1 31.9
Consumer benefit 0 0 0
Diversion Benefit 9.4 9.4 16.7
Total Benefits 2,970.2 826.0 124.5
Economic Costs 100 100 100
Ratios:
Direct Value Added 20.581 6.505 1.446
Net Val ue Added 18.547 6.788 .336
Total Benefits 29.702 8.260 1.245
Source: Computed from IOH survey information
* From Kilby (1985: 109)
Can-meaningful conclusions be drawn by comparing cost benefit ratios as
measured for the IOH loans to the smallest and youngest clients from
1989 to 1992 with the IOH cost benefit ratios determined by Kilby for
197"1 to 19827 The most significant comparison seems to be the large
relative increase in the ratios of direct value added and net value added
after deducting the opportunity cost of labour. Without deducting the
control group's net benefits, these ratios are 20.6 and 18.6 for 1989 to
1992 and only 1.5 and .34 for 1977 to 1982. This comparison indicates a
14-fold increase in the direct value added ratio and 54-fold increase in the
net value added ratio. To understand these differences, it is necessary to
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examine the evolution of IOH during the 1980s. This narrative begins in
Chapter 5 on IOH in Kilby "Searching for Benefits" and it is based on
background information provided by IOH. The primary information available
to Kilby was a 1983 impact evaluation of IOH done by Peter H. Frazer and
Bruce A. Trippet (Frazer and Trippet 1983). This document notes that IOH
made 161 loans from 1977 to 1982. Frazer and Trippet selected 69 of
these clients for a survey which was done in 1983. These surveys form the
basis for the benefit measurements done by Kilby. The results of these 69
studies are extrapolated to encompass all of the loans made by IOH from
1977 to 1982.
In comparing the Frazer and Trippet evaluation from 1977 to 1982 with
the information available for 1989 to 1992, it is clear that the IOH target
clients chanqed dramatically. Relative loan sizes were intentionally reduced.
This resulted in attracting smaller enterprises and poorer clients. Frazer
and Trippet noted in 1982 that the average IOH client employed 5.5
people including the owner(s). Only 13 per cent of the clients were solely
owner operated. There were no start-up enterprises and only 19 per cent
of the clients were women. They also noted that IOH did not make any
loans to retail vendors during this period. Most of the IOH clients were not
members of the lowest half of the economic strata and roughly one third
of the clients were deemed to be bankable. They compared the IOH client
profile with a larger nationwide survey done in 1979 (Stallman and Pease
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1979) and concluded that the IDH "clients were at the top end of the
micro-enterprise sector." Stallman and Pease (1 979) calculated that the
average micro-enterprise in Honduras employed 2.2 people including the
owner(s).
Interviews with IDH board members and executives indicate that IDH
changed its strategy during the mid- 1980s. They reduced loan sizes to
expand their outreach to more clients. They also increased their focus on
poorer target clients, women, and start-up enterprises. In addition, they
also increased the proportion of loans to informal sector retail vendors
which tended to be among the poorer segments of the population. During
1989 and 1990, IDH made a total of 1,323 loans amounting to 5.6 million
lempira. Table 8.9 compares the client profile information determined by
Frazer and Trippet from 1977 to 1982 with the general client profile for all
loans disbursed in 1989 and 1990 and with the profile of the 46 clients
surveyed in 1992 which were deemed to be the "smallest and youngest."
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Table 8.9: Comparison of IOHClient Profiles' 977 to 1992
All loans All loans 1992 Survey of
disbursed 1977- disbursed "Smallest and
1982(a) 1989+1990(b) Youngest Firms"
(c)
Number of Loans 161 1,323 46
Avg. loan size (d) 13,893 4,240 4,130
Avg. employees 5.50 2.61 1.52
% women 19 48 59
% Retail vendors 0 10 12
% Sole Owner Operator 9 40 61
% Start-ups 0 8 72
Pre-loan avg. monthly 1,372 845 672
income (d)
Sources: (a) Frazer and Trippet, 1983
(b) IOHAnnual Reports for 1989 and 1990
Cc) IOHClient Survey
Cd)Adjusted to , 989 lempira value
Due to the decline in average loan size during the 1980s, IOH had to
become more efficient in disbursing and collecting its loans. Management
was under pressure to improve its cost recovery ratios which are defined
as the per-centage of administrative costs and loan losses being covered by
income earned from clients. As a result, it was critical for IOH to reduce its
average administrative cost per loan. This is evident from the comparison
in Table 8. "0.
256
Table 8.10: Comparison of IOHAverage Administrative Costs 1977 to
, 992 (1989 Constant Lempira)
Number of Loans Disbursed
Amount Disbursed
Total Administration Costs (*)
Cost per Loan
Cost per Lempira Lent
Average Loan Size
161
2,236,773
727,220
4,517
0.33
13,893
1,323
5,609,000
924,000
698
0.16
4,240
All Loans Disbursed
1977-1982 (a)
All Loans Disbursed
1989+1990 (b)
Sources: (a) Frazer and Trippet, 1983
(b) IOHAnnual Reports for 1989 and 1990
* Excluding bad debts.
It is reasonable to conclude that a significant portion of the increase in the
ratios of direct value added benefits and net value added benefits to costs
(Table 8.8) is due to the reduction in unit administrative costs as shown in
Table 8.10. Real costs per loan disbursed were reduced by almost 85 per
cent from 4,517 lempira to 698 lempira per loan. Even with a reduction of
almost 70 per cent in the real average loan size, the unit cost per lempira
lent was reduced by over 50 per cent from 0.33 to 0.16. This was an
important lesson learnt by IOH and one that has been learnt by most
successful micro-finance institutions. Management of IOH attributed the
improved administrative efficiency between the early 1980s and early
1990s to increased confidence in their loan methodology and better
knowledge of their market. As a result, loan approval times were reduced
due to less processing and analysis and the caseload per staff member
more than tripled.
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The pressure to reduce unit administrative costs results from the need to
be financially sustainable. The focus on sustainablity is often imposed upon
micro-finance institutions by donors. Although often criticized by
practitioners, the focus on financial sustainability has become
institutionalized as an industry best practice which has forced micro-
finance institutions to develop financial disciplines and operational
efficiencies which lower unit administrative costs. It is clear that lower unit
administrative costs directly contribute to increases in social cost benefit
ratios.
It is also evident that a focus on smaller loans made to smaller and
younger firms leads to higher ratios of direct value added and net value
added benefits in relation to the economic costs incurred. This is clear in
Kilby's work in "Searching for Benefits." The comparative benefit statistics
in Table 31 (page 109) indicate that the two programmes in the
Dominican Republic (DDF-M and DDF-S) were the only institutions which
produced net value added benefits in excess of costs. It is noted that
these two programmes had the lowest average loan sizes. Also, the IDH
.impact evaluation done by Frazer and Trippet (Frazer and Trippet 1983)
notes that the smaller loans surveyed from 1977 to 1982 appeared to
produce more relative sales growth and a lower job cost per dollar lent
than the larger loans.
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As evidenced by the change in IOH client profiles during the 1980s (Table
8.9), IOH clearly changed its strategy to focus on smaller loans to smaller
and younger firms. The IOH board and management believed that smaller
loans would have more relative economic and social impact. Although they
were trying to reach poorer people, they were also trying to reach higher
rates of sustainability via higher relative interest rates. The strategic
change to smaller loans is a significant factor underlying the increased
ratios of direct value added and net value added benefits in relation to
costs as shown in Table 8.8. IOH has continued to apply this strategy
throughout the 1990s. According to the IOHAnnual Report for 2000, the
average loan size for 2000 is about 60% per cent lower (adjusted for
inflation) than the average loan size in 1989 and 1990.
Alth~ugh the changes in comparative cost benefit ratios for direct value
added and net value added after deducting for the opportunity cost of
labour are the most notable, other conclusions resulting from the
comparative benefit ratios are:
1. The change to smaller and younger firms did not increase relative bad
debt ratios. Actual bad debts from 1977 to 1982 were seven per cent of
loans disbursed by IOH. For loans to the smallest and youngest firms from
1989 to 1992, actual bad debts were only four per cent of loans
disbursed.
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2. As indicated in Section 5.3.5, business closure rates for the smallest
and youngest IOH clients were relatively high at 26 per cent. Twelve of the
46 firms surveyed had ceased trading by the end of 1992 when the survey
was conducted. This is higher than the 13 per cent closure rate for firms
to which loans were disbursed by IOH from 1977 to 1982. Nonetheless, .
despite higher closure rates, bad debt ratios were actually lower. Most of
the smallest and youngest firms which had closed managed to repay their
loans.
3. The smallest and youngest firms surveyed for 1989 to 1992 did not
produce much paid employment for others. This is noted and discussed in
Section 6.3. As a result, the benefit estimates for training benefits and
distribution benefits are relatively smaller than the larger firms surveyed
for 1977 to 1982.
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8.6 Critique of Methodology
The methodology of applying social cost benefit analysis to micro-finance
institutions as developed by Kilby is valuable in comparing different
institutions, programme strategies and groups of target clients. It could be
useful to donors in comparing the relative impacts of programmes in the
same country and across countries. As discussed in Section 8.5, this
methodology is also helpful in evaluating the evolution of a micro-finance
institution over time. Comparing the changes in cost benefit ratios and the
various sub components for IOH from 1977 to 1982 and from 1989 to
1992 provided insight into the impact of the strategic change to smaller
loans made to smaller, younger and poorer clients.
However, as discussed in Section 8.3 and 8.5, benefit levels may be
greatly overstated without the use of control groups to measure net
incremental impact. Although time consuming, the method used for
identifying a matching control group as applied in Section 5.1.4 was
relatively simple and cost effective. The control group was made part of
the research design in manner intended to enhance the accuracy of the
social cost benefit estimates. This approach to control groups could make
social cost benefit analysis a more useful tool in the evolution of the
micro-finance research. This successful application of a control group
261
contributes to overcoming a significant limitation of social cost benefit
analysis as discussed by Kilby.
However, Kilby also noted thata control group might tend to
underestimate the net benefits of loans to micro-enterprises. The primary
reason for this concern is that "loan recipients may be diverting a portion
of their loan to nondesignated uses, perhaps with a higher value added
payoff, all of which goes unreported" (Kilby 1985:9). He also noted that
closed firms tend to be underrepresented in control groups which is further
discussed in Section 5.3.5. This tendency for closed firms to be under-
represented in control groups also understates the net incremental
benefits generated by loan recipients for which there is a more realistic
identification of closed firms.
These shortcomings in the use of control group measurements may be
considered limitations of this research methodology. However, these
limitations tend to reduce the net economic benefits estimated for loan
recipients and make the resulting social cost benefit ratios more
conservative: Despite these shortcomings, this approach seems to expand
the Kilby model and provides a more realistic measurement of net
economic benefits.
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Another criticism concerns the straight-line time convention used by Kilby
in estimating the growth of value added over time. This convention
assumes value added grows uniformly over time. This time convention was
also applied in this "research to replicate Kilby's methodology. However,
there is evidence that growth is not uniform over time. This is especially
true of the smallest and youngest firms (Liedholm and Mead 1991). As
discussed in Section 6.6, credit is an accelerator of business growth and
most growth happens near the time of loan disbursement when the new
capital is actually invested. Testing straight line vs. accelerator growth
models would require detailed longitudinal study with frequent
measurement points. This type of longitudinal study was beyond the
objectives of this research. Kilby's straight-line convention was simply
replicated. A similar concern relates to the assumption that there are no
-economic benefits after the survey date. Although it is difficult to estimate
future income to be generated by micro-enterprises, there is evidence that
many such firms continue to produce income for a long time. The
estimation of future value added benefits would also require more
extensive longitudinal study.
A further criticism concerns the reduction of direct value added by the
opportunity cost of labour. Even in Kilby's measurement of maximum
benefit levels, direct value added is reduced by the owner's opportunity
cost of labour using a theory of a "ladder of job step up" (Kilby 1985: 10).
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In the case of IOH, this approach seems appropriate for the type of clients
to which IOHwas making loans from' 977 to , 982. They were in an
economic position where they generally had alternative employment
opportunities. However, during', 989 and' 990, many of the smallest and
youngest clients to which IOHwas making loans had been unemployed.
There was significant excess labour in the both the urban and rural sectors.
Although the Kilby model was replicated in this research, the assumptions
used to measure the opportunity cost of labour must be questioned both
for IOH and other micro-finance institutions making loans to the poorest
sectors. The same question applies to the calculation of distribution weight
benefits. The Kilby model only assumes income distribution benefits for
wages paid to employees. No distribution benefits are assumed for the
owner. This raises the question of whether there might also be distribution
weight benefits generated by creating self-employment for the smallest
and poorest entrepreneurs? However, some of these limitations can be
overcome by sensitivity analysis carried out in computing the cost benefit
ratio by using varying asssumptions (minimum, maximum, most likely
cases) and various measures of benefits (direct value added, net value
. added, total benefits). In comparing these various cost benefit ratios, it
may be clear, as in Table 8.6, the appoximate range in which the ratios lie,
regardless of the particulars of the assumptions.
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CHAPTERNINE
SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Summary of Results on the Direct Impact of IDH Loans to the Smallest
and Youngest Micro-enterprises
Credit programmes to assist micro-enterprises can be usefully classified as
being involved in either enterprise formation, enterprise expansion, or
enterprise graduation (Martinez 1990). Most successful micro-finance
institutions have focused on credit for enterprise expansion. This market
for enterprise expansion credit permits outreach to a large number of
clients via short-term loans which are primarily for working capital. This is
perceived as the best way to build a financially sustainable micro-finance
institution because enterprise expansion loans minimize risk and maximize
profitability. Many micro-finance institutions perceive credit for enterprise
formation as too costly and/or too risky.
This study aimed to develop an understanding of the direct impact of
enterprise formation loans provided to the smallest and youngest micro-
enterprises. This was done by examining the direct impact of individual
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enterprise formation loans made by IOH in Honduras during the period from
1989 to 1992. A survey was done of 46 IOH clients who qualified as the
smallest and youngest firms based on pre-defined criteria. To make
reasonably reliable estimates of the direct impact of credit provided to
these firms, it was necessary to gather similar information for a matching
control group who did not have access to credit from a formal lending
institution. The control group was selected in a manner which ensured
identification of smallest and youngest firms similar to the IOH clients.
As discussed in Section 4.3, IOH provided other services that were
connected to its loans. These other services included formal training
courses, informal consulting by project officers, and networking with other
clients. These other services were related to IOH's holistic Christian view of
development. The motivation for a holistic Christian view of development is
discussed in Section 2.4. This study did not attempt to distinguish
between the effects of lending services and other non-lending services.
Various statistical analyses were done with the survey data for the IOH
.clients and the control group. The analyses included both personal
variables and enterprise variables. Based on baseline tests of the defined
variables described in Sections -5.2 and 5.3, there were no statistically
significant differences in the composition of the two groups with respect
to prior income, age,' years of experience, previously having owned a
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business, gender, religion, industry type or number of employees. The
groups did have a mean difference in years of education that was just
statistically significant, but was of relatively small absolute value. Access
to credit from IOHwas the most significant variable differentiating the two
groups. As documented in Chapter 6, statistical t tests of differences in
group means and differences in group proportions were done to analyze
differences in the two groups. The IOH clients had a higher mean level of
monthly value added than the control group. The difference was
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
As indicated in Table 6.3, the cumulative mean increase in real monthly
income adjusted for inflation was 39.4 percent for the IOH clients and 9.8
percent for the control group. Growth in the real level of income enabled
the IOH clients to improve their relative earnings in comparison with the
economy as a whole. The mean income of the IOH clients increased from
58 percent of the average monthly formal sector wage in 1989 to 93
percent of the average monthly formal sector wage in 1992. The IOH
clients also improved their position relative to the absolute poverty line.
Average mean income increased from 2.3 times the level of absolute
poverty in 1989 to 3.5 times the absolute poverty level in 1992.
These results confirm that credit provided to the smallest and youngest
firms had a positive direct impact on income and income growth.
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For purposes of this study, productivity was defined as value added per
hour worked by the enterprise owner. The statistical results indicate that
the IOH clients generated 9.23 'lempira of mean value added per hour
worked by the owner and the control group enterprises generated only
5.58 lempira of mean value added per hour. This difference in mean is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A model developed by
Liedholm and Mead Cl 987) which calculated the return per hour of family
labour was replicated for the IOH clients and the control group. The mean
return per hour of family labour was 3.95 lempira for the IOH clients and.
1.4 1 lempira for the control group. These differences show a direct
positive association between access to credit by the smallest and
youngest firms and their level of productivity.
Although the smallest and youngest clients were able to use credit to
increase income and productivity, Section 6.4 concludes that there is no
evidence that credit led to the creation of paid employment. Table 6.5
shows that both the IOHclients and the control group had a net reduction
.in the mean number of paid employees from business inception until the
survey at the end of 1992. The decline was higher for the control group,
however. The decline in paid employees within the IOH group is contrary to
intentions when the IOH loan applications were completed. At that time,
the mean level of expected new paid jobs was 0.76 per enterprise. The
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increased use of unpaid family labour is the most likely reason for the
decline in the mean number of paid employees for both the IDH clients and
the control group.
The inconsistency between the pre-loan hiring plans of the IDH clients and
the actual decline in the number of paid employees can be partially
explained by the economic environment encountered by micro-enterprises
in Honduras during this period. The number of micro-enterprises was
growing faster than the market for their goods and services. This was
confirmed in a study of the micro-enterprise sector in March 1990 and
March 1991 (Nathan 1991). This study did not find any increase in
average employment per micro-enterprise. However, it noted a large
increase in the number of micro-enterprises in the specific markets
surveyed. To maintain total family income levels in this environment, it
seems that many micro-enterprises substituted unpaid family labour for
hired workers to whom cash wages would have to be paid.
As indicated in Section 6.5, this study used the poverty gap model and the
impact possibility frontier developed by Hulme and Mosley (1996) to
analyze whether the IOH enterprise formation loans had an impact in
reducing poverty. Due to the relatively large loan sizes, the poorest
potential clients who are not able to accept the risk tended to be
excluded, The IOH enterprise formation loans examined in this study
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averaged 160 percent of GOPper capita in Honduras. This is quite high
compared with micro-enterprise programmes that try to attract poorer
borrowers with initial loan sizes that are less than 50 percent of GOPper
capita. As a result of the relatively large fixed loan sizes used by IOH, only
28 percent of the clients had incomes below the poverty line at the time
of the loan. Nevertheless, the formation of the enterprises enabled by the
loan was relatively successful in reducing poverty. Of the 13 clients who
had incomes at or below the poverty line, 12 had incomes above the
poverty line by the time the survey was completed.
Hulme and Mosley Cl 996) propose one approach whereby lending
programmes can close the poverty gap: where entrepreneurs face an
upwardly sloping impact possibility frontier, a high proportion of total
clients who have incomes below the poverty line are needed to achieve
substantial poverty reduction. Income growth from the first loan may be
minimal and multiple loan cycles with increasingly larger loan sizes are
needed to move clients above the poverty line. However, for the IOH
clients in this study, the impact possibility frontier was not upwardly
. sloping .. Consequently, a single enterprise formation loan was capable of
moving entrepreneurs from below to above the poverty line. Although the
degree of poverty reduction could, of course, be improved by increasing
the proportion of poor to whom enterprise formation loans are given, the
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results here suggest that credit provision can be useful in achieving some
degree of poverty reduction.
In Section 6.6, the lOH enterprise formation loans are discussed in relation
to the 'protectional' vs. 'promotional' classification developed by Oreze
and Sen (1997) and the 'capital widening' vs. 'capital deepening'
classification developed by Hulme and Mosley (1996). The IOH loans were
clearly intended for 'promotional' objectives of enterprise development,
asset acquisition, and income growth. As a result, these loans were not
designed for 'protectional' purposes as needed to attract the poorest
potential clients who cannot absorb the risk of larger promotional loans.
The IOH loans were clearly used for 'capital widening' since they expanded
the stock of capital being applied with existing technology and there was
no evidence of new technology. The capital widening model (Hulme and
Mosley 1996) reasons that these loans are not able to produce continuous
long term growth because new technology is not used to increase
productivity. Even if these loans were not able-to produce continuous
growth, the IOH enterprise formation loans had a direct impact as an
accelerator of growth for the smallest and youngest enterprise studied.
Multiple linear regression analysis was applied in Chapter 7 to determine if
any other pre-defined enterprise or personal variables were more
significant than access to credit in explaining growth in value added or
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confounded the relationship between access to credit and value added.
Using an iterative process, thirteen variables were tested. The loan from
IOHwas one of only two variables that had a consistently high association
with value added growth. This 'confirmed the results of Chapter 6. The
other significant variable was prior ownership of a different business which
is discussed in Section 9.2.
However, does the impact of credit provided to the smallest and youngest
firms justify the costs? This was tested in Chapter 8 via social cost benefit
analysis. A model of social cost benefit analysis developed by Kilby (1985)
was replicated and expanded. A social cost benefit analysis was done for
the 46 IOH loans for the period from 1989 to 1992 in this study and the
results were compared with the results derived by Kilby in a social cost
benefit anaJysis of IOH for the period from 1977 to 1982. This comparison
(Table 8.8) shows the effect of IOH's change in strategy during the 1980s
in which they tried to make a larger number of smaller loans to smaller,
younger and poorer clients. The cost benefit ratios for direct value added
increases and net value added (after deduction for the opportunity cost
of labour) increased by factors of 14 times and 55 times, respectively, in
comparison with the Kilby study. The total cost benefit ratio increased
from 1.245 in the Kilby study to' 29.702 for the smallest and youngest
firms surveyed from 1989 to 1992. This confirms other research that the
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smallest and youngest enterprises have higher rates of growth than older
and more mature firms (Simon and Bonni 1958, Bates 1989).
Whilst 26 percent of the smallest and youngest firms surveyed had ceased
operation by the end of 1992, the Kilby study of IOH clients from 1977 to
1982 found that only 13 percent had closed. Notwithstanding the higher
closure rates, the bad debt ratio for the smallest and youngest IOH clients
in the 1992 survey was less than the IOH bad debt ratio during the period
from 1977 to 1982 when loans were made to relatively larger firms.
The social cost benefit comparison also showed the significance of reduced
administrative expenditures. Adjusted for inflation, IOHadministrative
expenditures per loan were reduced by 85 percent during the 1980s. The
unit cost per lempira lent was reduced by over 50 percent. The improved
administrative efficiency as measured by administrative costs per lempira
lent is a significant factor in the overall improvement in the social cost
benefit ratios.
Management of IOH attributed the improved administrative efficiency
between the early 1980s and early 1990s to increased confidence in their
loan methodology and better knowledge of their market. As a result, loan
approval times were reduced due to less processing and analysis and the
caseload per staff member more than tripled.
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9.2 Summary of Results on the Role of Personal and Enterprise Variables
Due to the limited empirical research available on the role of personal and
enterprise variables in the growth and dynamics of the smallest and
youngest firms, multiple linear regression analysis was applied to determine
if any personal or enterprise variables were associated with growth in value
added. As discussed in Chapter 7, thirteen personal and enterprise
variables were defined and tested for the IDH clients and the control
group. This included nine personal variables and four enterprise variables.
Four of these variables are linear and nine are dummy classification
variables. Only two variables were consistently significantly associated with
value added growth at the 5 percent level. These variables were access to
credit from IDH and whether the person had previously owned another
business. Nine members of the control group and eight IDH clients
indicated in the survey that they had owned another business prior to
starting the one for which the survey was conducted. Ownership of a prior
,business was negatively associated with value added. Those who
previously owned another business had less value added growth than the
other smallest and youngest micro-enterprises. This confirms other
research (Bates 1989) which indicates that management failures or
personal' shortcomings which resulted inthe closure of the prior business
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are likely to be repeated. Also, starting multiple income producing
activities may be attributed to efforts to diversify household income
sources. While this kind of household income diversification strategy may
increase security of poor households, none of the individual business
activities is able to develop very far as a result of divided capital and
effort.
9.3 Concluding Remarks on Research Methodology
Section 3.2 discussed some of the problems encountered by researchers
conducting ex-post facto field research on micro-enterprises. This study
was designed to overcome or minimize as many of these problems as
possible. In particular, this study makes an original contribution in micro-
enterprise research methodology by using a matching control group of
smallest and youngest firms. Chapter 5 describes the research design and
selection of the control group. The control group survey information was
critical to all the statistical tests and conclusions discussed in Chapters 6,
. 7, and 8. Without control group information, it would not be possible to
determine if access to credit had a direct impact on the growth of the
smallest and youngest firms. Also, the results of applying social cost
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benefit analysis in Chapter 8 are more meaningful and accurate with
control group information. The use of the control group is a significant
expansion of Kilby's model (Kilby 1985). This leads to the conclusion that
social cost benefit analysis of micro-enterprise assistance will tend to
significantly overstate economic benefits if control group information is
not utilized. The risk of overstatement without the use of control groups is
especially true in a macro-economic environment where total demand is
growing. As indicated in Section 4.2, it is also applicable in the early stages
of an economic downturn such as Honduras was experiencing in 1991 -
1992. The implications of using control groups during prolonged or severe
economic downturns are not clear and, as suggested in Section 9.4 below,
more research may be needed regarding the impact of micro-finance
during periods of economic decline.
Section 5.1.4 explained that the procedure used in selecting a matching
control group of the smallest and youngest firms who did not have access
to credit from a formal lender was slow and time consuming. However, the
statistical results obtained indicate that the collection of matching control
. group information was a necessary and worthwhile research investment.
Rather than dismissing control group information as too costly and difficult
to collect, it is important that micro-enterprise researchers and
practitioners develop simple ways of obtaining control group information in
impact research and-evaluation.
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Notwithstanding the general importance of using control groups in micro-
enterprise research, as discussed in Section 3.2.3, there are limitations
which must be considered. These include the tendency of control group
participants to be less open and honest than client research subjects
(Kilby 1985, Kobb 1997). The control group participants have not had a
prior relationship with the micro-finance institution and they will not have
the same level of trust as clients. Also, there is a risk of self-selection
sample censoring (Kobb 1997) if control group members decided not to
work with the micro-finance institution or if they had been rejected by the
micro-finance institution'.
These limitations tend to understate control group results and, therefore,
they overstate the net incremental client impact. These limitations may be
offset by two other limiting factors typically encountered in using control
groups, which tend to the opposite direction and have the effect of
understating net client impact. These are the tendency to understate the
increase in client income resulting from loan diversion, as mentioned by
Kilby (1985) and the tendency to have an under-representation of closed
firms in door to door control group selection as discussed in Section 5.1.4.
I This risk did not exist in the control group selected for this survey. None of the control group participants
was familiar with or had any prior relationship with IDH.
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Another conclusion regarding research methodology relates to the
selection and estimation of monthly value added as the primary measure of
enterprise income. All micro-enterprise field research has been inhibited by
the lack of financial records and the tendency to commingle business and
personal funds (Boomgard 1991, Kilby 1985, Liedholm and Mead 1991).
Therefore, researchers have to rely on the owners' memory and estimation
as the primary sources of financial information. Based on the experience of
this study, value added seems to be a good measure of income for which
information can be reasonably gathered. Estimation of value added starts
with sales turnover. This can be estimated based on the owner's recall of
the number of units or quantity of goods sold in a typical time period, such
as a month. Recall of sales turnover tends to be more accurate than recall
of other income measurements (Liedholm and Mead 1991). Also, subjects
have less motivation to lie about sales turnover than about net income
measurements that may have income tax implications. For most types of
micro-enterprises, it is fairly simple for both research subjects and
researchers 'to estimate the cost of purchased inputs to be deducted from
sales turnover in computing value added. Value added is also the measure
of national income benefits used in theoretical models of social cost
benefit analysis. For these reasons, it is usually not necessary or
constructive to use more refined measures of enterprise net income than
value added as used in this study.
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9.4 Further Research Issues
As indicated in Section 1.2, there is a general lack of empirical research on
the impact of extending credit to micro-enterprises, especially with regard
to the impact of enterprise formation loans to the smallest and youngest
micro-enterprises. The lack of research may be partially attributable to
what Rogaly calls "micro-finance evangelism" (Rogaly 1996). Micro-
finance evangelism assumes that the poor immediately benefit from credit
and that the only important issues are broader outreach to more poor
people and the sustainablity/profitability of micro-finance institutions. This
view is based on a minimalist model of micro-finance as discussed in
Section 2.3.2. A minimalist approach is justified on the basis of client
demand and it presumes there must be a positive economic impact from
loans at the interest rates being charged or the poor would not borrow
from micro-finance institutions. Adherents to a minimalist model and to
"mitro-finance evangelism" have discredited traditional impact assessment
which measures changes in income or well being (Rogaly 1996). However,
there are several academics who argue that micro-finance cannot be
assumed to reduce poverty just because institutions achieve high levels of
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outreach or almost perfect repayment rates (Copestake 1995, Rogaly
1996).
This study aimed to contribute 'original empirical research on the direct
impact of credit provided to the smallest and youngest micro-enterprises.
A control group was used to provide statistical validity and rigour and to
contribute a reasonably simple and replicable method to improve micro-
enterprise impact research. A primary conclusion with respect to further
research is simply a call for micro-finance practitioners, donors, policy
makers and researchers to undertake more empirical research on the
impact of loans and other micro-finance services. Nothing has really
changed since Kilby's conclusion in 1985 that "micro-finance schemes
have the potential to be among the most effective of all types of
development programs and foreign aid expenditures" (Kilby 1985: 1).
Despite increasing levels of expenditure being committed to micro-finance
over the past thirty years, there has not been enough empirical impact
research to determine the overall effectiveness of micro-finance. Social
cost benefit models need to be developed and expanded to help
practitioners understand the impact of micro-finance on their clients and
to "facilitate comparisons between different micro-finance institutions,
different methodologies, and different target populations. If meaningful
impact data can be obtained, managers of micro-finance will be better able
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to design and alter products and services to better meet the needs of
clients. Also, meaningful impact comparisons between different
institutions, different methodologies and different target populations will
help policy makers, -donors, and practitioners to better allocate resources
to improve the overall effectiveness of micro-finance.
Based on the review of micro-finance impact research in Chapter 3, it is
clear that there are no common standards or generally accepted practices
in micro-finance impact assessment. There is a need for the micro-finance
industry to agree on a common set of standards and guidelines for impact
assessment. Whilst the AIMS project sponsored by USAID has provided a
major contribution towards documenting various practices that are used in
micro-finance impact assessment, further research and policy debate is
needed to develop a generally accepted set of best practices in impact
assessment.
Most impact assessments are done by the implementing micro-finance
institution or a sponsoring agency. There is usually a strong bias in favour
of documenting a positive impact to justify the project expenditure or
investment made. Published impact assessments rarely have any
independent review or verification. Combined with the lack of any generally
accepted standards regarding the measurement of impact, the lack of
independent verification calls into question the meaningfulness of most
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impact assessment. As suggested by Cheston and Reed Cl 998), further
research is needed to determine if the micro-finance industry should use
independent reviewers to 'audit' impact assessments.
A specific area for further social cost benefit research is to compare the
impact of enterprise formation loans with enterprise expansion loans.
Although this study concluded that enterprise formation loans to the
smallest and youngest firms had a positive social cost benefit ratio, further
research is needed to make meaningful comparisons with other types of
loans. Since most micro-finance institutions concentrate on making small
short-term working capital loans to existing enterprises, it is necessary to
compare the impact of enterprise expansion loans with enterprise
formation loans which are perceived as beinq inherently more risky and
more expensive, Such a comparison might be helpful in encouraging micro-
finance institutions to alter policies towards a higher proportion of
enterprise formation loans.
Similar impact comparisons between individual and group lending
.rnethodoloqies would also be useful. The focus on large outreach results in
group methodologies being most prevalent because they can reach more
people. However, there is concern that group methods treat all clients as
homogeneous and standardized group procedures limit client potential
(Copestake 1996, Montgomery 1995). Standardized and inflexible group
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loan policies are a common explanation for high drop out rates in many
group micro-loan schemes. Individual loan schemes are considered to be
more tailored to client needs (Churchill 1999). Social cost benefit analysis
comparing individual and group loans could shed more light on this issue.
Based on some recent impact evaluations, there is concern that the less
poor the borrower, the greater the increase in income from a micro-
enterprise loan (Gamser 2000, Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Some of the
poorest borrowers become worse off as a result of micro-enterprise credit
(Hulme and Mosley 1996, Montgomery 1995). The impact of credit on the
poorest borrowers should also be tested in a statistically rigorous manner
using the tools of social cost benefit analysis. As discussed in Section 7.2,
income level prior to the loan did not have a statistically meaningful effect
on p~rformance after the loan; however, the IOH client group from 1989 to
1992 was not an especially poor population.
Further research should also be done to refine the application of social
cost benefit analysis to the study of micro-finance impact. This would
involve further study and testing on several of the key assumptions used
in the Kilby model (Kilby 1985).
1.' Conduct more frequent longitudinal study of how and when micro-
enterprises grow in relation to the investment of capital. (This information
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could refine the straight-line growth convention used by Kilby and
replicated in this study);
2. Refine assumptions about external economies based on empirical
research related to actual final demand linkages and net forward linkages;
3. Refine assumptions and approaches to estimating and weighting for the
opportunity cost of labour, training benefits, and distribution of income
benefits. This will require further research on how micro-finance affects the
poorest segments of the population.
As indicated in Section 7.4, the study of personal variables did not try to
measure internal variables such as attitudes, energy level, values or
motivations. Such internal variables may be significant factors in predicting
entrepreneurial success and enterprise growth. Further research is needed
to measure the impact of internal variables on micro-entrepreneurs and to
determine if there are positive associations between specific internal
variables and enterprise growth.
Both Leidholm and Mead (1991) and Boomgard (1992) indicate there has
been very little research on the closure of micro-enterprises. Although this
study included some information on business closure as discussed in
Section 5.3.5, this is-an area where further research is also needed. Such
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research might lead to a better understanding of the negative association
discovered in this study between a micro-entrepreneur having owned a
previous business and the growth of their new enterprise.
Being restricted to one country, this study did not attempt to examine the
impact of different economic, social, political, policy or institutional
environments on the growth and success of micro-enterprises. These areas
require further research to determine if there are particular environments
or policies that are most conducive to the success of micro-enterprises
and especially to their potential impact in reducing poverty.
As discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, this study was conducted during the
early stages of a relatively mild economic downturn. While overall demand
was ~Iowing, it appeared that demand for micro-enterprise goods and
services was reasonably stable. There is a need for further research to
determine the impact of micro-finance services during periods of severe or
prolonged economic decline. If total demand is falling, does support for
specific micro-enterprises simply come at the expense of all other non-
assisted micro-enterprises and, therefore, there is no net overall benefit to
the economy or society (Hulme 2000)7
Finally, as noted in Section 5.1.1, this study did not attempt to distinguish
between the impact of lending and' non-lending services. IOH, in addition to
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providing credit, also provides a range of non-lending services that are
seen as part of its holistic Christian approach. These services include
training on management and business topics, spiritual and pastoral
guidance, leadership training and values formation. Consequently, the
impact analysis conducted in this study was a test of the joint
effectiveness of both these types of services. Further research could
usefully examine the relative impact of these lending and non-lending
services. A rigorous quantitative study on the impact of non-lending
services would be useful in enabling micro-finance institutions to determine
how to best allocate resources. Resource limitations and the need for
financial sustainability are often given as reasons that micro-finance
institutions cannot afford to undertake non-lending transformational
services. Action research could be undertaken to examine different models
of transferrinq some of the costs of providing non-lending holistic
transformation services to clients or other groups such as churches or
philanthropists ..
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Annex I: Survey Document
(English Translation of Spanish Survey Document)
December 1992
HONDURASMICROENTERPRISESURVEY Survey Number _
Date _
Interviewer _
Introduction:
Section A will determine if the business qualifies for the survey. If the business qualifies
for the survey after completing Section A, complete sections B, C, D, E and F for all
businesses in the survey. If the business is not still operating, complete Section G for
closed businesses.
Objectives:
The purpose of this survey is to obtain information about small enterprises in Honduras
and their impact on the economy. A primary measure of impact will be the jobs created
by these small enterprises. The survey will also gather information about the problems
experienced by small enterprises. The survey is focused on the smallest and newest
enterprises and the problems they face. As a result, the survey is only for enterprises
which were started after January 1, 1988 and which were started with no more than one
employee in addition to the owner. The survey will include enterprises that are still
operating and enterprises that have been closed.
A. Qualification Data:
1. Have you ever owned a business? Yes / No
2a. Did you start a business between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1990? Yes/No
2b. If yes to Question 2a, when did you start this business? Month Year _
Note A: If the answer to Question 2a is no, the business does not qualify for the survey.
We are only interested in businesses that were started after January 1, 1988 and before
December 31, 1990.
3. Is the business identified in Question 2 still operating? Yes / No
4a. Did you have any paid employees when you started this business? Yes / No
4b. If yes to Question 4a, how many paid employees did you have when you started this
business? _
Note B: If the' answer to Question 4b is more than one paid employee at the start of the
business, it does not qualify for the survey.
Conclusion: Please 'check here ' if the business qualifies for the survey and
, complete the survey. All questions relate to the business identified in Question 2.
B. Proprietor Data
Sa. Name of Proprietor: _
b. Business Name: _
c. Business Address: ~ --------_-
d. City ITown: _;; _
6. Gender: Male I Female
7. Date of Birth: _
8. Education Level: _
Indicate highest level. Codes: 1) No schooling 2)Attended primary school-not completed
3) Completed primary school 4) Attended secondary school-not
completed S)Completed secondary 6)Attended university-not
completed 7)Competed university 8) Other _
9. Religion: _
Codes: 1) Catholic 2) Evangelical 3) None 4) Other _
1O. What did you do before starting this business? _
Codes: 1) Owned another business 2) Employee is another business 3) Unemployed
4) Student %) Other _
11. What was your average monthly income prior to starting this business? _
12. For how many years were you employed in this type of business or industry before
you started this business? _
13a. Are you paid employees of another business that you do not own? Yes I No
b. Do you own another business besides the one identified in Question 2? Yes I No
c. If yes to 13b, how many other businesses do you own? _
14 a. Have you ever had any training for your business activities? Yes I No
b. If yes to 14a,
Source of Training Type or Topic Amount of Time
C. Primary Business Data
15. Type of Business: _
16. Primary Business Code: _
Codes: 1) Clothing 2) Carpentry 3) Metals 4) Baking 5) Mechanics 6) Shoes
7) Blocks and Tiles 8) Pottery 9) vendor 10) Agriculture 11) Services
12) Other _
17a. Does your business have a high and a low season? Yes / No
b. If yes, when are these seasons and how much do you operate this business during
these seasons?
Months Hours / Day
High Season
Low Season
Normal Season
d. If no, how many hours per day do you usually operate this business? _
18. What was the principal source of money used to start this business?
Codes: 1) Used no money 2) Gifts 3) Loans from family of friends
4) Formal credit institutions 5) Moneylender 6) Your own savings
7) Other (please specify) _
19a. Have you ever received loans for this business? Yes / No
b. If yes to Question 19a,
Sources Dates Amounts Used for
C. Employment Data (As of the survey date if the business is still operating. As of the
closing date if the business is closed.)
20. How many hours per week do you usually work in this business?
21. Do you usually have employees working in this business? Yes / No
22. If yes to Question 21, please complete the following table.
Employee Type-code M/F Date Hired Average Average When hired If employed
Hours/ Wages/ 1. Employed when hired,
Week Week 2. Unemployed old wage
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
, o.
, 1 .
12.
'3.
14.
'5.
16.
Codes:
'l , FT Paid Non-Family
2. FT Paid Family
3. FT Unpaid Family
4. FT Apprentice
5. FT Seasonal
6. FT Unpaid Non-Family
7. PT Paid Non-Family
8. PT Paid Family
9. PT Unpaid Family
10. PT Apprentice
11. PT Seasonal
12. PT Unpaid Non-Family
E. Other Questions
23. Who are your major competitors? _
Codes: 1) None 2) Small Firms Nearby 3) Large Firms Nearby
4) Firms elsewhere 5) Public Enterprises 6) Other _
24a. Have you ever experienced problems or barriers to the growth of this business?
Yes / No
b. If yes to Question 24 a, list two major barriers or problems at the following times:
Now: First _
Second _
When you started this business:
FirsL _
Second _
Codes: 1) Lack of working capital 2) Problems with location of facilities
3) Lack of market knowledge 4) Problems with raw materials 5) Problems with
production quality 6) Economy-recession 7) Economic situation-inflation
8) Problems with employees 9) Transportation problems 10) Lack of equipment
11) Other _
25. In your opinion, how have the following changes since you started this business?
a. The overall demand for products like yours? _
b. The number of businesses like yours in your locality? _
c. The volume of your own business? _
Codes: 1) Much increase 2) Little increase 3) No change 4) Little decrease
5) Much decrease 6) Do not know
26a If you could overcome some of the growth barriers and your business was able to
grow, would you add employees? Yes / No
b. If yes to 26a, what would be the ideal number of full-time paid employees? _
F. Financial Data
27. Business Records
a. Is there a formal set of books foe the business-general ledger? Yes I No
b. If no to 27a, are there records for the following:
1) Sales- YIN 2) Expenses- YIN 3) Inventory- YIN
4) Payroll- YIN 5) Purchases- YIN
c. Are any records kept on computer? YIN
28. Working Capital
a. Does the business have any of the following: 1) Accounts Receivable- YIN
2) Accounts Payable- YIN 3) Inventory- YIN
b. If yes to any items in 28a, do they have detailed records?
1) Accounts Receivable- YIN 2) Accounts Payable- YIN 3) Inventory-YIN
29. Management Information-Does the owner have management information available to
determine the following:
1. Monthly sales data?
2. Monthly profit or loss?
3. Payments for owner salary?
4. Sales comparison to prior year? Yes I No
Yes I No
Yes I No
Yes I No
30. Cash management
a. Does the business have any accounts with banks? Yes I No
b. Does the owner keep business and personal funds separate? Yes I No
31. Legal
a. Is the business incorporated? Yes I No
b. Is the business registered? Yes I No
c. Does the business pay any social taxes? Yes I No
32. Financial Data: When answering each question below, indicate whether it is
A) Actual data E) Estimated data N) No data
(If the business is still operating, the data should be for 1992. If the business is not
operating, the data should be provided for the last year in which the business was
operating.) .
AIEIN
a. Average monthly sales?
b. Purchases as a % of sales?
c. Average monthly profit (loss)?
d. Average monthly salary to owner?
e. Ratio of income in ( d) to total family income?
G. Closed Business Data
33. When did you close this business? ( Month/Year)
34. List the three main reasons why this business was closed?
First :.... _
Second _
Third _
35. What have you done since this business was closed? _
Codes: 1) Started another business 2) Employee in another business
3) Unemployed 4) Retired 5) Other _
Signature ( Interviewee)
Signature ( Interviewer)
File Review Data for IDH Clients in Survey
Survey Number _
Number of Loans Received _
File Data For Each Loan 2 3
Date of Loan
Amount of Loan
Term of Loan
Interest Rate
Fees
Guarantees? YIN
Collateral? What
Current Status-codes below
Employees at time of loan
Employment created-per file
Loan Status Codes
1) Paid in full
2) Payment current on amount outstanding
3) Payments in arrears on outstanding portion-should be collectible from business
4) Payments in arrears on outstanding portion-collect via legal process
5) Payments in arrears-not collectible
Annex II: statistical Analyses- t-tests of Differences in Group Means and
Group proportions and Other statistical Tests
All T-tests do not assume equal variances between groups and therefore use the Satterthwaite test
statistic. A pooled variance test-statistic in all cases gave very comparable p-values.
T-test for Mean Differences
The TTEST Procedure
Variable !DH Mean Std Dev OF t Value Pr > ItI
Priorlncome 0 5.2174 4.7745
Priorlncome 1 6.7174 7.2714
Priorlncome Diff (1-2) -1.5 6.151 77.7 -1.17 0.2458
AgeC 0 35.717 10.751
AgeC 1 33.63 9.8237
AgeC Diff (1-2) 2.087 10.298 89.3 0.97 0.3337
Education 0 9.087 4.555
Education 1 10.913 4.0157
Education Diff (1-2) -1. 826 4.2938 88.6 -2.04 0.0444
YearsExperience 0 6.6957 6.3486
YearsExperience 1 5.2826 5.624
YearsExperience Diff (1-2) 1.413 5.9973 88.7 1.13 0.2615
Employees 0 0.6957 0.7563
Employees 1 0.587 0.8049
Employees Diff (1-2) 0.1087 0.781 89.7 0.67 0.5062
FinalEmployees 0 0.5217 0.7223
FinalEmployees 0.5435 0.7805
FinalEmployees Diff (1-2) -0.022 0.752 89.5 -0.14 0.8900
PlannedEmployees 0 2.0435 4.2214
PlannedEmployees 2.7174 2.094
PlannedEmployees Diff (1-2) -0.674 3.3321 65.9 -0.97 0.3356
Revenue 0 38.891 48.319
Revenue 1 48.609 36.497
Revenue Diff (1-2) -9.717 42.818 83.7 -1.09 0.2795
ValueAdded 0 15.13 18.624
ValueAdded 1 22.609 16.297
ValueAdded Diff (1-2) -7.478 17.499 88.4 -2.05 0.0434
HoursPerWeek 0 70 22.371
HoursPerWeek 1 62.37 16.623
HoursPerWeek Diff (1-2) 7.6304 19.708 83.1 1.86 0.0669
VAPerHour 0 0.2426 0.3142
VAPerHour 1 0.4013 0.3455
VAPerHour Diff (1-2) -0.159 0.3303 89.2 ~2.30 0.0235
EmployeeChange 0 -0.174 0.6767
EmployeeChange -0.043 0.6978
EmployeeChange Diff (1-2) -0.13 0.6874 89.9 -0.91 0.3652
T-tests for Proportions
The FREQ Procedure
OWnedaBusiness
01 11--+--------+--------+
cl 361 10121.74%
I I I--+--------+--------+
I I 38 I 8 I
I I I 17.39%1--------+--------+
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 0.2763 0.5992
Sex (Male)
01 11--+--------+--------+
C I 26 I 20 I 43.48%
I I I--+--------+--------+
I I 27 I 19 I
I I I 41.30%1--------+--------+
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 0.0445 0.8329
T-test for Percentage Income Increase Above vs. Below Poverty Line
The TTEST Procedure
Variable Poverty Mean Std Dev DF t Value Pr > ItI
PercentIncrease 0 2.604 3.238
PercentIncrease 1 17.333 15.022
PercentIncrease Diff (1-2) -14.729 8.317 12.0 -3.503 0.0044
Correlation Betwee~ Loan Size and Prior Income
The CORR Procedure
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N
0.00264
46 Prob> Irf under HO: Rho=O
0.9861
Annex III: Statistical Analyses- Multiple Linear Regression Analyses
Backwards Selection Model 1
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
13 5409.70427 416.13110 1.38 0.1858
78 23437 300.47090
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE 17.33410 R-Square 0.1875
Dependent Mean 18.86957 Adj R-Sq 0.0521
Coeff Var 91.86272
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > JtJ
Intercept 1 12.04334 12.02786 1.00 0.3198
IDH 1 3.87294 3.95043 0.98 0.3299
Employees 1 3.16129 2.74966 1.15 0.2538
Sex 1 1.44124 3.91426 0.37 0.7137
Age30 1 0.44374 5.85496 0.08 0.9398
Age3045 1 1.89489 5.18032 0.37 0.7155
Education 1 0.04627 0.53871 0.09 0.9318
Catholic 1 8.27469 6.53370 1.27 0.2091
Protestant 1 9.23252 6.73103 1.37 0.1741
OwnedaBusiness 1 -9.37250 5.51260 -1.70 0.0931
Priorlncome 1 0.64453 0.35599 1.81 0.0741
YearsExperience 1 -0.53823 0.33648 -1. 60 0.1137
Manufacturing 1 2.48190 5.08372 0.49 0.6268
HoursPerWeek 1 -0.09533 0.09586 -0.99 0.3231
The GLM Procedure
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Age
Religion
2
2
57.9063239
586.9569561
28.9531620
293.4784781
0.10
0.98
0.9082
0.3811
Source
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Backwards Selection Model 2: Education Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
variable
Intercept
IDB
Employees
Sex
Age30
Age3045
Catholic
Protestant
OWnedaBusiness
PriorIncome
YearsExperience
Manufacturing
BoursPerWeek
Source
Age
Religion
DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Analysis of Variance
DF
Sum of
Squares
12
79
91
5407.48801
23439
28846
17.22485
18.86957
91.28378
Parameter Estimates
Parameter
Estimate
12.43106
3.89805
3.15445
1.40519
0.54786
1.96295
8.35312
9.27061
-9.58257
0.65623
-0.53797
2.42851
-0.09619
The GLM Procedure
DF Type III SS
2
2
59.338226
599.092260
Mean
Square
450.62400
296.69553
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
Standard
Error
11. 07820
3.91477
2.73119
3.86716
5.69198
5.08709
6.42879
6.67407
4.90909
0.32681
0.33434
5.01377
0.09474
Mean Square
29.669113
299.546130
F Value
0.1875
0.0640
t Value
1.12
1.00
1.15
0.36
0.10
0.39
1.30
1.39
-1. 95
2.01
-1. 61
0.48
-1.02
1.52
F Value
Pr > F
0.1350
Pr > It I
0.2652
0.3224
0.2516
0.7173
0.9236
0.7006
0.1976
0.1687
0.0545
0.0481
0.1116
0.6295
0.3130
Pr > F
0.10
1.01
0.9050
0.3690
Source
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Backwards Selection Model 3: Age Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
Variable
Intercept
IDH
Employees
Sex
Catholic
Protestant
OwnedaBusiness
PriorIncome
YearsExperience
Manufacturing
HoursPerWeek
Source
Religion
DF
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Analysis of Variance
DF
Sum of
Squares
10
81
91
5348.14979
23498
28846
17.03239
18.86957
90.26381
Parameter Estimates
Parameter
Estimate
13.67645
3.93818
3.08070
1.24314
8.01832
8.99011
-9.93001
0.67688
-0.53767
2.34665
-0.09340
The GLM Procedure
DF Type III SS
2 569.416695
Mean
Square
534.81498
290.10228
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
Standard
Error
9.65854
3.84789
2.69425
3.80266
6.31342
6.53580
4.65812
0.31963
0.31759
4.94683
0.09329
Mean Square
284.708348
F Value
0.1854
0.0848
t Value
1.42
1.02
1.14
0.33
1.27
1.38
-2.13
2.12
-1. 69
0.47
-1. 00
1.84
F Value
Pr > F
0.0658
Pr > It I
0.1606
0.3091
0.2562
0.7446
0.2077
0.1728
0.0361
0.0373
0.0943
0.6365
0.3197
Pr > F
0.98 0.3792
Backwards Selection Model 4: Sex Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
9 5317.14576 590.79397 2.06 0.0428
82 . 23529 286.94255
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
16.93938
18.86957
89.77090
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
0.1843
0.0948
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 14.20694 9.46926 1.50 0.1374
IDB 1 3.87791 3.82248 1.01 0.3133
Employees 1 3.27980 2.61017 1.26 0.2125
Catholic 1 8.09789 6.27428 1.29 0.2005
Protestant 1 8.94915 6.49891 1.38 0.1723
OwnedaBusiness 1 -9.96217 4.63165 -2.15 0.0344
Priorlncome 1 0.68468 0.31699 2.16 0.0337
YearsExperience 1 -0.53986 0.31579 -1.71 0.0911
Manufacturing 1 2.45831 4.90808 0.50 0.6178
BoursPerWeek 1 -0.09608 0.09242 -1. 04 0.3016
The GLM Procedure
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Religion 2 569.341792 284.670896 0.99 0.3752
Backwards Selection Model 5: Manufacturing Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 8 5245.15992 655.64499 2.31 0.0277
Error 83 23601 284.35271
Corrected Total 91 28846
Root MSE 16.86276 R-Square 0.1818
Dependent Mean 18.86957 Adj R-Sq 0.1030
Coeff Var 89.36486
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > I tl
Intercept 1 14.88204 9.33045 1.59 0.1145
IDB 1 3.99372 3.79822 1.05 0.2961
Employees 1 3.82696 2.35986 1.62 0.1087
Catholic 1 7.64085 6.17950 1.24 0.2198
Protestant 1 8.13201 6.26236 1.30 0.1977
OwnedaBusiness 1 -10.05859 4.60671 -2.18 0.0318
Priorlncome 1 0.67499 0.31497 2.14 0.0350
YearsExperience 1 -0.53762 0.31433 -1. 71 0.0909
BoursPerWeek 1 -0.09520 0.09199 -1. 03 0.3037
The GLM Procedure
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Religion 2 507.920844 253.960422 0.89 0.4133
Backwards Selection Model 6: Religion Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
6 4737.23907 789.53985 2.78 0.0161
85 . 24109 283.63760
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
16.84154
18.86957
89.25242
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
0.1642
0.1052
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 22.20314 7.54362 2.94 0.0042
IDB 1 5.00590 3.67659 1.36 0.1769
Employees 1 3.39972 2.32475 1.46 0.1473
OWnedaBusiness 1 -9.66092 4.58249 -2.11 0.0380
PriorIncome 1 0.62054 0.31161 1.99 0.0497
YearsExperience 1 -0.49518 0.31216 -1.59 0.1164
BoursPerWeek 1 -0.10371 0.09125 -1.14 0.2589
Backwards Selection Model 7: HoursPerweek Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 5 4370.87867 874.17573 3.07 0.0134
Error 86 24476 284.59949
Corrected Total 91 28846
Root MSE 16.87008 R-Square 0.1515
Dependent Mean 18.86957 Adj R-Sq 0.1022
Coeff Var 89.40363
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 14.68678 3.63480 4.04 0.0001
IDH 1 5.80347 3.61511 1.61 0.1121
Employees 1 3.49681 2.32712 1.50 0.1366
OwnedaBusiness 1 -10.21714 4.56400 -2.24 0.0278
PriorIncome 1 0.63807 0.31176 2.05 0.0437
YearsExperience 1 -0.46251 0.31136 -1. 49 0.1411
Backwards Selection Model 8: Years Experience Eliminated
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of variance
Sum of Mean
Source OF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 4 3742.88856 935.72214 3.24 0.0157
Error 87 . 25104 288.54651
Corrected Total 91 28846
Root MSE 16.98666 R-Square 0.1298
Dependent Mean 18.86957 Adj R-Sq 0.0897
Coeff Var 90.02145
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable OF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 12.27399 3.27416 3.75 0.0003
IDH 1 6.67555 3.59177 1.86 0.0665
Employees 1 3.46663 2.34311 1.48 0.1426
OwnedaBusiness 1 -9.92298 4.59121 -2.16 0.0334
PriorIncome 1 0.49873 0.29937 1.67 0.0993
/
Regression with IDR Excluded
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
3 2746.16981 915.38994 3.09 0.0313
88 26100 296.59392
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE 17.22190 R-Square 0.0952
Dependent Mean 18.86957 Adj R-Sq 0.0644
Coeff Var 91.26815
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 15.47243 2.82400 5.48 <.0001
OwnedaBusiness 1 -10.50025 4.64413 -2.26 0.0262
Employees 1 3.11338 2.36773 1.31 0.1920
Priorlncome 1 0.57896 0.30034 1.93 0.0571
Regression with Owned a Business Excluded
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
3 2395.02796 798.34265 2.66 0.0533
88 . 26451 300.58417
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
17.33736
18.86957
91.88004
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
0.0830
0.0518
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 11.13575 3.29824 3.38 O.OOll
IDH 1 7.20072 3.65753 1.97 0.0521
Employees 1 2.82132 2.37199 1.19 0.2375
PriorIncome 1 0.38947 0.30116 1.29 0.1993
Regression with Employees Excluded
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
3 3111.28413 1037.09471 3.55 0.0177
88 25735 292.44489
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
17.10102
18.86957
90.62753
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
0.1079
0.0774
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 14.17782 3.03096 4.68 <.0001
lOB 1 6.24450 3.60404 1.73 0.0867
OwnedaBusiness 1 -9.05740 4.58444 -1. 98 0.0513
Priorlncome 1 0.55998 0.29849 1.88 0.0640
Regression with Prior Income Excluded
The REG Procedure
Dependent Variable: ValueAdded
Analysis of Variance
Source
Sum of Mean
DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
3 2942.07046 980.69015 3.33 0.0231
88 . 25904 294.36778
91 28846
Model
Error
Corrected Total
Root MSE
Dependent Mean
Coeff Var
17.15715
18.86957
90.92499
R-Square
Adj R-Sq
0.1020
0.0714
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > ItI
Intercept 1 14.21974 3.08946 4.60 <.0001
IDH 1 7.53846 3.58990 2.10 0.0386
OWnedaBusiness 1 -8.63146 4.57071 -1. 89 0.0623
Employees 1 4.00645 2.34389 1.71 0.0909
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